



BULLETIN
of the
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

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Front cover photograph :

Presidents Arif and Nasser broadcasting on occasion of signing U.A.R.-Iraqi Agreement

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq,
21 Queen's Gate, London, S.W.7.

Editorial

SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF 14th JULY REVOLUTION

On 14th July Iraq celebrated the sixth anniversary of the Revolution of 14th July, 1958, of which the Revolutions of 14 Ramadan (8th February), and 18th November, 1963, were an extension and a correction of its deviation.

The foreign policy of the Iraqi Government, as formulