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COOPERATION COUNCIL
OF THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
(GCC)
THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL
RIYADH

**THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
OF THE GCC
AN EXPERIMENT
IN UNIFICATION
(1981 - 1986)**

SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC

ABDULLA Y. BISHARA

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THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL

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CENTRE FOR ARAB GULF STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

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IN THE NAME OF ALLAH THE COMPASSIONATE THE MERCIFUL

INTRODUCTION

This volume is a collection of the speeches and interviews given in English by the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr. Abdulla Y. Bishara. Their subject is the Council itself in all its aspects. They were delivered between the beginning of January 1982 and the end of 1987, i.e., during the first five years of the existence of the GCC and they are therefore basic to a good understanding of this newest of experiments in Arab Unity.

In his capacity as the first and only Secretary General which the GCC has had, Mr. Bishara is eminently qualified to speak about this newest Middle Eastern political configuration. In these speeches, he deals variously with the hopes and fears of the GCC, its philosophy, its activities and its long-range policies. He also speaks of the dangers to which it has been exposed in the past and he forecasts some of the dangers which he expects the Council will have to face in the future. Prime among these dangers is the tragic prolongation of the bloody Iraq/Iran war along with the equally threatening danger of Israel. Mr. Bishara forcefully analyzes these dangers, not only in relation to the GCC but to the entire Arab world. He is particularly eloquent on the dangers posed by the perennial unsolved problem of Palestine, pointing out how the GCC has always been intimately concerned with this tragic dilemma since the beginning of its existence.

Mr. Bishara outlines the internal workings of the GCC and the relations between its member states. He also describes its external relations in great detail, both inter-Arab relations and with the world at large.

The Information Department of the GCC feels that readers of this booklet, and most particularly among them the historians, scholars, policy makers and diplomats, will gain a clearer understanding of the GCC, how it works and what

it stands for. When the reader puts this booklet down, he will be better informed as to what the GCC has actually accomplished in the first five years of its existence and what it hopes to accomplish in the next five years by way of making the States of the Arabian Gulf secure, stable and productive members of a peaceful world community.

The Information Department
of the Secretariat General

of the
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

1987

The President and Vice Secretary of Engineers, Technicians, Technicians and Technicians

in 1971. The Council was established in 1971 and with the aid of the

in 1987. The Gulf Cooperation Council was established

In the last year of the past few years, the Gulf Council has been able to overcome many of the problems which have arisen in the Gulf since the formation of the Council. The Council has been able to overcome many of the problems which have arisen in the Gulf since the formation of the Council. The Council has been able to overcome many of the problems which have arisen in the Gulf since the formation of the Council.

**SPEECH OF THE SECRETARY - GENERAL
OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
TO THE BAHRAIN ENGINEERS SOCIETY**

THURSDAY, 14th of JANUARY 1982

It is a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day. It is a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day. It is a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day.

However, it has been a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day. It has been a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day.

With the aid of the Council, it has been a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day. It has been a pleasure for me to be here today and to meet with you on this important day.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTEENTH SESSION

The President and the Secretary of Engineers, Excellencies, Distinguished Friends and Guests.

In 1971, Britain abrogated its treaties with the Gulf and withdrew from the Gulf.

In 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council was established.

In the time span of the past ten years, the Gulf passed from uncertainty to confidence. Years ago, in the western media and elsewhere, there were concerns and fears that the new independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates would not weather the storms looming large on the horizon, let alone survive as separate entities. There was nervousness as to whether Oman would be able to cope with the seemingly increasing tension and rebellion on its borders with Democratic Yemen. There was a competition among the great powers and Iran as to who would fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. All those fears, concerns, and worries about the future of the Gulf underscored how ignorant the world was of the Gulf and how much its political institutions as well as the resilience of its people were underestimated.

Not only has the Gulf passed the test and the hardship of uncertainty successfully, but it has proved to be as one of the most stable areas in the world, notwithstanding the turbulence which has characterized the Arab world in the past decade.

Moreover, it has proved to be one of the most consistent and predictable areas not only in the Arab world but in the world at large.

And on top of that, it was the area in which all decisions whether political or economic were taken from within and not from outside.

All Gulf decisions were truly Gulf, most of the time, or Arab, some of the time. And even the Arab-oriented decisions taken by the Gulf emanated from the deep conviction that there were Gulf interests inherent in such decisions.

Who on earth would imagine in the late sixties that the Gulf States, vulnerable as they were, would impose an oil embargo on the mightiest power as witnessed the case in the oil embargo against the United States in 1973 in the aftermath of the October War? And who on earth expected the Gulf States, vulnerable as they were, to oppose the Soviet Union on Afghanistan? And who on earth imagined the persistence of the Gulf States on the need to reform the world economic structure despite the pressure of the Western World to influence such persistence? And who on earth could foresee the role of the Gulf in the process of decolonization with the aggravations of the Africans in Zimbabwe, Angola, South Africa, and elsewhere?

And who on earth had the foresight to see that the tragic death of the late King Faisal would be taken by the Gulf in its stride as an act of fate with smooth transfer of power without disrupting the political institutions of the State concerned?

In sum, the stability of the Gulf which is derived from its political institutions is by far stronger than the world has realized. Why is that? What causes this strength? The answer is the uniqueness of the Gulf. It is unique in the absence of opposition. There is no unemployment in the Gulf, there are no secret cells that operate against the governments, there are no leaflets distributed clandestinely. There are no ideologically motivated groups that have designs on the governments. There is unique accessibility to the highest authority. There is the power of oneness that prevents alienation. There is a sense of belonging that provides the strength which the Gulf enjoys.

And what about the Gulf Cooperation Council?

Indeed there are problems in the Gulf. And the Gulf Cooperation Council emerged with the full conviction that no State in the Gulf can cope with these problems alone. The world expects from the Gulf States an assurance on the continual outflow of oil and the protection of navigation routes. This is an international demand that cannot be met by any State on its own.

A failure by the Gulf States to ensure the outflow of oil would produce incalculable risks without excluding direct military confrontation. The other serious longterm threat to the Gulf is the inflow of foreign immigrants who constitute in certain member States, the majority of the population. What is their future? What will happen to the second generation of these immigrants? Assimilation is impossible due to differences in race, culture, language, tradition and philosophy.

And the third challenge is how to preserve the true Gulf character and the assertion of its personality. In other words, how to protect the independence of an authentic Gulf decision which is not influenced by considerations apart from the interests of the Arabism of the Gulf.

The Gulf Cooperation Council came about in order to satisfy the aspirations and the expectations of the people of the Gulf who realize that the absence of a collective decision implies great power rivalry with adverse consequences to the national security of the Gulf States. The people wanted unity so as to be able to ward off the great powers rivalry in spheres of influence. They wanted an end to State individualism, and to be replaced by State-Collectivism.

They wanted stability based on collective endeavour so as to ensure the strength that controls any foreign-inspired attempt at sabotage.

The people of the Gulf who are outnumbered in their own countries feel that the burden and the price for economic and social progress can not be con-

fronted by a single state and that a well-coordinated effort is indispensable for the solution of this problem.

The Gulf Cooperation Council, no doubt, is the right answer to many of the concerns of the Gulf people.

It provides stability. It ensures a collective approach to all the problems of the Gulf.

It is an umbrella that generates protection and moreover it is a genuine Gulf dream for unity. It preserves the Gulf character and its independence and safeguards the Arabism of the Gulf.

In a nutshell, the Gulf Cooperation Council is a factor for stability, for Arabism, and for a policy of nonalignment.

But the Gulf Cooperation Council will not accomplish its purpose unless it is backed by a strong public opinion that creates dynamism and generates momentum that provides a driving force for cooperation and coordination. We need a public opinion that interrogates the nature of decisions taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council.

And we need a public opinion that accepts the cost and the price of collective effort. In any joint-effort there is no place for absolutism. Absolute sovereignty with absolute insistence on a certain viewpoint by any member state will damage the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose essence is the abdication of absolutism.

And here I pinpoint the role of public opinion in advocating the acceptance of concession for the individual for the sake of the whole. I think the future challenge to the Gulf Cooperation Council lies in how much the member states are willing to accommodate. On May 25, 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council saw the light of day.

In 6 months, we have succeeded in initiating a political philosophy that governs our activities and provides the guidelines for our work.

The Gulf Cooperation Council's philosophy is that it is a confederal structure whose aim is total unity. We move on the basis of this perception.

When the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council was signed, on that historic day, May 25, 1981, in the city of Abu Dhabi, that signing of the Charter was accompanied by the adoption by the Heads of State, of a working paper that laid down the basis for economic integration. There was also a concluding political declaration that defined the foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The most salient points of the economic and the political declarations were the emphasis on integration in all economic fields and on convergence in foreign policy. Immediately thereafter, the draft unifying economic agreement was initiated by Ministers of Finance and National Economy and later in the Second Summit of the Heads of State in Riyadh in November 1981, that agreement was signed. It will change the face of the Gulf by transforming it from separate markets and parochial concerns to a large single common market in which the Gulf nationals can move freely with full freedom of ownership of properties and with all the privileges accorded to the nationals of the receiving member state. This is not only a dramatic step but it is unprecedented in the history of the Gulf. Very shortly, the Ministers of Finance will meet in Riyadh to work out the details for the implementation of this agreement. It is a great achievement that meets the aspiration of the Gulf people.

But we also realized that economic progress cannot operate in a vacuum and that prosperity cannot be enjoyed unless there is political stability. We realized, furthermore, that the principles of non-alignment and the opposition to great power politics and to the establishment of military power that enshrines these principles and that our credibility on non-alignment could be

questioned if we do not establish military bases in the area cannot be observed scrupulously unless there is a military coordination with a view to obtaining a strong Gulf power. Without Gulf power, our protestations on non-alignment and on self-reliance become meaningless.

Hence, we held a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Member States in September 1981, and the Chiefs of Staff laid down the basis for military cooperation. Very soon the Ministers of Defence of the Gulf Cooperation Council will meet in Riyadh to consider the ways and means of implementing the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff.

In the Field of security, the Ministers of Interior of the Gulf Cooperation Council will meet to consider proposals tabled by the Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat on Cooperation on Security Affairs. We read the writing on the wall and borrowed more than one leaf from the book that might have caused a bloodbath in Bahrain. And we cannot indulge in complacency over our security.

We have plans to increase communication in the Gulf in order to make it one inseparable unit. We have plans for everything that contributes to forging the unity of the Gulf. And that is the uniqueness of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is not the U.N. which is an organization of sovereign member states, neither the Arab League which is an association of States. We are ahead of that. We are a confederate structure with the dynamics toward unity. We work on that basis.

Ladies and Gentlemen :

The Gulf is not always a garden of roses. To achieve our goals we need a strong public opinion which is aware of the necessity for a collective approach. And we need the realization of the people of the Gulf of the fact that there must be a sacrifice by the leaders and the people.

The implementation of the unifying economic agreement entails sacrifice for all the Gulf States. The Kuwaitis, for example, must accept the fact that other Gulf nationals have the same rights in Kuwait as the Kuwaitis. This applies to every country of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Without this sacrifice, and the acceptance of the price of confederation, we will encounter many hang-ups.

We must accept that the political problems of Oman are ours otherwise we depart from the letter and spirit of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is a crucial test for the Gulf Cooperation Council. Another issue of concern for the Gulf Cooperation Council is the condition of the Arab World.

Here I would say that the Gulf has fared very well. It is not only stable but it has become the centre of political gravity without which the Arab world be more confused. The Gulf is the centre of the political gravity not only for its wealth, but mainly for the serenity of its views and judgment. The Gulf is not blurred in its vision by dogmatic perceptions or by party ideology or by partisan pseudo-objectivity. Its views are genuine, frank, fairly objective and truly Arab. This gives the Gulf a wealth of political credibility. And because the Gulf is always consistent and predictable, it has obtained a reputation for seriousness in international affairs; and so we attained the required degree of reliability in international diplomacy.

I believe that the Gulf role in Arab politics is increasing and I believe that decision-making in the Arab world is shifting towards the Gulf. The challenge is how to capitalize on this fact and how to present and defend the seriousness of the Gulf attitude and make it more adaptable and palatable to the Arab world and to the world in general. A case in point is the Saudi plan which has all the features of the Gulf seriousness and its business-like approach.

Ladies and Gentlemen :

My final remark was that the Gulf Cooperation Council was a dream of the Gulf and should be the dream of the Arabs. The Arabs want the absence of the spheres of influence of the great powers and so do we.

They want the preservation of the Arab Character of the Gulf and so do we. They want the elimination of foreign influence and pressure and so do we. They want a strong unified Gulf that contributes to the Arab cause and so do we.

The Gulf Cooperation Council philosophy is based on this and its endeavour is directed towards the attainment of this goal. And yet there is a negative attitude by Arab public opinion to the Gulf Cooperation Council.

I believe that such a negative attitude is unjustified, irreconcilable with Arabism , and that it is our duty to change.

I have a great hope that the dynamics of the Gulf will reshape the face of our area. What we need is time, because we have unusual determination for success from both the leaders and the nationals. I am positive we will succeed.

THE SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. The main features of the Gulf

Geographical stability based on the common defence, the political system, the ruling families and the law. The legitimate consistency of these elements is the responsibility between peoples, and the responsibility. The history of the six states revolves around the environment.

There is no feeling of commonness between nations and power by force or by justice. The families protect, the system, the law and the rule. It is a simple structure in the responsibility between peoples, and the responsibility.

OUTLINE OF A SPEECH ON THE SECURITY OF THE GULF

Wednesday, 22 September 1982

School of International Affairs

Columbia University

New York, New York

2. The surrounding that characterizes the Gulf system.

Geographical stability which the Gulf region has 2 in Arab public opinion. The Gulf region is characterized by commonness in security and justice.

3. The geographical stability which exists from responsibility and freedom from ideological rigidity.

Gulf politics have never been shaped by rigid models or formal political systems. It flows out within the constitutional limits with the traditional. Hence, history in the Gulf established responsibility in many forms in the elements of the stability of systems and immediate appreciation. With respect to the Gulf, the Gulf region has been the supportive role in Arab

THE SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. The main features of the Gulf

Continued stability based on the oneness between the political system, i.e., the ruling families and the land. The legitimate constituency of these families is the inseparability between people, and the establishment. The history of the six states revolves around the establishment.

There is no fleeting administration that comes and goes by polls or by ballots. The families personify the system, the state and the land. It is a unique structure, because the ruling system is neither the overlords of medieval Europe nor the symbol of the constitutional continuity as in the case of Scandinavia. People and states are intertwined in the manner of a mosaic. This is a fact misunderstood by Arabs and foreigners alike. Nasser's Egypt was defeated by Saudi Arabia in the war over Yemen. This misunderstanding led to futile adventures and brought about further division in the Arab world. The smooth transfer of power in these countries attest to this fact. I believe also that revolutionary Iran is indulging in misunderstanding whims.

2. The consistency that characterizes the Gulf politics.

It generates credibility which the Gulf enjoys be it in Arab politics or abroad. The word means commitment, and commitment is equated with honour.

3. That pragmatism which comes from experience and freedom from ideological rigidity.

Gulf politics have never been tinged by rigid reaction or fantasy-like schemes. It flows out within the predictable and in line with the expected. Hence, the role of the Gulf obtained supremacy in Arab politics in the aftermath of the futility of grandiose and unrealistic approaches. With Egypt shackled by Camp David, the Gulf moved from the supportive role in Arab

politics to the initiator. A glaring example is the outcome of the Fez Summit Conference held recently in Morocco -an outcome which is Gulf in flesh and in breath.

4. The ability to accept sacrifices for national honour.

In the Arab Israeli conflict, the Gulf assumed a role that legitimized its full partnership. In 1956, King Saud imposed oil an embargo on Britain and France. So did King Faisal in 1967. He did so again in 1973. Other Gulf States, vulnerable as they were, placed the legitimacy of Arabism over calculation of the region.

The road to the G.C.C.

When the heads of state met in Abu Dhabi in May 1981, they brought with them credentials that accorded to them undisputed capacity for action and sacrifice. And the GCC came to life with a legacy of vigour and power. Vigour from past practice in giving and sharing and power from the scarcity of energy resources that has made the Gulf the theater of an uninterrupted flurry of diplomatic activities as well as the target of intermittent intrigues. I do not believe that the GCC is a reaction to external pressure. It is a fulfillment of genuine indigenous aspirations. The ingredients of unity were always there. We, the Gulf people, always acted and believed on the basis that the Gulf is one. One family, one region, one destiny, long before the GCC. We realized how the security of the six states was interlocked. There was sharing of wealth when wealth came to some and belatedly to others. The programmes for education and health that Kuwait initiated in 1953 for the Arab Emirates attest to the concept of sharing. Disputes among small emirates were arbitrated in Gulf spirit by good offices of other Gulf notables. So the GCC is a modern articulation of indigenous wishes. It is true that external turbulences added vigour to the quest for unity of the Gulf which is the essence of the GCC. The GCC mandate is unity, the means of achieving it is economic integration. But the GCC is not only a framework for unity. It is an edifice for stability. It is, above all, a power that will reshape the

Gulf, politically, socially and demographically. It is the first modern endeavour to remove barriers, to excise obstacles, to enlarge the identity from the attachment to the sub-region to the requirement of the whole zone. It is a challenge to the mode of thinking of the people as well as to the ability of the laws and regulations to adjust to the new environment.

This cannot be done unless the political will of the top and the acceptance of the aspirants merge together to create the era of the GCC. In sum, the challenge is directed to the ability to sacrifice absolute sovereignty and traditional allegiance for the sake of a larger identity. The Gulf is new to the notion of collective endeavour with all the attendants related to drastic alterations in thinking and behavior.

But What About the Problems of Security?

I believe that the Gulf enjoys more security than many people think. The fact that the GCC is established and is functioning with remarkable speed has generated in the area the feelings of security and order. It is not only a fallback for member states but it acts with awareness that the Gulf security is inseparable. It has generated the realization that the security of Kuwait, for instance, cannot be isolated from the safety of a remote village in Oman. The GCC brought about a community of concerns, identity of survival. There is a pool of instruments and intellect to confront problems. There is a supremacy of the region over the particularism of the sub-region.

Although our Charter does not articulate cooperation on security, yet we realized that economic integration which is the cardinal element in the GCC cannot be fulfilled without stability. That economic progress cannot be enjoyed in an environment replete with uncertainties. The Ministers of Interior met in February in Riyadh and will meet again in October to discuss the first collective Gulf agreement on security matters.

But the Gulf is not threatened from within. There are no ideological doctrines that operate in collision with states. There are no externally planted hostile forces that seek to undermine the almost unanimously accepted political structure. There are no indigenous political parties that try to emulate the now bankrupt doctrines that polluted the Arab world in the fifties and the sixties. In the Gulf, internally, there are genuine local forces that advocate the westernization of traditional dialogue between the nationals and the system. But their protestations depend on persuasion not violence, on cooperation not confrontation.

And there are forces that are not happy with the speed of modernization for fear of the erosion of old values. These forces, with the exception of a very tiny minority, operate within the mainstream of the system. I believe the real challenge to us in the Gulf is our ability to adjust to the social and political demands. This ability to adjust is inescapable in view of the fact that we in the Gulf are fundamentally the advocates of the status quo. But the status quo cannot be preserved unless there are constitutional openings for evolutionary changes. I believe there is in the Gulf adequate resilience for such peaceful changes. But my concern about the threat from within centers around the unstoppable influx of foreign labour. The foreign labour constitutes the majority of the people in some member states of the GCC. This is a problem that has become a daily topic in our region. Not only social problems accompany foreign immigration but also political and cultural. It hits directly on the very special vein of national identity. So far, we have not worked out a real courageous prescription for the problem of foreign labour. I admit that by and large, our attempts are based on improvisation. There are restrictive measures introduced but they do not amount to a satisfactory solution. What is at stake is the style we live in and the traditions we value. A serious confrontation of this problem entails a restructuring of our life style and re-reading of the sanctity of valuable traditions.

What About Dangers From Without, From Outside?

There are many dangers that hover over the Gulf. Admittedly, the power of the Gulf to influence external dangers is limited. Some of these dangers are time-old, others are recent, but all of them cannot come to an end without the cooperation of superpowers. Oil gave the Gulf a mixed catalogue of the positive and the dangerous. And even the positive, the social, political and preeminence cannot be divorced from the benevolence of the superpowers. The rivalry of regional powers for supremacy is an element of instability. Who can forget the role of the Shah who allocated to himself the power of arbitration and adjudication in Gulf affairs from 1970-1980 and the weird concept of the Shah tempted other local forces to invite foreign powers to counterbalance Iran's dominance. The Soviets found a warm welcome in Iraq and South Yemen in the 60's. In power politics prevalent at that time, that was legitimate. What was not legitimate, and to some extent inexplicable, was the West's endorsement of the Shah's megalomaniac attitude. There was no recognition by the West of the legitimate sensibilities of the Arab side of the Gulf. No doubt, this fact added to the guarded ambivalence that characterizes the relations between the Gulf and the West. The seeds of the Iran-Iraq war were placed by the Shah's policy. And no wonder that war erupted in 1980 because the situation had all the lubricants for conflict. The Gulf has succeeded in containing this war but not in eliminating it. There are factors beyond our control whose cooperation is essential for an end to the bloody fight. Iran erred, exactly as did Nasser, when it failed to comprehend the socio-political structure of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The consignment of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran to the Gulf with hope that religion will catch support is bound to fail when there is no environmental acceptance of such fundamentalism. There is neither political nor religious fertility for Iran's doomed consignment. The Gulf States supported the Islamic mediation to end the war as they did in respect to non-aligned efforts as well as to the UN. The war constitutes a threat to the security of the Gulf. Its threat emerges from Iran's determination to export the ardour of

political religion, the Gulf cannot write off the danger of regional threats. The GCC reacted with amazing resilience and a combination of diplomacy and action. On action, the GCC Defence Ministers met in Riyadh in January 1982 to draw up a plan for a collective stand against regional supremacy. They will meet again on the 10th of October to discuss further links of cooperation on defence matters. The plan as such may not provide the military deterrent needed for the defence of the Gulf but its importance lies in the emergence of the six states as one unit. Here again, as we did in security, there is a pooling of available resources. This is a new element that the GCC brought.

The second outside danger is superpower rivalry. Here, the US made a mistake. Its policy suffers from a congenital defect that separates the Gulf from the main Arab concern with the conflict with Israel. President Eisenhower set the fashion of failure when he in 1958 issued his doctrine. The vocation of that doctrine was to convince the Arabs that International Communism was more a threat to the Arabs than Zionism. The doctrine failed. President Carter, in the heat of the American dispute with Iran, and with the Soviets in Afghanistan, came out with his doctrine. The essence is the same as was the case with President Eisenhower's doctrine. The Soviets are a bigger danger than Israel. It failed again and that will be the fate of any doctrine that places more weight on the danger of the Soviets than it does on the danger of Israel. No doubt, the Gulf witnesses an amazing race for the preservation of interests and for the recycling of petro-dollars. The West wants money and it wants political docility that absorbs the West's perception of the catalogue of dangers. The Gulf rejects that. Besides, the Gulf cannot absolve the West and the US from the responsibility of its ambivalence on Palestine and its ardent concern for the Gulf. The recent events demonstrated the US political waywardness on Palestine. When the Gulf was crying out loudly for a fair posture by the US, Washington failed to understand the intensity of the sincerity of that cry. This fact has not been ignored by Arab radicals who still perceive the Gulf as an

anchor for Western interests. From this, the GCC still suffers. The other danger that beclouds the Gulf with uncertainty is the attempt by alien ideologies to penetrate the regimented political structure of the Gulf. It is no secret that Arab parties inspired by foreign ideologies have tried to establish constituencies in the Gulf for the purpose of influencing the political decision of the Gulf states. Hence, the danger is minuscule and tiny, because the Gulf, in its present composition, is still more immune to ideological adventures than the outside world realizes.

I personally think that the danger that comes from the instability of the Horn of Africa has so far been underestimated. There is a link between superpower rivalry in the Gulf and the events in the Horn of Africa. A secure and solid Somalia is in our favour. So is the case in North Yemen that suffers from an alien manipulated rebellion. To some forces, the road to Riyadh passes through Sanaa in Yemen. We in the GCC cannot overlook the fact that the security of the Arabian Peninsula is interconnected.

The persuasion we undertake in diplomacy with the US for the security of the Gulf is bound to be affected by the centrality of the dangerous zone we face that is the Middle East problem. The massacre of the Palestinians in camps in Beirut is bound to affect the understanding between the Gulf and Washington. The political capital of the Gulf lies in persuading the goodwill of others. In Beirut, the bridges we tried to build on the question of Palestine and inherently on the security of the Gulf were dealt a deadly blow.

The dire lesson of all this gruesome experience is reliance on ourselves, utilizing our means for survival and for thwarting dangers. The message we learnt is that we have to surmount the indulgent comfort of subregional disinterestedness for the sake of an assertive collective approach whose essence is self-reliance. This is the GCC as I perceive it.

LONDON, 1988) to address this distinguished gathering of British and Arab Government and officials on the main features and activities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization of which I have had the honour of being its Secretary-General since its inception in May 1981. The GCC's overall aims will soon become much more explicit, as well because of the wide-ranging experience of the Gulf States through opening up economic cooperation and free and trade routes to trade, it is through developing various economic zones to establish a free system of inter-state development. We in the Gulf States are fully aware that trade progress with stability and predictability, and it is the hope that based on the success of the GCC. The GCC's dynamics have provided a regional unity in the region, but also predictability. We in the GCC believe that we have a range of stability and predictability. This is a common goal to work, as they have not, and we cannot afford to lose it. We are determined to work together, as they have not, and we cannot afford to lose it. We are determined to work together, as they have not, and we cannot afford to lose it.

**SPEECH GIVEN AT A LONDON SEMINAR ON
THE COOPERATION COUNCIL OF THE
ARAB STATES OF THE GULF**

December 1, 1983

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The agreement on Arab Affairs has clearly said, especially the leadership of the GCC and its activities. Yesterday, 30 November 1983, for example, the Board of Directors of the newly set up \$2,000-million investment fund Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) met in final meeting. The GIC, which will be able to borrow substantial funds from various sources, will be the GCC's main vehicle for developing joint ventures set up by member states. The Gulf States

NO HARRISON HONORARY AT A HONOR HONORARY
THE COOPERATION COUNCIL OF THE
ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

December 1982

I AM PLEASED to address this distinguished gathering of British and Arab businessmen and officials on the main features and activities of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), an organisation of which I have had the honour of being its Secretary-General since its inception in May 1981. The GCC member states' links with Britain go back many centuries. It was because of the strategic importance of the Gulf that Britain came to our area to ensure stability and sea and land routes to India. It is through trade that nations become close to each other and causes of war can be eliminated. We in the Gulf region are fully aware that trade prospers with stability and predictability, and it is this belief that forms the essence of the GCC. The GCC is a dynamic force providing not only stability in the region, but also predictability. We in the GCC believe that we have a heritage of stability and predictability. This is an enormous asset since, as I have just said, trade cannot flourish in chaos or unpredictability. The GCC has emerged as a stabilising force, not only within the Gulf itself, but also in the Arab region as a whole.

The GCC's Charter was signed on 25 May 1981 by the heads of the six member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). About eight months earlier, in September 1980, the Iran-Iraq war erupted and the shadows of instability loomed large in the region. Yet, despite this, GCC heads of state opted for economic integration rather than military cooperation to achieve regional stability. Only two weeks after the signing of the GCC's Charter, the Council's Unified Economic Agreement was announced.

The agreement, as Lord Jellicoe has rightly said, constitutes the backbone of the GCC and its activities. Yesterday (30 November 1983), for example, the board of Directors of the newly-set up \$ 2,100 million Kuwait-based Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) held its first meeting. The GIC, which will be able to borrow substantial funds on money markets, will be the GCC's main vehicle for financing joint ventures set up by member states. The Gulf states

have now clearly shifted from an individual to a collective approach in both trade and politics.

GCC - a full fledged common market by 1990

The era of businessmen coming to Riyadh, for instance, staying in a hotel and waiting for a telephone call for signing a contract is over. Gulf markets now pose a considerable challenge to European and other foreign businessmen. Competition is increasingly becoming tougher and it will be even more so as the GCC becomes a "common market" similar in some ways to that of the EEC. I would expect that a Gulf Common Market will be firmly established by 1990.

The first step towards achieving this aim was taken in March 1983, when the Council abolished all customs duties on domestic goods moved from one member country to another. The same also applies to goods at least 40 per cent of whose value has been added locally. In March 1984, further steps will be taken and these will require an even more competitive and aggressive trade approach.

Co-ordination of economic policies

For the first time in their history, Gulf states have, through the GCC, introduced regional central planning. This covers not only industry and agriculture, but also infrastructure schemes, including road and rail networks. All economic sectors are being coordinated and centralised. GCC ministers of industry will meet on 13 December 1983 in Riyadh, the Council's headquarters, to assess the extent to which member states have already achieved in coordinating and centralising their industrial policy.

The era of rivalry and "duplicate" industrial projects is truly over. We are, therefore, heading towards one strong domestic front regarding economic development and foreign trade. Trade now does not, as Lord Jellicoe said, flow

into GCC members through individual endeavour, but through a collective channel managed by GCC institutions.

POLITICAL STABILITY - AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT

At the GCC's fourth summit, held in Doha, Qatar, on 7 November 1983, the Council was for the first time called upon formally to help in working out measures to reduce political tension in the Arab region as a whole. Stability in the Gulf and the rest of the Arab region is, of course, the key to progress in economic development and trade. What we do in the GCC regarding our regional and inter-Arab politics is rewarding to you since your business interests in the whole region rely heavily on political stability. Without the assurance of a common Arab consensus, the region's economic performance and trade cannot progress.

We at the GCC think that stability in the Gulf cannot be separated from that of the wider Arab region. What causes instability in other parts of the Arab region directly or indirectly affects stability in the GCC area. It is therefore in your interest that the GCC continues its efforts to bring about a general Arab consensus.

The GCC cannot afford to ignore Arab political differences. Such differences will not only affect us, but also Europe and rest of the world. It is in the Middle East region in particular that trade and development cannot be separated from politics. Without a stable and healthy political condition, the GCC members cannot afford to maintain strong commercial links with Europe and other countries. GCC efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and the way in which the Council manages its relationships with other Arab states are naturally in your interest as businessmen and as people of goodwill whose job is to encourage the flow of technology and trade into our region.

TAPPING EUROPEAN MARKETS FOR PETROCHEMICALS EXPORTS

It is also for the first time that the Gulf region will in the near future be able to tap your markets for selling its petrochemicals and petroleum by-products. We have to bang hard on the doors of your markets to ensure access to our exports. I have the privilege of being asked by the GCC Ministerial Council to undertake exploratory talks with GCC European trade partners to ensure that our products can be marketed in these countries.

Interdependence is now becoming an increasingly important feature of both world trade and politics. Trade does not simply mean moving goods from one country to another. It involves transfer of technology and managerial skills. Talks were recently held at the GCC's headquarters in Riyadh with a visiting EEC delegation on how GCC members can benefit from transferring to the region of European technology and managerial skills.

The Gulf states are now, for the first time, exploring collectively how this can be done. We have told our European partners that there is a unified GCC wish and determination to acquire such technology and skills not only through trade but also through contacts based on lasting understanding. We have introduced drastic changes in regulations and laws to make such a collective approach possible.

UNIFIED ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

We now have a unified policy towards Arab and international issues and appreciate that there is a price for this collective approach. Such a price meant in part that members had to abolish industrial and commercial rivalry among themselves. Through industrial coordination, certain members had to drop certain planned projects, both in industry and agriculture.

This is a new experiment in the sense that it implies that collective measures require abdicating certain privileges attached to sovereignty. Member

states have been for the first time called upon to change their laws to make them compatible with such a new era of collective approach. It is also for the first time that member states have been asked to accept financial burdens which we had not thought of before.

EMPHASIS PLACED ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

In his eloquent speech this morning, Lord Jellicoe touched upon security co-operation within the GCC. I would like to stress however, that it was trade and economic integration that was emphasised by GCC heads of state in their first meeting in May 1981. In their second meeting (in Riyadh, November 1981), trade and security were equally emphasised.

The understanding was, and still is, that trade and economic integration cannot operate in a vacuum or chaos. Gulf people believe that the region's security is their own responsibility and it is because of this that they cooperate in security measures.

Now, the GCC collective approach includes not only trade and economic integration, but also military schemes, technology and imports. Military hardware is now being bought collectively and not individually as before. The GCC now represents a unified market for arms and other related goods. It is therefore important that exporters of such goods realise that they are dealing with a single market.

The collective approach extends to internal and Arab political issues as well. Two years ago, for example, I went to Aden for talks on the South Yemen-Oman tension. The country's President told me: "You in the GCC are now coming to me with a message on ending the tension and I think that is a constructive approach. I think your common approach to political issues would make it easier for the tension (with Oman) to disappear." I found the President's receptiveness healthy. It was because we had a unified policy towards the South

Yemen-Oman tension that a happy end to the problem was possible. The two countries have recently agreed to establish diplomatic links and both the tension and its causes have now disappeared.

Progress and cooperation within the GCC itself cannot be achieved in isolation from what goes on in neighboring areas. It makes no sense to have prosperity in the Gulf while bordering states such as North and South Yemen lack prosperity. Very recently, the GCC received a delegation from North Yemen for talks on economic cooperation. We have sent a mission to both North and South Yemen to discuss the same subject and very soon we will start an economic assistance programme for both countries. To ensure stability in the Gulf, we have to talk to the two Yemens and to bring them closer to the GCC.

LACK OF AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF GCC DYNAMICS

While attending a seminar held about a month ago in the United States on **US Policies and the Challenges in the Gulf**, I understood that the US administration still approaches the Gulf in the same way as it did before the creation of the GCC. The US has not yet realised the dynamics the GCC has brought about not only with the Gulf but also in the wider Arab region. The change has been considerable, not only in trade, but also in the wider Arab region. The change has been considerable, not only in trade, but also in psychology and morale.

I told the seminar that the day when the US or other powers could send their boats to the Gulf with total disregard to the wishes and determination of its people is over. The GCC is a new concept; a new structure that has to be reckoned with, both politically and militarily. I was both surprised and shocked to learn that the US has been unable to grasp the new changes the Gulf has witnessed since the setting up of the GCC.

In Europe, the approach is different. During my visits to European capitals, I have been overwhelmed by the intensity of interest in the GCC. I found this in London and Paris and Rome and Brussels during my visits for talks with various institutions, including the EEC, on developments in the Gulf. Such awareness is not restricted to politicians, but extends to businessmen and, indeed, to almost anyone with an interest in the Gulf and its people.

ADOPTING A NON-ALIGNED DIPLOMACY

Trade for you is a source of contacts and profit. For us in the GCC, it is a bridge towards understanding and assertion of diplomacy. We in the GCC survive by two things. First, there is an enormous fund of goodwill towards the rest of the world. This is reflected by our open diplomacy which reaches not only all Arab capitals but many others too. Second, because of our credible approach and status, we are able to mediate effectively where there is disagreement. This is not only good for us, but for the whole of the Arab region. We have scrupulously emphasised the importance of non-alignment in our diplomatic contacts with all other countries, including other Arab states. A non-aligned approach towards other Arab states has naturally placed additional responsibility on us, and this is why numerous GCC missions will be sent to Arab capitals to narrow differences among Arab states. This is our destiny and we have to fulfil it to the brim.

WORKING TOGETHER TO END THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I would like to say a few words about the Iran-Iraq war. To begin with, I must say that it is us, the people who live in the Gulf region, who have the prime responsibility to end this war. We have to do our utmost to find a happy end to this unhappy war. But others must also share this responsibility. The problem with this war is that at a certain stage it became an almost forgotten war. When the world became indifferent towards this war, it was us, the people of the Gulf,

who suffered enormously. You as businessmen or politicians have a certain responsibility to exert whatever pressure you can to end the war. As long as this war continues, we cannot guarantee stability in the Gulf. Without a stable Gulf, there can be no stability in the entire Arab region. Such instability may lead to an escalation in superpower rivalry and this would be detrimental to the whole world, including, of course, Europe.

In concluding, I would like to say that we all must combine whatever resources we have to end this war and to relieve the people of Iraq and Iran and others in the Gulf region from its sad effects. I hope that the next time we meet, hopefully soon, this war will be something of the past.

CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

THE OUTLINE OF AN ADDRESS AT A CONFERENCE HELD IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, U.S.A.

22-23 SEPTEMBER 1983

The Syrian political thinkers dominated the Arab theatre for 50 years. Their drive was for immediate unity. Their dream was never fulfilled until 1958 for a brief time. The Syrian thinkers appealed to the Gulf. The people of the Gulf took the cue from the old Damascus school on the merits of Arab unity. But the Gulf people always yearned for a solid and permanent unity based on well studied steps and on gradualism. The decision leading to the emergence of the G.C.C. is based on the oneness of the region, oneness in destiny, identicalness in environment, political as well as social and economic, and homogeneity of moods as well as of modes.

On 25th May 1981, the heads of states met to translate the yearnings of the Gulf into reality. They signed a charter whose final objective is Gulf unity and they chose Economic Integration as the modality for the realization of the objective. Economic integration in the Gulf is a vehicle for obtaining the goal and not the target.

Economic integration which has become a watch-word in the Gulf, means one common market, with coordinated policy on industry, agriculture, trade and other related matters.

Economic integration also means the complementarity of infrastructure. For the first time in its destiny, the Gulf adopted a collective approach to problems ranging from import-export to the completion of infra-structure and logistics. And because of our newness to the Collective Approach and Joint - Endeavours, we are bound to have difficulties. But none of these difficulties is insoluble. The first step of Economic Integration took place in March 1983. For the first time in certain areas of economic activities, all nationals of the Gulf are treated equally regardless of origin. It is a modest step but an important one.

These modest steps are symbols rather than fulfillment. They are symbols of the determination of the six states, that there is no alternative to cooperation and coordination in all fields. Our target is that by the end of the eighties,

the Gulf will be the Gulf common market with all the consequences that such a step entails: equality in economic activities; freedom of movement of people and goods; the completion of infra-structure such as deepening of ports, transportation, telecommunication and training. This means the emergence of the Gulf states as one Solid Economic Entity that will set in motion a strenuous competition from industrial countries for the obtaining of major projects.

The Gulf Investment Organisation whose board will meet in October for the first time will act as a catalyst for economic development in the region including industrialization and the building of logistics in the Gulf.

Economic cooperation is just one feature in shaping the **collective confrontation of problems**. The heads of state in the first meeting adopted a consensus that serves as basis for the foreign policy of the G.C.C. Its essence is non-alignment in international politics, and the search for Arab consensus—a bold and imaginative approach to regional issues.

That document which I read out gave the G.C.C. a sense of vocation, a mission, as a messenger of good will. In the Arab field, our policy is to bring about reduction of tension between Arab states and to strive for Arab consensus, to eliminate polarization, and to work for a general framework of conciliation.

Manifestations of this policy are the trips of foreign ministers to Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and other capitals. Without the G.C.C. efforts, there will be a vacuum that consolidates and regiments public positions.

Hence, each and every state in the world has a stake in the success of the G.C.C. An Arab world free of tension is in the interest of the international community. Trade flourishes, predictability supersedes turmoil, dialogue replaces animosity.

The Iraq - Iran war is a threat to the stability of the region. As I said, non-alignment is an important policy for the Gulf. It is important to cultivate friendship and not accelerate tension. Only non-alignment saves the Gulf from the tribulations of the rivalry of super-powers. Non-alignment means **Self-Reliance**, another catch phrase in Gulf politics now. **Self-Reliance**, a principle our heads of state laid down, implies drastic changes in the outlook of the Gulf.

Collective Approach to issues related to security has so far proven to be challenging and daring. Shortage of manpower, lack of expertise, non-completion of infra-structure, have all added to the strain in coordination in defence matters. In a world full of wolves and predators, no country can depend for its security on the good will of others. To us there are no alternatives. We have to go forward. U.S. Rapid Deployment Force serves America's interests and not necessarily ours. To us, Gulf force is the only guarantor for our security. Diplomacy is another factor. Afghanistan and USSR threats are threats of remote nature, they are not immediate. What is immediate is the threat that emanates from the Mid-East problem. U.S. policy, to be credible, has to realize that it is impossible to separate the Gulf security from a fair solution of the Palestinian problem. The U.S. policy, to be credible, has to realize that the Gulf is not immune from the ravages that engulf the Mid-East at present. Horn of Africa, the two Yemens and the security of the Gulf can not be separated. We were able to put an end to the unfortunate hostility between Oman and South Yemen. The two Yemens are part and parcel of the people of the Gulf. They can not be left out in the cold as we embark on ambitious programs for Gulf development. I went to both Sanaa and Aden with this spirit. We have succeeded in ending polarization in the Arab Peninsula. Self-Reliance, which is in its embryonic stage, and diplomacy are our approach to ward off problems and to keep them at arms length.

For the first time a military get-together in the Gulf will soon take place. Its importance is not in its effectiveness but in its significance. It underlines the concept of self-reliance.

It is impossible to approach issues of the Gulf without taking into consideration the new factors that the G.C.C. brought about.

Many theories and strategies held so dear by their advocates, will become either obsolete or rendered incredible, if they do not adjust to the new environment in the region.

The G.C.C. triggered new interests in regional cooperation. Sudan and Egypt, North Africa and the Grand Magreb. Such meetings we encourage. It is the only way to rescue the Arab world from disintegration. No country in the Arab world can go solo in grappling with complex problems of the area. I have the feeling that the U.S. policy is still predicated on the pre -G.C.C. era. References to protecting the Gulf by American troops cropped up throughout today's deliberations. We in the Gulf feel that such indicators and references give rise to concern rather than relief. We do not envisage circumstances that justify the dispatch of foreign troops. The people of the Gulf have a certain resilience and traditional ways for coping with problems. Diplomacy is instrumental in the life of the Gulf. British withdrawal created nervousness in Europe but not in the Gulf that accepted the British departure with characteristic adjustment. The emergence of UAE was a remarkable illustration of that adjustment.

Final observation is that the role of the G.C.C. as an instrument for stability, is not sufficiently appreciated. I am a great believer in public opinion. Without public opinion that follows our steps, examines our goals, interrogates our methods, we will have some difficulty in maintaining the momentum. Public is a major contributor to the defeat of bureaucracy that does not respond to the new environment in the Gulf. I hope we will succeed in engaging public opinion scrutiny of our work. This is a challenge I hope to see.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

WASHINGTON, DC
SEPTEMBER 22, 1986

Good afternoon and welcome to the National Press Club. My name is Tom Squitieri. I'm the secretary of the club and the Washington correspondent for the **Lowell Massachusetts Sun**. I'd like to welcome my fellow club members and their guests in the audience today as well as those of you who are listening to this program over one of the 303 National Public Radio stations or watching of one of the 2300 cable systems affiliated with C-SPAN, the cable satellite public affairs network.

I'd like to remind those of you in the audience today that if you have any questions for our speaker, and I trust that you will, please write them on the cards furnished at your table and pass them to the front. I'll ask as many as time permits. I would now like to introduce our guests at the head table from left to right. I ask that they stand briefly when I call out their name and that the audience please hold their applause until I'm completed. From the left is Mr. Hamdi Fuad, bureau chief of **Al-Ahram** newspaper. Dr. John Duke Anthony, president of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. Joseph Polokov, the Washington correspondent for Jewish newspapers. Devon Shimway, editor and publisher of **Oil Daily**. Ambassador Ma'mun Al-Kurdy, general coordinator of international economic cooperation for the G.C.C. Skipping our luncheon speaker only for a moment, to my right, Randy Allen, the vice president of Pyramid Video and chairman of the club's speaker committee. Ginny Blodgett, the director of communications for the senior executive association and member of our speakers committee who organized today's luncheon. Gil Kline of Media General Newspapers. Magda Abu Fadil, the editor of Middle East Affairs News Service. And Greg Rish, bureau chief of NewsFeed Network.

Our guest today brings an impeccable record as a skilled and highly respected diplomat, even though, as often is the case, his successes and strategies have gone unnoticed by most of the American population. But where the skills and results weigh heavily, in the United Nations and in the world financial markets and in the embassies, Abdulla Bishara is very well-known and very

well appreciated. Ambassador Bishara comes to us today as Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional economic and political alliance of nations, that coordinates trade and security interests in the Gulf states. Founded in 1981, the G.C.C.'s members, which are Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, produce one-quarter of the non-communist world's oil supplies valued at about \$450 million a day. Structurally and functionally, the G.C.C. shares several characteristics of the European Common Market. In 1985, the G.C.C. was the ninth largest market for U.S. goods. Ambassador Bishara is now in his second term as Secretary General of the organization. Prior to his appointment to this position in 1981, he served as Kuwait's chief delegate to the United Nations for ten years, establishing among other things, a close friendship and working relationship with the U.S. chief delegate to the U.N., George Bush. During his term as Kuwait's representative on the Security Council, Ambassador Bishara chaired the committee which helps oversight powers on the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. While at the U.N., his Sutton Place townhouse is also remembered for two things: lavish parties, complete with exotic foods, and perhaps in the U.S. political framework, the meeting site between the Ambassador of the United States to the U.N., Andrew Young, and a leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization --a meeting which eventually led to Young's resignation as chief U.S. delegate. Our guest also had the enviable record of claiming to never have missed a Broadway play. He began his diplomatic career in 1963 serving in Kuwait's embassy in Tunisia. He later served as an ambassador to Argentina and Brazil before becoming director of the Foreign Ministry Cabinet in Kuwait prior to his appointment in 1971 to the United Nations. In 1958, a graduate of Cairo University, Ambassador Bishara taught school in Kuwait before studying International relations at Oxford. Among the accomplishments cited for the G.C.C. are joint military exercises among the member countries and a combined military force, the success in preventing the spread of the Iraq-

Iran War and reduction of economic barriers between member nations. In 1981, our guest said to reporters when questioned about the G.C.C., "The baby is only born, don't ask me whether it's got teeth yet." Well six years later, we're anxious to see if the baby is crawling or, at this point, running. Mr. Ambassador, I'm always glad to welcome anyone to the National Press Club anyone who has secretary in front of their name.

The Speech of Mr. Bishara

Thank you very much Mr. Squiteri, Secretary, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to express my gratitude to you, Mr. Secretary, you Mr. Allen, to the members of the club and to the distinguished audience for attending this function. I come here with a feeling that my duty is to inform. I'd like to inform you about what the G.C.C. is about, and what we in the G.C.C. expect the United States to understand and to accept whatever we may say. I never write speeches. I remember I wrote one speech and that speech I was unable to read. Today I will give you what I think about the G.C.C., the present situation and our relationship with the United States.

Now, the present day in the Gulf is not a pleasant one. The area is surrounded by ravages of war. It is engulfed by uncertainty. It is the target of confusion. Notwithstanding this, I think we in the G.C.C. have been able to maintain stability, predictability and moderation. These are our major assets in terms of confronting the issues prevailing in our area. Moderation is the essence of the Gulf. We preach understanding. We preach accommodation. We defend compromise. On that basis, we are against any change in the balance of power in our region. We detest and oppose resort to force. We abhor violence. We cannot accept the use of force arbitrarily in our regional dispute. The Gulf is a very sensitive area. It has to remain intact as it is. It has to be preserved on the basis of coexistence, accommodation, understanding, and live

and let others live. These are the principles which we have unscrupulously observed in our relation in our regional context. What happened since 1980? The Iranian revolution took place. We in the G.C.C. never took a hostile attitude to the Iranian revolution. Our goal, our crusade was to preserve the status quo. We in essence are a power of a status quo-- we in essence are a protector of the status quo-- the preserver of the balance of power in our region. The Iranian revolution came with a determination that should effect changes by resort to force. The Iranian government wanted to change the texture, the political texture, the status quo of our region by resorting to force. It wanted to settle its dispute with Iraq by using force and violence. We cannot accept that. We told the Iranians and others that a resort to force in our region would trigger confusion, shambles, and would invite disaster. For us in the Gulf the area has to be tranquil in order to serve the world economy and to serve the sense of moderation and understanding. And also, to send the message of compromise, negotiation, and sacrifice.

In the summit of the G.C.C. in November 1985, the G.C.C. heads of state produced a document in which the message of the G.C.C. was underscored, and that was a conciliatory attitude towards Iran with a view toward helping and assisting the termination of war. The message was sent also, equally and with equal force and clarity, to the government of Iraq. The government of Iraq responded favorably to the initiative of the good offices, to the good will, of the G.C.C. for the termination and putting an end to this tragic war. The Iranian government showed interest in the promotion of bilateral relationships between the Gulf states and Iran. It did not show an interest in the termination of war, or in showing receptiveness to the good offices of the G.C.C. Consequently, the G.C.C. had to display certain unequivocal determination for the protection of its territorial integrity. We made it clear in the course of our contact with the world and also in our contacts with the United States, and with regional powers in our area, that the Gulf countries are determined to protect

their territorial integrity and political independence and safeguard their interest if it comes to resort of force and we find there's no alternative except collectively to confront whatever dangers or head off any threats against our territorial integrity. We are determined not to shun or run away from our responsibility. Our message, which is being put forcefully across to all regional powers in the Arab world and beyond is that the G.C.C. member states seek understanding and insist on a dialogue. I must say that because of the determination to protect our territorial interests and territorial integrity combined with a sense of moderation, and a convinced belief in the constructive results of a dialogue, the G.C.C. has been able to ward off threats and to head off problems. The peak I would say in the Iraq-Iran War reached its zenith in March 1986 when the Iranians were able to penetrate the territorial integrity of Iraq in the south. In combination with the ability of the Iranians to penetrate Iraqi territory, threats emerged, sabre rattling, provocative statements were made. The answer of the G.C.C., which was mature and reasonable, was that in combining determination to head off problems and to stave off threats, the G.C.C. is determined to initiate a dialogue with Iran or with any party or with any capital that would enable the region to have peace and tranquility.

I must say in all fairness to the United States policy on this, that the U.S. has assumed a plausible posture and commendable understanding of our policy and also is aware of our determination. The U.S. has been very supportive in our approach for creating an environment conducive to negotiation, to talks, to contacts. The U.S. has shown also understanding of the need of the G.C.C. member states to insure stability and tranquility and consequently, the United States is aware that the Gulf region, whose slogan and motto is self-reliance, is in need under certain circumstances of acquisition of arms to defend its territorial integrity on the basis of legitimacy and on the basis of a fair deal. And I must say that through our contacts with the United States we have come to the conclusion that in America there is an awareness that a strong, stable, healthy, unpolluted Gulf is in the interest, not only of its nationals, not only in the interest

of the world economy, but in the interest of the United States as well as its commercial institutions. The Gulf, in a sense, has a certain international feature. It has assets. The Gulf has its own texture of uniqueness. It is unique in moderation. It is unique in strategic value. It is unique also in economic value. We the people in the Gulf are determined to preserve this uniqueness. And determination to preserve this uniqueness arises from the fact that without stability the Gulf will invite disaster and confrontation and conflagration. Also, we found it imperative upon us --it is imperative-- for us to endeavor, and no matter how costly it is, to find and build defensive measures. For the first time in our history, the G.C.C. member states have become security conscious. I would say that there is an obsession in our area with security. And this fact stems from an awareness that when the chips are down we have to defend our territorial integrity. And when the chips are down we are not ready to invite volunteers from abroad. Self-reliance is a resolution taken by our heads of state since the first meeting and reiterated at every summit conference by our heads of state. It means, and this is the message we like to send all over, that Gulf nationals have to defend their own territory. And I think that without the process of the last five years, in our dealing with the Iran-Iraq War we have come to a degree in which we find that we have expertise in war management. We in the Gulf, I can say from our context, from my own knowledge and I am privy to all this context, that we have collected an expertise in war management. And we have been able, I would say, to emerge rather fairly unscathed by virtue of our ability to ward off threats. And that created in us what we call expertise in war management. We've been able to keep our area able to contain the war because of diplomacy and moderation. We talk to every capital in the world about the dangers of the spread of the Iran-Iraq War, of an expansion of the War. We left no stone unturned to bring to the attention of every capital that if the war spreads, the floodgates of confusion will be open and tragedy will prevail. And to a certain extent we have created an international awareness of the danger of a

spread of the Iran-Iraq War. I think that has created a deterring, restraining factor.

Definitely we have some complaints and we have some observations. We think that there is an international complacency on the Iraq-Iran War. This complacency stems from the fact that we in the Gulf have been able to contain the Iraq-Iran War. And I think that the international community is lulled into a too relaxed attitude about the Iraq-Iran War and the possibility of a spread and expansion, because the G.C.C. countries have contained it. This in a way took a lot of incisiveness, blunted a lot of incisiveness. But this is not an excuse for the international community to enjoy complacency.

I was in Europe two months ago. I talked to officials in various major capitals in Europe. I told them the war has been contained not because of an international, unequivocal stand but because of the G.C.C. ability to handle it through dialogue, through moderation, through improvisation. But mostly all this came from this ability to develop an expertise on war management. Again the war has not spread because everybody, even regional powers, are aware of what is at stake when the Gulf is tampered with. We in the Gulf have made it clear that a change by evolution is acceptable. A change by consent is acceptable. A change through receptiveness is not objectionable. But a change by invasion, by using non-conventional ways to destabilize and to invade cannot be accepted and hence we have this misunderstanding with the Iranian revolution. It is not really the Iranian revolution that brought about this misunderstanding. It is the resort to force as a vehicle for settlement of dispute. We in the Gulf cannot afford to let our area be tampered with, notwithstanding the uniqueness of the Gulf in terms of the world economy, in terms of strategy, in terms of the superpower global context. We like our area to remain stable in order to service world economies, to remain stable in order to spread and reinforce the message of understanding and moderation. And we'd like our area to be stable simply because, whether we like it or not, it has become almost a reg-

ional and international commonwealth. Everybody has a stake in the stability of the Gulf. The villages in Latin America or businessmen in Japan, and not only because of oil, not because of the financial assets of the Gulf, but because it has special uniqueness in Arab politics and also in international politics.

Let me say what we want from the United States in the present circumstances. I think we expect an attentive ear when we come with a request for acquisition of additional defensive measures. I would like any request by the G.C.C., individual or collective, to be judged on its merit and not to be lumped together with extraneous elements. I don't like the quest by the G.C.C. for additional defensive measures to be influenced by domestic party politics in the United States. I would like the merits of the request to take the upper hand. And I think we in the G.C.C. are entitled to this understanding and we are entitled to be judged on merit.

My third point is that no matter how we in the Gulf states manage to ward off problems and to overcome threats and to send away the alarming signals of war, we will remain affected, we will remain affected for a long time by the Israeli-Arab dispute and conflict. A fair, durable settlement of this conflict would contribute enormously to the stability of the Gulf. The absence of a fair and durable settlement of this dispute will always leave clouds of confusion and clouds of uncertainty over the horizons of the Gulf. But we advocate what the United States advocated in the Paris peace conference in 1919. I was telling some of my friends this morning, it was really Woodrow Wilson who took the principle of self-determination into Paris and it was Woodrow Wilson who was able to defend that principle which was key to the evolutionary changes in the world global texture and political structure at that time. And I was in the United Nations for many years and I saw how we welcomed small states from obscure areas and we celebrated them as contributors to world peace. And in fact many of these states which we were welcoming into the United Nations were neither viable nor having the trappings and features of being states. But

this was self-determination. And I like, we in the Gulf like, to see this self-determination applied to the people of Palestine. And definitely this will contribute to the stability, tranquility and the quiet of the region.

My fourth point is that we at this moment are embarking into negotiations with the United States with a view to concluding an economic agreement. We think that our cooperation on political matters will always be incomplete without trade and economic cooperation. Trade and economic cooperation between the G.C.C. and United States has been left on an ad hoc basis. It is our hope that we and the United States will be able to sign an economic agreement that ensures the flow of trade, that removes obstacles and lays down the basis for a continued fair equitable frame work that takes into consideration the interests of both sides.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my final point. I was interviewed three days ago by an Indian professor and she asked me what is the meaning of this Peninsula Shield you have somewhere in the Gulf. Peninsula Shield is a symbol of collective determination by the member states to defend themselves.

I said to her the Peninsula Shield is a group, a bunch of soldiers placed somewhere in our region as an illustration of the determination of member states to defend themselves. She asked me, "Is this illustration permanent or transitional?" She meant, "You use collective determination to defend yourselves. Is it based on a principle you believe in or an ad hoc arrangement to scare away the Iraq-Iran War?" My answer was the G.C.C. is a framework that regulates the efforts of the member states, that embodies their dreams for the future and also embodies their frustration with the present. The Peninsula Shield is only the tip of the iceberg for a determination of these member states to face the challenge of the next century collectively. And we in the Gulf believe that the challenges of the next century are of such a nature that individually it would be almost impossible to confront. Collectively we hope we will be able

to confront the challenges of the next century. So my final point is that the G.C.C. is an organization which expresses the determination of its member states to face the challenges of the future collectively. I referred earlier to the Iraq-Iran War, how we hoped that before we enter the next century the Iraq-Iran War will not be with us. But the present status quo should be with us because without the present status quo of frontiers and demographic structure of people, of the systems as they are, the Gulf will never be able to remain as an area that caters for the welfare of the international community. I thank you very much.

Letter and personal, the Council meeting is open to all organizations which have an interest in the Gulf region. It is a forum for the exchange of views and information. The Council can help in the development of the region by providing information, technical assistance, and other services. It can also help in the development of the region by providing information, technical assistance, and other services. It can also help in the development of the region by providing information, technical assistance, and other services.

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, DC
SEPTEMBER 23, 1986

With relations with the Gulf States, the Council is open to all organizations which have an interest in the Gulf region. It is a forum for the exchange of views and information. The Council can help in the development of the region by providing information, technical assistance, and other services. It can also help in the development of the region by providing information, technical assistance, and other services.

Ladies and gentlemen, my topic this evening is about the organization which I supervise in terms of its daily work. It contributes to tranquility and stability in the region. In the last five years since the inception of the Gulf Cooperation Council we have encountered problems, obstacles, threats, ultimatums, terrorism, interception of ships, subversive activities, leaflets distributed secretly, clandestine propaganda, hostile attitudes, public, secret, covert activities. In spite of this catalogue of unattractive events we have survived pretty well. We have, I think, told those who opposed us as prophets of doom that we have a congenital maturity in diplomacy and dialogue which so far has enabled us to head off problems and stave off threats. And how we did stave off threats! And how we did ward off problems! Now, we were not able to overcome threats by means of a miraculous agent which we possess but through patience, tolerance, accommodation, diplomacy and dialogue. And if you want to ask me what are the main features of the G.C.C. that contributed so far to the stability of the region, I would say, modestly, tolerance, moderation and dialogue. And these constitute our instrument for retaining our nerves and retaining our composure in the face of unimaginable, provocative challenges and unmanageable attempts to undermine what we own, and undermine our stability.

With patience we handled the Iranian literature, the Iranian rhetoric against the Gulf. With tolerance we were able to head off the threat of terrorism and intimidation by the perpetrators of terrorism. With dialogue we have been able to eliminate misunderstanding or any miscalculation with Iran or with any other regional power. Dialogue, tolerance and moderation are instruments which come with wisdom, without which one cannot survive. Survival need not come through armaments and troop movements or through provocative rhetoric. It can sometimes be achieved through the assumption of a compromising and accommodating posture. And we handled the Iraq-Iran War, we con-

tained it, we were able to, I would say, take a lot of its fire and its spark. Occasionally, yes, it erupts. Occasionally, yes, it comes and rages in flames but most of the time, in these rages, these flames are confined to the front of the two combatants, Iraq and Iran. How we were able to contain the Iraq-Iran War by keeping a dialogue with Iran. The Iranian rhetoric was tireless, no matter how difficult the statements were, no matter how the Sunday sermons were provocative and threatening. We have never lost our nerve or patience of conviction that dialogue will one day triumph over senselessness and over misunderstanding. Yes we combined dialogue with a certain sense of determination that when we are threatened, and seriously so, we will collectively defend our territorial integrity. And I tell you, frankly, the heads of state discuss that and as a symbol of their determination they have set up an armed force known as the Arabian Peace Shield to preserve the sovereignty and interest of the Cooperation Council. This is a symbol of determination, but determination which is based on dialogue with the combatants and dialogue with the world in order to bring pressure to bear on the two combatants to put an end to this tragic war. And more than that the Gulf should always be stable, should always be quiet, and that the navigation of routes should always be open in order to serve the world economy and in order to serve the balance of power in that very delicate and sensitive region. And I think we have been able, and successfully so, to contain, not only the war, but also to bring it to the attention of the world community. The Gulf would not have been the same today. And I remember in April 1981, I went with the foreign minister of Kuwait to Moscow, prior to the inception of the Gulf Cooperation Council, one month prior. I went to Moscow on an official visit with the delegation with the deputy prime minister and foreign minister as his advisor. I was at that time at the United Nations. Mr. Gromyko, the present president of the U.S.S.R. was our host for the third time and asked about the intention of the Gulf states to establish the Cooperation Council in order to provide for their security and in order to insure tranquillity and obtain predictability in that region. And we asked for the support of the Soviet Union

on such a move. And the response was from Mr. Gromyko as president, and I'm not spilling beans, this is now public, that the Soviet Union would watch very closely the development and progress of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If the Council emerges as a front for the interests of foreigners, the Soviet Union will not be in a position to support the Gulf Cooperation Council. On the other hand, if it emerges as an organization subservient to the interests of the indigenous people and to serve their interests and to protect the independence of the region of the Gulf and the member states, the Soviet Union will be in a position to support it.

That was in April 1981. Barely ten months ago, for the first time, a positive statement by the Soviet Union praised the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in providing stability and in providing an indigenous framework for cooperation on defense measures -- a system and a framework that spared the Gulf the adventures of foreigners or the intervention of foreign troops. And I thought that, after waiting and monitoring and examining and investigating us for 5 years, that was a statement which must be based on at least a well-balanced calculation. And I think, generally, after that statement, the Soviets displayed keen interest, not only in the development of the daily work of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but also in the context which the Council maintains with various capitals. And they asked me if I would be available in the future to visit one of their institutions to speak in such a manner on the Gulf Cooperation Council. I thought that this development attests to the objectivity of the Gulf Cooperation Council and attests to its ability to convince those who are reluctant and those who followed our initial development with half-hearted enthusiasm.

To the United States, I am very grateful. From the first day, the Gulf Cooperation Council received encouragement and understanding. From the western countries the G.C.C. received encouragement and support. From the world at large the Cooperation Council emerged now as a powerful, regional force. Its dynamics are not only directed to preserve and maintain security but its

dynamics are future looking and future oriented. Its dynamics are not only to preserve the status-quo, which is our objective in terms of security and to preserve the balance of power which is our objective at the moment, but to look forward with hope to the next century when the Gulf members--the six of them-- enter into the corridor of the next century shoulder to shoulder with determination to adopt the demands of the next century. And to conform to the challenges of the next century. In the corridor of the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council lies much aspiration and hope. Yes, at present we have some obstacles but these obstacles arise from without. They are not a product from within. Most of these obstacles are directed at the political map of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Because we stand for moderation, because we breathe out reason, we have become, by the logic of the Gulf Cooperation Council, by the nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the target of terrorism.

I was interviewed on TV this morning, and the first question raised was the equation between Arabs and terrorism and the equation of Arabs and their linkage with terrorism. And I regret to say it is a fact I accept. There is an attempt, in some media, to portray Arabs as terrorists whereas, in fact, we suffered more than anybody else, regional or otherwise, from terrorism. The head of state of Kuwait was a target of terrorism, and Kuwaiti institutional buildings, and U.A.E. buildings. Diplomats were gunned down in various capitals by terrorists and I think we take no backseat in terms of our confrontation, abhorrence, and condemnation of terrorism and definitely there is a lot in store for us in terrorism. And this emerges and emanates from two factors: one is the Iraq-Iran War. One day the Iraq-Iran will be a war of attrition rather than invasion, it will be a war of destabilization. It will be a war of terrorism and of subversion, but it will not have the ability to invade. The ability to conquer has been blunted and has been contained. And we are all ready, psychologically I would say, to combat and confront such a stage. We believe that there will be a coalition between terrorists who are an outproduct and byproduct of the Iraq-Iran War

and other terrorists in the region who see the GCC as a target because of its tolerant nature and because of its aversion to and hatred of terrorism and because of the fact that those who can sway the GCC have the upper say in Arab Politics. For this reason we will have a coalition, a collaboration of terrorists who are the product or the byproduct of the Iraq-Iran War and extremism which finds the G.C.C. as the bulwark against extremism and which finds the G.C.C. as a receptive target in order to create confusion and wreak havoc in the region. And I say this in the full knowledge that we and the heads of state at the summit conference in Muscat which was held last November for the third time adopted guidelines for strategy on the cooperation among member states to combat collectively and seriously and determinedly the fears and the dangers and the fallout of terrorism. We in the G.C.C. are working on our efforts to combat terrorism collectively. We have joint training, we have security forces, we have inflow of information, we have meetings of responsible officials in order to coordinate policy plans of the G.C.C. to combat this danger which has so far threatened us more than anybody else. And the combination of frustration and anger, the belief that the G.C.C. states are stemming the spread of extremism, our moderation and our nature of tolerance and acceptance and our hatred of violence --all these factors make us a good target and a good menu for terrorism. My final remark is that in my talks in the various capitals in Europe and in the United States and beyond, we feel it is imperative to have an international display of anger over the Iraq-Iran War. We think that it is imperative and of overriding importance to have an international display of opposition to this Iraq-Iran War. To my regret, and with sorrow I would say, I have not seen that. We have begged with capitals --to release statements that would underscore their sentiments of opposing the bloodshed and opposing the resort to force in order to effect change. Again, we have not been able to obtain such a mild statement. The United States has a role to assist in obtaining such a statement. You cannot underestimate the importance of general sentiment by the international community against the continuation of the Iraq-Iran War. Two years ago,

we went to the Security Council --we, the Gulf Cooperation Council-- and I was leading the technical team who was negotiating with various groups over text which we prepared. And the objective and aim of going to the Security Council-- not that we have illusions; I myself am more aware than my people about the limitation and the limits and the constraints of the Security Council-- was to obtain a document that we thought reflected the verdict of the international community over the Iraq-Iran War. And that document said that the G.C.C. member states should be immune from the fallout and should not be the target under any excuse of subversive activities. Something similar to that should be always obtained, without stealing.

There is international indignation against the use of force, or the resort to force, the employment of force by Iran for the settlement of disputes. There will never be an attentive ear to whatever request we put to Iran for the termination of this war. We in the G.C.C. always have a message of good will, of accommodation in the full knowledge that we are bound to live as neighbors. Consequently, we act in good faith and our good faith should not be eroded, and we have continued in that. But at the same time we cannot just close our eyes and turn our back on those who use force in our region in order to change the balance of power. The secret of the Gulf is the retention of the balance of power. The delicate balance of power, the frontiers we inherited should be maintained. The demographic structure should be kept. The tranquility should be kept. The region is a major providing source not only for energy but for moderation, for political accommodation. It serves the world, it serves the good will of the world. It is strategically valuable, not because it has deposits of oil, but because of its deposits also of rationality and sensibility. Because of all these features, it's very important to have a tranquil Gulf. The message of the G.C.C. is this --the retention of the balance of power, the maintenance of peace and tranquility. The G.C.C. is a framework that reflects the agony of today and expectations of tomorrow. I thank you very much.

**NBC - TV "ONE ON ONE"
WITH JOHN MCLAUGHLIN**

SEPTEMBER 28, 1986

MCLAUGHLIN : 49 years of age; spouse: Meriam, 20 Years, 1 son, 1 daughter; Cairo University, B.A.; Oxford University, Balliol and St. Johns, International Relations and African Studies, M.A.; Kuwaiti embassy Tunis, second secretary, one year; Foreign Ministry Cabinet, Kuwait, director of, seven years; Ambassador from Kuwait to Argentina and Brazil, ten years; United Nations, Permanent Representative, Kuwait, ten years; Foreign Minister of Kuwait, Ambassador, one year; Gulf Cooperation Council , Secretary General five years, and currently, Abdulla Bishara, it's One-on-One.

Mr. Secretary General, why are you in the United States?

BISHARA : I came here to put across the message of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The good will of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

MCLAUGHLIN : The Gulf Cooperation Council is the Persian [sic] Gulf Cooperation Council. Who are the members of that council?

BISHARA : Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman -- six member states.

MCLAUGHLIN : And they surround the Gulf and, opposite Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, is what country?

BISHARA : Iran.

MCLAUGHLIN : Iran.

BISHARA : Yes, and on the northern tip is Iraq.

MCLAUGHLIN : What percentage of OPEC oil is controlled by those six Cooperation Council members?

BISHARA : I would say fifty-five percent of the world's energy reservoir.

MCLAUGHLIN : Fifty-five percent?

BISHARA : I would say that.

MCLAUGHLIN : And what percent of the OPEC countries' oil is controlled by that group of countries?

BISHARA : Well, I think it's a considerable percentage.

MCLAUGHLIN : About, perhaps, seventy percent?

BISHARA : Well, I think so.

MCLAUGHLIN : What is the gross national product would you say, the combined gross national product? I have seen a figure of \$175 billion for all of those countries combined. Which, as you know, is about nine times the gross national product of Israel. It's a large and impressive group of countries, is it not?

BISHARA : Yes, I think you are right. It ranges between 175-180.

MCLAUGHLIN : Why did you form the Council?

BISHARA : In order to face the challenges of the future. Individually it's very hard, collectively it's easy. It is a strength.

MCLAUGHLIN : What was the individual thing, more than anything else, which prompted you to initiate the Council?

BISHARA : Conformity with the demands of the future.

MCLAUGHLIN : How about the Iran - Iraq War?

BISHARA : Well, it was a factor, but it was not the factor that triggered the Gulf Cooperation Council. It was created in conformity

with the demands of the people. People wanted the Gulf Cooperation Council.

MCLAUGHLIN : But you do provide for your mutual defence collectively, do you not?

BISHARA : We do. Yes.

MCLAUGHLIN : What is the ratio of military strength between the Gulf countries that you represent and Iran?

BISHARA : Well, you know the Iranians are 40 million people. They can mobilize as many as they can, while our manpower is very limited. And, in all fairness, we don't have a confrontational spirit. We don't have any intention to fight.

MCLAUGHLIN : But you are aware of the incursions on the part of the Iranians, the attempted air incursions into Saudi Arabia.

BISHARA : Yes I am aware. But these things are the fallout of the Iraq-Iran War. We can tackle, we can handle this. I think we've got it all.

MCLAUGHLIN : You find that the AWACS planes that have been supplied through the United States have helped the Saudi Arabians in determining what the movements are of those potentially enemy aircraft from Iran?

BISHARA : I find them very useful and I find them also the symbol of determination of the Gulf Cooperation Council to defend its own territorial integrity.

MCLAUGHLIN : How serious is the Iran-Iraq War? This very week marks the anniversary of six years of that war and the figures are undetermined as to how many lives have been lost. It is said that

up to one million lives may have been lost: 700,000 by Iranians, 300,000 by the Iraqis. Is that a fair statement?

BISHARA : I would say it's a fair statement if you count one million **casualties**, yes. But it's a very tragic war and we are determined and we have left no stone unturned to terminate, put an end to this war. But it's a wild goose chase. It's very difficult.

MCLAUGHLIN : Have you read the reports that this week there was a parade in Tehran and President Khomeini -- not the Ayatollah -- but president Khomeini said that he would fight for victory no matter what the cost. And that a new number of battalions, perhaps up to 300,000 men, are now going to form a new offensive for Iran and perhaps break into Iraq. How serious is the situation?

BISHARA : The situation is very serious. but I tell you frankly, we in the Gulf Cooperation Council, we are opposed to the use of force to determine and to settle disputes. We want this war to come to an end. We think the international community has a responsibility or moral obligation to pay more attention to what goes on between Iraq and Iran. Now Iraq is a status-quo power. Iraq wants a peaceful settlement.

MCLAUGHLIN : Who started the war?

BISHARA : It's the confusion, it is the illogic --

MCLAUGHLIN : Iraq crossed the borders of Iran.

BISHARA : No. It is not. I can dispute that. I'm not defending Iraq or blaming Iran. What really triggered the war was the illogical confusion of the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution

came with logic which we cannot accept in the Gulf-- the logic of changing the frontiers, changing the status quo by power. Now, we have nothing against Iran. We have to coexist.

MCLAUGHLIN : There are a number of Shiite populations. Now these tend to be rabid, Muslim fundamentalists, correct? And these Shiite populations, even in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, exist. They also exist in almost all of the member countries of your council. And they look to American observers like tinder to which a flame, if put to them, would explode into fire. Is that the fear of the Gulf nations?

BISHARA : No. We don't have fear which arises from within. We are not threatened within our own boundaries. Any threat, any saber-rattling noises come from outside, and we are pretty certain that we have no problems with our domestic indigenous people. We may have problems from outside. We have threats. We have all these dangers on the horizon. Definitely. We have hostile rhetoric in the area.

MCLAUGHLIN : The recent press reports indicate that Baghdad has the appearance of being under control, but it is no more under control than the Potemkin villages, that it is really very jittery, very nervous, that there are serious food shortages. Is that your impression?

BISHARA : That is not my impression. But I don't believe anybody can go through war for six years. This war lasted more than the First and the Second World Wars. And, definitely, it's bound to create it's own fallout -- psychological fallout, not only in

Baghdad, but also in our region. Do you think that we are not concerned? We are concerned.

MCLAUGHLIN : Jordan is concerned too?

BISHARA : Definitely.

MCLAUGHLIN : Many of these governments are very fragile, are they not?

BISHARA : No, they are not fragile, but their security is intertwined. The security of the Gulf, with Jordan, is intertwined. Jordan depends on the moderation and stability of the Gulf. If the Gulf is in trouble, Jordan is bound to be affected.

MCLAUGHLIN : On the one hand, you want international support for this situation. You want international, what, mediation? Do you think it can be solved by mediation?

BISHARA : I think it can be solved by powerful pressure on Iran to come to logic. And what's the logic? We don't want --

MCLAUGHLIN : Who's going to put that kind of pressure on the Ayatollah Khomeini?

BISHARA : Well, it is the international community. I don't see any international indignation against that war. I don't see it. The problem is change in the Gulf. We accept changes by nature, natural changes, but we cannot accept changes by tanks.

MCLAUGHLIN : I want to talk with you about what would happen if the Iraqis score a breakthrough and Iraq collapses, when we come back.

(Commercial break).

MCLAUGHLIN : A former head of the French intelligence said we know that France supplies Iraq with arms. And he is a very close observer of the Iraq-Iran War. If there were a breakthrough, a winning breakthrough on the part of Iran, and they're launching a new offensive, this is what he says would take place: "If you look at the map, as one must constantly, and imagine a **coup d'etat** in Baghdad, and the Baghdad we know becomes a Shiite Baghdad, it would be, at that very moment, the beginning of a huge Shiite empire that will stretch from Pakistan, if you note that on the map, all the way over to the Mediterranean". "One of the greatest perils," says Alexander de Marlenches, "of our era is a Shiite explosion. It would, in effect, be a triumph of the irrational and of fanaticism. If Baghdad were to be governed by a second Khomeini, it would be the death knell." Is that exaggerated?

BISHARA : I think so. You know, our philosophy in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and that's why I'm here in fact, to tell the world, is to keep the balance of power. A predominant role by a regional power over the other powers is bound to tip the balance of that regional power, and will bring in confusion to the world community, to the world economy, to the world strategical, global existence. And definitely we cannot accept a change in the strategic balance in the region.

MCLAUGHLIN : Yes, but, you cannot accept, you mean that these Gulf nations will not permit an Iranian win over Iraq? Is that what you are saying?

BISHARA : No. What we say is that we cannot accept tampering and

playing with the balance of power. We have to stick to it. Definitely we are bound to defend Iraq. We are bound to it.

MCLAUGHLIN : You've been defending Iraq for the last five years. The last six years. You've pumped in \$35 billion to defend Iraq.

BISHARA : Well, it is nothing in comparison with the casualties that Iraq has suffered. And I tell you frankly that Iraq is defending, not only their own territory, they are defending the balance of power.

MCLAUGHLIN : Look. If Iraq falls, and there are observers now who say that the likelihood is Iraq will fall, if that happens and you look at the map, you see that Syria, which is tied very closely to Iran, will open its borders. Then Lebanon will fall. And then Jordan will fall. That government is not all that stable. What about the threat on Israel? Let us assume, in a worst-case scenario, that that were to happen. What would then be the threat to Israel?

BISHARA : I think the whole region will be in confusion. It will be drowned in irrationality. I hope we will not reach that nightmarish stage. I earlier talked about the role of the international community. The international community must pay more attention to the situation there.

MCLAUGHLIN : If the Iranians were to win that war, what would be the threat to Israel?

BISHARA : The whole area will be relegated to irrationality. And I tell you frankly we can not imagine a change in the balance of power. That's why we come out ...

MCLAUGHLIN : Do you think that is an extreme scenario?

BISHARA : Oh, definitely.

MCLAUGHLIN : Do you think it has any probability?

BISHARA : No.

MCLAUGHLIN : You don't think that Iran can win this war.

BISHARA : I think Iran should not win this war. And Iran should know the futility of this war. That is the message we are going to put across, and already putting across -- how futile this crusade is to change the frontiers by force. We should not -- the world community -- should not accept it.

MCLAUGHLIN : What is the dependence of the United States on Persian Gulf oil?

BISHARA : A lot. Not in terms of percentage. But you know the United States is intertwined with Europe and Europe depends heavily on the energy of the Gulf, and Japan.

MCLAUGHLIN : If this war were to be resolved as I have indicated, in a worse case scenario, Iran were to win, Saudi Arabia would fall too.

BISHARA : The whole region would be totally absorbed in confusion.

MCLAUGHLIN : I don't want to exaggerate the situation there. But the reports coming out of that region now are not favorable towards Iran.

BISHARA : I tell you frankly I'm fed up with all those reports that come from that region.

MCLAUGHLIN : You think they're excessive?

BISHARA : So much. And exaggerating and provocative. I have been reading lately statements and reports --- very demoralizing reports on Iraq. It is unfair. I don't think they are accurate, I don't think they are objective. They are slanted, they are provocative and they are undermining the spirit of the ...

MCLAUGHLIN : Then what you're saying is that this war will be resolved in Iraq's favor.

BISHARA : No. What I am saying is that this war has to come to an end on the basis of coexistence and cohabitation as the French say. And, live and let others live.

MCLAUGHLIN : Khomeini has turned down all the efforts at accommodation--you know that. What makes you think that diplomacy is going to resolve this war?

BISHARA : No. What makes me think is that if there is an international stand, all for one, that this crusade should be blunted, and that the war should come to end and that the futility of this war should be forcefully shown I think . . .

MCLAUGHLIN : I want to devote just a little more time to this subject before I talk to you about terrorism. And my question to you is this: you are an experienced diplomat, you spent ten years representing the government of Kuwait at the United Nations. It was in your apartment that Andrew Young met with the Palestinian representatives to the United Nations in a meeting that was originally underpublicized and then publicized. You know where all the bodies are buried, so to speak. You know diplomacy inside out. You tell me how you can put a group together, any kind of an international group, that can

exert pressure to make this war come to an end in which maybe a million lives have been lost between Iran and Iraq.

BISHARA : I feel that there is complacency in the world about this war. I feel that there is indifference. I feel that the world community is able really to put pressure to bear on Iran. I don't see it.

MCLAUGHLIN : How? How? How? The United Nations? It's a toothless tiger.

BISHARA : It's not. It is toothless in terms of implementation, but also it reflects the international community indignation. It has moral weight. It doesn't have incisive teeth but it has moral weight.

MCLAUGHLIN : Your council controls an enormous amount of oil, the largest deposit of oil of any region in the world. It is strategically, arguably, the most important waterway in the world and you cannot put a group together that will force an accommodation between these two warring powers. What makes you think that any other international entity can do so?

BISHARA : I think that the world is able really to put pressure to bear. But I am not happy with the role of the world community. I see laxity, I see relaxation, complacency. And I see indifference. And that's why we are really globe-trotting everywhere to tell the world how important it is to come to its senses. And how important it is to send a message to Iran that this war should come to an end.

MCLAUGHLIN : I want to talk to you about terrorism. I want to talk to you about what is happening to the Arab image as a result of terrorism.

(Commercial break)

MCLAUGHLIN : Mr. Secretary General, I'd like to ask you this question. You know that Arabs are playing a very prominent role in world terrorism. We have Abu Nidal, we have Abu Musa, we have the Achille Lauro, we have the German discotheque which precipitated the American strike against Libya. We have the murders, 17 of them took place in the synagogue in Istanbul, we have Pakistan -- the list is almost endless. In 1970 you complained to the **New York Times** about Americans who are not right in their perception of the Arabs as corrupt, treacherous and unpredictable. But isn't this kind of activity leaving the Arabs with that kind of an image?

BISHARA : Listen, it's a very bad image. Terrorism is bad. We condemn it. Condemnable. But it is unfair, really, to lump all Arabs together and portray them as terrorists. There are outlaws. There are outcasts. And these people are crazy, they are outcast. They don't belong to the mainstream of Arab psychology and Arab thinking. And I beg that this is the knowledge of every reasonable American, that this is the feeling of every reasonable American. Now to portray the Arabs as terrorists in a situation which does not distinguish between outcasts and the majority of the Arabs who are totally against and condemn this terrorism is unfair.

MCLAUGHLIN : Let me ask you this question. There are six Americans being held in Lebanon and they've been there for a long period of time. Why is it not possible for your council to exert such leverage -- you talk about the importance of diplomatic leverage -- to exert such leverage on Syria and on the government in Lebanon to force the release of those six Americans who are suffering such agony over there. Why can't you do something about that?

BISHARA : You know, we cannot accept the compliance with the demands of terrorists. We cannot accept that. We ourselves are victims of terrorists in our GCC. We suffer from terrorism. We are now collectively trying to combat terrorism. Why don't we put any pressure on the Syrians or the Lebanese government? We don't know anything about these six Americans. No one knows who holds them, no one knows who keeps them hostages. But in the final answer, we should not encourage terrorism by giving in to the demands of the terrorists.

MCLAUGHLIN : What do you think the United States should do with regard to terrorism. First of all, do you deplore--

BISHARA : We condemn.

MCLAUGHLIN : I know you condemn terrorism, but what about those governments that house terrorists. Do you deplore the behavior of Muammar Khadafi?

BISHARA : Well, I have nothing to do with whatever you say about Libya. I am not aware of the role of the Libyans and any terrorist action and I cannot really align myself or align what

the sentiment of the GCC will be towards this accusation. I cannot.

MCLAUGHLIN : You deny that the government of Libya has been involved in terrorist activity in a state-sponsored terrorist way?

BISHARA : I tell you frankly I'm not privy to any information about that. I don't know. And I cannot accuse anybody on the basis of hearsay.

MCLAUGHLIN : Do you approve of the Libyan raid by the the United States: The Libyan air strike?

BISHARA : No.

MCLAUGHLIN : In an effort to eliminate state terrorism there?

BISHARA : No. No. Listen, first of all I am an Arab and I have a sentiment. Notwithstanding whatever political differences, I must retain this sentiment of Arabism and I cannot accept resorting to force by a state against another state. Now, we are against Iran, not because we have any special, uh--

MCLAUGHLIN : Let me ask you one final question. Please, we'll both have to be brief on this. The question is this: if there were a Palestinian homeland, how much would terrorism be reduced in your judgment?

BISHARA : Well, I think it would be reduced but it can not be eliminated.

MCLAUGHLIN : How much do you think it would be reduced?

BISHARA : I really don't know.

MCLAUGHLIN : Would it be cut in half?

BISHARA : I don't know.

MCLAUGHLIN : Well, they're mostly Palestinians who are involved in the terrorist attacks.

BISHARA : Unfair. You know the majority, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians are against terrorism. These are outcasts. They have their own desperation, they have their own complaints, their own reasons.

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL :
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

American - Arab Affairs Council
29, Louis University
Moscow, U.S.A.

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ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

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Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express my sense of gratitude to the American-Arab Affairs Council, to St. Louis University, to all who contributed to the success of this seminar and to all who travelled from all sections of the United States to be present here. And I must admit that it is very difficult for me to review what we have achieved in two years in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) in a 15-minute address. In 1974 when I was the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United Nations in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, I was invited to speak at New York University on American foreign policy on the Middle East. I foolishly enumerated 12 points which I called the dozen defects of U.S. policy on the Middle East. I spoke there for 40 minutes, and when it was time for the question and answer session, the first question came from a man who was over 60 who had a buffalo-like body. I asked him what his question was, and he said that after listening to my list of 12 defects of U.S. policy on the Middle East he wanted to add one to make 13. I asked what the 13th defect was. He said the United States committed a big mistake by accepting me as Ambassador to the United Nations! I believe there is some justification in his saying that, bearing in mind the indignation at that time in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Well, let me discuss the GCC. Since you don't come to Riyadh to be informed, to be familiarized with what we do, how we live, what circumstances we work under, it is my pleasure to come to you and give you some glimpses of our activities. Unlike many developing countries, the Gulf states achieved in the 1970s things which made possible the creation of the GCC - political and economic emancipation. These two factors, which many countries in the world desire but have not yet attained, brought about the emergence of the GCC.

You have to bear in mind that what we have done is merge six separate entities, starting from Kuwait in the north down to Oman in the south. Pulling together six different experiences and six different experiments, in an attempt to bring about a durable consensus which would be the basis of the GCC to

build upon for the future, is not an easy task. So if you were to ask me what challenges we face, the first I would single out is the challenge of bringing about a durable consensus extracted from six different experiments, working out the framework and providing a catalyst for future activities in the Gulf.

Let me say with a certain sense of nostalgia that we in the Gulf owe a great deal to the Syrian thinkers of the early 20th century. In 1916 many wise Syrians held a strong yearning for Arab unity. Their dream was to obtain Arab unity regardless of the forces of regionalism or the demands of nationalism. To them the right prescription for an effective cure of the Arab ailment was Arab unity. They never saw the realization of their dream. In 1958 the first product of their dream came about in Syrian–Egyptian unity. Despite the fact that that experiment of 1958 met with a lot of difficulties and ended with a setback, we in the Gulf drew on the expertise of those pioneers. The idea of Arab unity played a role in the GCC. It had a role because it planted in the minds of the people in the Gulf, perhaps imperceptibly, perhaps unconsciously, the nobility, the forcefulness and the wholeness of the concept of unity. And when the GCC merged on the 25th of May 1981 in the city of Abu Dhabi, at a meeting at the Intercontinental Hotel, no matter what we were able to admit at that time, that dream of the great Arab pioneers who strove for Arab unity was there.

Now what really triggered the creation of the GCC? Admittedly the pioneering role of the Arab intellectuals for Arab unity and the merit of the idea of Arab unity were there, but they were not enough. In the Gulf area, we never thought of ourselves as separate. There has always been a sense of oneness in destiny, hope and fate, identity in environmental surroundings, political and social as well as economic. I remember that my compatriots, the Kuwaitis, in the 1940s and 1950s travelled down the Gulf without any official papers. It was that strong sense of oneness that brought the Gulf together in its present modern structure, in the GCC.

On the 25th of May 1981 the heads of state signed two important documents. One is the charter of the GCC. The essence of the charter is the unity of the Gulf. They adopted another document, supplementary but no less fundamental than the charter, calling for economic integration. They made it a point that economic integration is not a goal in itself, but merely a means for the attainment of the final objective. Economic integration in the Gulf as stated in GCC documents is a vehicle for obtaining the goals as reflected in the charter of the GCC, and not the target. Economic integration, since then a watchword in Gulf politics, means one common market with a coordinated policy on industry, agriculture, trade and other related matters.

Integration, economic and social, is a vehicle for bringing about the final objective, which is the unity of the Gulf.

Economic integration as it is interpreted in the secretariat of the GCC also means complementarity in infrastructure. I would say for the first time in the history of the Gulf we adopted a collective approach to problems ranging from export–import to the establishment and the construction of logistics and infrastructure. And because of our newness to a collective approach and to joint effort, we are bound to have problems. But we made it a point from the outset, both in the secretariat of the GCC and with member states, that today's problem, no matter how intractable, could be a soluble one tomorrow.

The first stage of economic integration went into force in March 1983, following implementation of the economic accord that the heads of state signed in November 1982. I myself was surprised by their easy compliance with requirements of the first stage. For the first time in the history of the Gulf, nationals regardless of their origin can move freely to exercise certain economic activities without the requirements of legislation or the imposition of a bureaucratic solution. What we achieved in March this year is a beginning, but we feel that such a modest step is a symbol rather than a fulfillment of our

determination to reach our final goal of confronting issues collectively. The era of individual approach to major issues in the Gulf is almost—I underline the word almost—over.

Our target is that by the end of 1980s, the Gulf will be one common market, with all the obligations and privileges which that step entails. By the end of this decade the Gulf will have the qualities stipulated in the economic accord which the heads of state signed in 1982. We will have completed the requirements of our infrastructure. We hope to be able to deepen ports and to have an extensive system of transportation, telecommunications and civil aviation.

We believe that what we have achieved so far is an indication of our determination, but it is not an illustration of our ambition. This means that the emergence of the Gulf as one solid economic entity should be taken into consideration by international business communities. I must say that when I came to New York two months ago on an official visit related to the GCC, I felt that there wasn't an understanding of what the role of the GCC meant to the business community. The heads of state have approved the emergence of the Gulf Investment Organization with a capital of two billion dollars, the objective of which is to finance economic projects in the Gulf and outside it. The Gulf Investment Organization will operate on a commercial basis, and I believe it will have a strong impact on international commercial and financial institutions. The first meeting of the board of the Gulf Investment Organization will take place shortly in Riyadh. We hope that by creating the Gulf Investment Organization as an instrument of financing economic projects, our ability to confront economic issues collectively will be enhanced.

When The heads of state in Abu Dhabi initially signed the charter of the GCC and the guidelines for economic cooperation, they issued a communique on the final day of their deliberations. The first duty I undertook as Secretary General of the GCC was to read out that final declaration of the first summit of

the GCC. The communique defines the foreign policy of the GCC; it underlines the importance of nonalignment. The essence of nonalignment as we perceive it in the Gulf is to pursue an unceasing and unflagging search for Arab consensus for a broad and imaginative approach to regional issues, and to rely on whatever means we have for defense, security and the survival of our region. In that document the role of the GCC in Arab politics was defined as one of conciliation, a mission of goodwill, a contribution to the reduction of tension between Arab states, an element of harmony rather than discord, dialogue rather than confrontation and polarization. Since the adoption of that document we have scrupulously upheld the spirit and the letter of that provision, working collectively to reduce tension and plant harmony instead of discord. We believe that we have an inherent right to provide some conciliation, to provide some rationality to the present mood in Arab politics.

On the foreign policy of the GCC, the heads of state were unequivocal in their adherence to the policy of self-reliance. This is another catch-phrase in Gulf politics; apart from "economic integration" we have the term "self-reliance," with which we have become so obsessed in the Gulf. Self-reliance means that we have to rely on ourselves, on our own intellectual, diplomatic, political and military resources, to ensure the security and the stability of the Gulf. Here it should be clearly understood that we in the Gulf have no certain liking for foreign troops to defend our own future and to defend our own sovereignty. We believe that we can, by approaching this issue collectively, ensure the survival of our sovereignty and the continuous security of the Gulf. In this respect it should be noted that we in the Gulf do not feel quite at ease with references to foreign intervention in order to defend the security of the Gulf states. We believe that our mission is to ensure that the Gulf is free from super-power rivalry, free from great power naval contention and competition. We want to see that Gulf stability is ensured by the littoral states themselves. In this context I'd like to stress that we feel that the security of the Gulf is not

threatened by certain academic references but by the fact that the Middle East question has not been resolved. We have to say in all fairness that it is impossible to separate the security of the Gulf from the question of Palestine. No matter that we say, the Gulf will never be able to arrive at security and stability unless the question of the Middle East is resolved.

The second issue that clouds the security of the Gulf is the Iraq-Iran War. The Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates and the Deputy Prime Minister of Kuwait went to Tehran and Baghdad to display the good offices of the GCC in order to ensure the peace and stability of the Gulf and in order to put an end to this tragic war. Unfortunately, things did not develop the way we would like. However, notwithstanding that, we cannot give up, we have to continue without any let-up the effort of bringing about an end to this tragic war. We believe quite honestly that as long as the war continues the stability of the Gulf is not 100 percent guaranteed.

We have also sought a foreign policy that takes into account the security and integrity of the Arabian Peninsula. In other words, the Gulf is surrounded by three wars, the Middle East war, the Iraqi-Iranian war and the situation in the Horn of Africa. So we have been quite active in our endeavor to strengthen our relationship with the two Yemens. I have gone to Sanaa and to Aden with a spirit of goodwill and a view to achieving some understanding that our security is inseparable and that the people of Yemen and the people of the Gulf are one and that the concerns of Yemen cannot be separated from the concerns of the Gulf. In that respect the GCC has succeeded in reducing tension between Oman and South Yemen. And we have succeeded in containing sources of other tension in that area. We hope that in the days to come we will witness a better climate between South Yemen and Oman, but generally we have been able to resolve the thorny issue between the two countries and to cement a very strong economic relationship with North Yemen. Recently an economic delegation went to both Yemens from the GCC, aided by an assistant for polit-

ical affairs. The came back with a very strong report urging us to take into consideration the dire need of the two Yemens for economic aid, as well as for some sort of constructive dialogue between the GCC and the two Yemens.

We believe that there are no alternatives to self-reliance and a strong determination to ensure the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. And that's a costly endeavor, because we have to engage in a process of consultation, dialogue and persuasion in order to ward off threats and danger. I believe that in terms of economic integration and in terms of our collective approach to security matters, we have made positive strides. But we do have problems. For six separate political entities to work together all of a sudden on the basis of a consensus is not an easy undertaking. We have to bear in mind that the national interests of all six member states still operate forcefully. We must understand that a bureaucratic, regimented democracy is very difficult to mold to the requirements of our collective approach. It is true that we also have problems in defining our own priorities, but with the process of consultation and dialogue and with our endless scope of meetings, we have been able to define our own priorities. We cannot try to achieve our final objectives with one stroke, and that's why we divided our economic agreement into three stages. Politically, we were able to define our immediate goal at this juncture as a process of confederation rather than political integration. As to security matters, there are some with approaches that have a certain legitimacy who want to expedite our pace on security measures. Others think that the best thing is to have economic integration as a vehicle for the attainment of the final objective. But by and large, we have been able to achieve a consensus on foreign policy and security priorities.

In our relation with the United States I believe that the only irritation element is the Middle East question. I am told that the threat that looms large on the Gulf comes from the Soviet Union. To me that is not very convincing, as I feel that the threat from the inability to achieve a fair and a just solution of the

Middle East problem is far more dangerous than a remote threat that might come from Afghanistan or other quarters. This separation of the Gulf from the mainstream of Arab politics is impossible. I believe that it would be much better for the interests of the U.S. as well as the GCC if we realized that the stability of the Gulf cannot be isolated from the problem of the Middle East.

Some people think that the power of persuasion which the GCC has could be utilized for the advancement of American plans, projects, ideas and theories on the Middle East. I was at the United Nations when the Camp David accords were signed. I was amazed by the vehemence of my American friends in the U.S. delegation who related their hope that a country like Saudi Arabia would convince Syria or the PLO to join in the Camp David accords. We feel that this arises either from misunderstanding or from an incomprehensible set of priorities which does not jibe with our interests. Recent events have rather eliminated the hope that the Gulf states would utilize their power of persuasion for the advancement of plans, projects or whatever theories the Americans would offer. I am glad to note that the hope they placed in the power of Saudi Arabia to engage in a process which is futile to the Gulf and to international interests has disappeared.

In the GCC we follow scrupulously the principle that our actions, steps and deeds should be credible. If we gave out pronouncements and issued declarations that we could not implement, our credibility would be jeopardized and our ability to fulfill our ambition would be questioned. That is why we have followed a credo in the GCC that in both foreign and domestic policy our promises should be compatible with our ability to deliver. It is a point which we made clearly at the ministers' conference that took place in Tyre recently. We also thought that all of a sudden many countries expected more from us than we could deliver. I myself have been subjected to numerous invitations to come to these countries in the hope that we might engage in the economic develop-

ment of their projects. We have tried to refrain from raising great expectations when their fulfillment is not in the realm of possibility for the GCC.

I have always said that without public opinion in the Gulf we will be misled and mislead. I am an advocate of the power of public opinion. In the Gulf, we have encouraged public debate that questions what we do. Without public opinion I am afraid that we may develop a monologue or a dialogue with governments rather than with our legitimate constituency, the people of the Gulf. We pride ourselves that the GCC is a reflection of the aspirations of the people and that what our heads of state did on the 25th of May 1981 was to articulate their yearnings and aspirations. We in the GCC are the advocates of the creation of a public awareness that would scrutinize what we do, question what we achieve and our motives, take us to task if we depart from the objectives expressed by the heads of state in official documents. I always say to our generals in the Gulf that yes, we have difficulties, but a collective approach is something new to the Gulf; it is a merger of six experiments, I tell them that I myself enjoyed my bachelorhood and when I got married I had difficulties in the early years of marriage because I was not adapted to partnership, but rather to individualism. It will take time for us in the GCC to comply with the requirements of the collective approach. But we have to bear in mind the Chinese adage, "It's better to light a candle than curse the dark".

The Nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council

Presently the Gulf is imperiled by war, and the target of confusion and armed conflict. The GCC has been the main stabilizing force, working to maintain the predictability of Gulf economic and political affairs even as the conflict rages. The essential nature of the GCC is moderation; we preach cooperation, coexistence, peaceful resolution of conflicts, compromise and accommodation. The GCC is a forward-looking organization and embodies the aspirations of the member states, but we embrace change only when it is peaceful, based on persuasion and consensus. The use of force or coercive change is absolutely unacceptable to us. Moderation is the essence of the societies and governments that make up the GCC.

Another important quality in the GCC is flexibility. This is the basis of cooperation. The heads of state are used to patience, quiet persuasion, consensus - building and cooperative decision making. These have been our traditional political tools, and they form today the foundation of unity within the GCC and of cooperation in the region. Moderation and flexibility form our natural system of operation. They are our breath, our philosophy.

These qualities do not prevent us from taking firm positions; indeed, they strengthen us in the positions which we do undertake. The member states share a deep-seated consensus that we must coordinate and integrate our economies as a natural unit. But the GCC is more than economic integration, more than a common market, for to ensure continued prosperity there must be stability in the environment. Our consensus in security matters is based on the independence of the Gulf, assertive self-determination and collective self-defense. Our security needs can be served only by self-reliance.

The coordination of our armed forces into a "peninsular shield" is a symbol of our will for collective security measures and spirited defense. As a shield it threatens no one and serves no policy of intervention. The peninsular shield

is the embodiment of our determination to protect our territory now and into the next century. We entertain no false hopes of external support, nor even the possibility of requesting such action. A call on foreign troops to help defend our territory would truly be the kiss of death for us; foreign intervention would be a prescription for disaster. If we can't defend ourselves, it is irrational for us to expect to survive as sovereign states.

The GCC is an all-embracing structure which was formed to meet the future needs of the member states as they arise. It is a natural, self supporting organization, an irreversible force. The GCC is the bulwark of moderation and stability in successfully containing the spread of the Iran-Iraq war and sparing the Gulf foreign intervention. Without it, Gulf history would be very different today.

The Significance of the Gulf Region :

The Gulf as it is today is unique and valuable for many reasons. First there is its strategic location, of enduring value to world trade and communication and to a stable relationship between the East and West. It is also the heart of both the Arab and Islamic worlds. Then there is the constructive, stabilizing role its governments play in regional affairs and world councils, always upholding the value of moderation and understanding. Finally, there are the oil resources, important now for world economic health, and even more critical to future global prosperity in the 1990s and beyond. With these resources come unique responsibilities in the fields of energy policy, international finance, and trade and development. In shouldering responsibilities in these fields, the GCC member states have always worked to moderate extremes, to preserve stability and enhance predictability.

In these roles the GCC states are fulfilling their own needs and following their own political values, but the needs of the greater world community are

served at the same time. From Latin American villagers to businessmen in Japan, all are affected by the Gulf.

We are determined to preserve the unique value and role of the Gulf in today's international system. For instance, the GCC has provided a structure for the member states to coordinate an energy policy which is consistent with our interests and which will also serve the consuming nations. States like Japan, which are so dependent on Gulf oil trade, are entitled to assurances regarding price and supply. With such a sensitive dependency, they deserve consideration. As a result, the GCC's oil ministers recently met and articulated our energy policy: predictability of supply with regard to energy exports, and a price which promotes a healthy world economy. Currently this means about \$15-20 a barrel. This is the kind of positive and beneficial effect that rises from the status quo in the Gulf today.

Importance of Stability in the Gulf :

We in the Gulf have become passionate about security. We want to prosper, to maintain our international message of the value of moderation and understanding, to continue to participate positively in the world economy. The GCC is a product of the status quo, and it seeks to preserve stability in the region. This stability rests on the balance of power in the Gulf. Internally, the GCC states face very few security threats. It is the use of force which threatens the status quo and tries to upset the balance of power; we abhor and condemn the use of force. Regional stability must be based on coexistence and understanding.

The GCC believes the Gulf must remain intact as it is. This is in everyone's interest. We have worked through diplomacy and moderation to contain the conflict of the Iran-Iraq war, and have emphasized everywhere the danger of its spreading. If it does spread, the floodgates of confusion will be opened. The regional powers are aware of what is at stake of they expand the conflict and tamper with Gulf-wide security. Both superpowers have acknowledged and

welcomed the stabilizing effect of the GCC on the region. Not just oil consumers, but the whole world community with its myriad links to the Gulf, has benefitted from the containment of violence. Even Iran, whose use of force we have opposed, benefits from the GCC, as we contribute to a stable environment.

Evolution of the GCC

When the GCC held its first summit meeting on May 25, 1981, the heads of state had no firm prior knowledge of the organization's ultimate form. When I was named its first secretary general, we adopted certain guidelines as a cornerstone. In addition to pledging ourselves to economic integration, the identity of the GCC as an independent entity in the Gulf was emphasized, with self-reliance on the foundation of its collective defense and security.

From May to November of that year, economic coordination was stressed. At the second heads of state summit, in November 1981, Oman argued for greater emphasis on security issues, while trade-oriented states like Kuwait stressed economic issues. A traditional openness in the Gulf has made trade the basis of life for many states in the region. But the Omanis, in whose territory lies the strategic Hormus Strait, are naturally interested in security issues, and the second summit agreed to send a delegation to Oman in recognition of its legitimate concerns.

The report submitted by the delegation galvanized GCC interest in improving our collective defense posture. In January of 1982, the first meeting of GCC defense ministers was convened as a result of this report. Meanwhile, other events helped determine this course of events, for Bahrain had experienced an externally inspired coup attempt in December 1981. Strengthened cooperation among interior ministers regarding internal security also became a high priority.

Throughout 1982 and 1983, we laid the groundwork for a joint military force and collective air defense system. In late 1983 we held the first joint military maneuvers ever in our part of the world. The GCC also raised its profile in the regional and international arenas as it moved beyond internal preoccupations to deal diplomatically with the Iran-Iraq war. The war, which had begun in 1980, took several years to spread beyond a land-based conflict to attacks on shipping in the Gulf. As long as it remained land-bound, we concentrated on GCC military modernization and coordination at our own pace.

Beginning in 1984, the GCC launched an international campaign to obtain a clear consensus on the active neutrality of the GCC member states on the Iran-Iraq war. We went to the U.N Security Council in response to the Iranian shipping attacks, and it reaffirmed the doctrine of non-acquisition of territory as a result of war. The international consensus on GCC neutrality reduces the temptation to the combatants to expand the war. The peak of the threat to Gulf stability occurred in March 1986 when an Iranian offensive struck Iraq and showed signs of spilling over into Kuwait. Since the failure of this offensive, it now appears that neither side has the power to break the deadlock in the land war.

This is how the GCC has dealt with security problems, by patiently applying the political values in our tradition. With tolerance we defused provocation, with dialogue we ruled out miscalculations, through diplomacy we validated our neutrality, and through the moderation of all our policies we contained the spread of the war. Through reason and compromise the GCC has deflected many threats, including subversion, propaganda, menacing rhetoric, and the interception of shipping.

The GCC and the Superpowers : Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was initially suspicious of our motives in forming the Gulf Cooperation Council. On the eve of its formation, I visited Moscow as part

of a Kuwaiti diplomatic delegation, and Foreign minister Gromyko warned us that the Soviet Union would watch carefully to see whether the GCC followed non-aligned policies or served pro-Western interests. Five years later, the USSR praises the system and framework of the GCC as a genuinely indigenous organization and authentic local expression. In 1985, the U.A.E. and Oman followed the earlier example of Kuwait in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a development which could have happened only as a result of Soviet recognition of the GCC as a stabilizing force against the confusion of the Iran-Iraq war and foreign intervention. Now the Soviet attitude is actively positive: they know we will work to defuse crises in the Gulf, and we will never invite any foreign forces into the region.

The GCC and the Superpowers : United States

Good relations with the United States are very important to us. A GCC a US economic agreement is currently being negotiated to increase the benefits in the economic relationship to both sides. We believe that trade and economic cooperation should not be ad hoc, but should follow a formalized framework which promotes fairness and growth in the relationship.

The U.S. has shown a great understanding of the need for stability in the Gulf, of the dangers of the spread of conflict there, and of the useful, indeed essential, role of the GCC in the region. We appreciate the diplomatic support we have received from the U.S. which has discouraged reckless moves or expansion of fighting in the Iran - Iraq war. The U.S. clearly recognizes the importance of its interests and those of its Western allies in a peaceful, intact Gulf. Since the continued maintenance of the regional balance of power necessitates an improvement in the GCC's collective self-defense capabilities, we expect to find an attentive ear if we should come to the U.S. for the acquisition of defensive military systems. Our requests must be judged on their own merits, and not made a plaything of domestic U.S. politics or confused with

extraneous issues. We expect much more from a superpower with critical interests in the region; certainly it should judge serious security issues on their own merits.

The GCC and Europe :

The European states have a distinctive link to the region and important roles in trade, development and finance in addition to their dependence on our oil exports. We expect them to recognize the importance of the Gulf to their interests and to assist where they can with local problems which may affect them. After the U.N. Security Council passed the resolution affirming the neutrality of the GCC States, I traveled to European capitals in an effort to prompt similar strong stands by their national governments. We asked for strong public statements condemning the use of force and the issuance of warnings against any expansion of the conflict. Unfortunately, these pronouncements have not been forthcoming.

France should be singled out for the helpful role it has played. It has shown an understanding of the need to maintain the balance of power in the Gulf and we appreciate the action role it has taken.

The GCC : Relations with Iraq and Iran

The GCC has not been hostile to the Iranian revolution, nor even to the rhetoric of the revolution. In the beginning, Iran called for the overthrow of the moderate regimes in the area, but we can tolerate hostile propaganda. It did not represent a real threat to us. But it soon became clear that the Iranian government wanted to change the political texture of the region by resorting to force. And in its disputes with Iraq, it has resorted to force.

We cannot tolerate the use of force in the region, particularly when it seeks to eradicate the balance of power. The GCC supports the current bal-

ance of power. We are states that emerged from the status quo, and our unique role in the international system depends on the continuation of the status quo.

Our political philosophy calls for toleration and compromise. We are all destined to be neighbors in the Gulf, and we believe coexistence is the only solution to regional rivalries. At the GCC heads of state summit in November 1985, we projected a very conciliatory attitude toward Iran and called for the termination of the war. The Baghdad government agreed with this stand and the desirability of a negotiated settlement. Tehran did not accept the good offices of the GCC to mediate between the two sides, even though it wanted to improve its bilateral relations with us. The GCC states have insisted on the need for understanding in the region and for a dialogue between Iran and Iraq.

The GCC and Syria

The GCC does not accept the Syrian argument that confinement of the war to Iran and Iraq does not present a serious threat. We argue that their aid is wrong because it prolongs the conflict, and any prolongation is dangerous.

The Current Threat: Spread of War

As I have emphasized, the Gulf plays a critical and unique role in the international system. Any disruption in the region due to the spread of the war would harm the whole international community. Thus the current challenge is not for the GCC alone, but for other interested parties, also, to contain the spread of violence.

We face two threats:

1. The frontline frustration in the land war has led to attacks on shipping in the Gulf. There were 53 major attacks in 1984, 55 in 1985, and in the first nine months of 1986 we have already seen 61 attacks. Obviously the combat-

ants are practicing less restraint. The importance of international commerce demands an international response.

2. It is becoming increasingly clear in the war that each side's ability to invade is contained by the other's strength. This may well lead to a bitter war of attrition. Terrorist and commando strikes will probably result, and possibly include the GCC states as targets. Extremists will be tempted to strike against the GCC as a bulwark of moderation, and oil facilities on which the world depends could become targets.

Considering these threats, it is imperative to have an international display of opposition to the Iran-Iraq war. International awareness and concern will be a restraining factor. International complacency over the war will tempt the disruptive forces into believing they can plan strikes with impunity. We need a stronger manifestation of international concern, and more global cooperation in stemming the re-armament supplies to the Gulf.

Conclusion

This is the context of the GCC—it serves the internal needs of the member states in economics and security, and it works to preserve the balance of power in the Gulf. Even as we work for stability and the preservation of the status quo, the dynamics of the GCC are future-oriented. There is simply no alternative to the GCC and its traditional political values. No other imaginable framework would be suitable or workable.

Questions and Answers:

- Q.** How far along the road of unification do you foresee the GCC traveling? Will Sovereignty be affected by integration?
- A.** The GCC is an irreversible process, but its main characteristic is flexibility. There is no imposition or embarrassment to any member state. Instead, we follow a practice of exemption: when consensus is lacking, and one or more members have difficulty with a policy direction, we exempt the issue temporarily.

ily and turn to other areas where greater consensus exists. We practice persuasion. There is no loss of sovereignty. The word cooperation is key, that is why it was chosen for the name of the Council, not federation or union.

Q. Will the GCC expand? It would seem that other regional Arab states would be eligible for membership, such as Iraq or the Yemens.

A. The GCC is not dogmatic about politics, but we are definitely "like-minded" states. In particular, we adhere to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. But we observe meticulously the Arab consensus and we want the GCC to be a support for Arab unity.

Q. What is the GCC's role in the Arab - Israeli dispute?

A. It is up to the countries in that region to initiate their own future. As a regional organization we will concentrate on the Gulf, and support the general Arab consensus regarding affairs in the eastern Mediterranean region. However, regardless of the outcome of the Iran - Iraq war, we in the Gulf will definitely remain affected by the Arab-Israeli dispute. Without a fair and durable settlement, clouds of confusion and uncertainty will hang over the Gulf.

Since this is an American audience, I would like to stress that it was Woodrow Wilson who enunciated and popularized the principle of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This generally is the idea of the people in the Gulf regarding the Arab - Israeli dispute, that the missing ingredient to peace has been self-determination. This principle was the cornerstone in the Fez Resolution of the Arab Summit and of the Jordan/PLO peace plan; we wish it was reflected in the policies of the main diplomatic actors in the conflict.

Q. How are GCC-U.S. relations affected by the Arab - Israeli dispute?

A. They are very affected. U.S. credibility in our region has been seriously damaged; no one any longer entertains the belief that America will push strongly for a fair and durable peace. America is regrettably seen by many as a party to the conflict, not a mediator, because in local eyes, it has become blind to all but the

Israeli positions. There is a store of goodwill in the Gulf toward the U.S. as a leader in education and technology, but no goodwill for U.S. policies which support the acquisition of territory by force as practiced by nearly every Israeli government.

Q. What is the likelihood of an Iranian victory? Would the GCC be forced to intervene if one were imminent?

A. We cannot accept the triumph of one regional power over another. Such a disruption of the balance of power would result in hegemony in the Gulf. However, GCC forces would not intervene; they are modest in any case and designed for self-defense, not offense. Our policy is to support Iraq in its efforts to head off threats of invasion.

Q. What actions do you urge for the U.S. in the Gulf?

A. Understanding, that is all, no action. We seek understanding of the nature of the GCC, of the need for stability in the Gulf, and the rejection of the use of force. We have no illusion about encouraging outside forces to take such-and-such actions in our part of the world; we know we must rely on ourselves. We have obtained real expertise in war management: containing threats and juggling dangers.

Q. At the same time, there seem to be frequent calls for superpower diplomacy to help end the war. What could the superpower do?

A. The USSR thinks the Iranian revolution is to its benefit because it reduces Western influence in the region, but at the same time the Soviets must realize they do not want the revolutionary regime in Tehran to destabilize the region. They must draw the line.

We also appreciate the Reagan Administration's requests to the Congress to increase the defensive capabilities of the GCC, but we were publicly embarrassed over Congressional wrangling and interjection of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This was a disappointment.

Finally, the European powers should produce a document condemning any assault of Gulf security, to include armed aggression and acquisition of territory by force. Perhaps the U.S. could help break the diplomatic logjams to help us achieve a strong European stand. All these actions will reduce the will of the combatants to pursue armed victory or to expand the violence and raise the stakes. We must block these avenues and leave open only the avenue of mediation and negotiation.

Q. What conditions will it take to end the war, under Khomeini and a successor regime?

A. The only way to end this war, under Khomeini or any other regime, is to convince Iran that further struggle and sacrifice will be futile. It must be demonstrated that the use of force leads to international repercussions that are unacceptable.

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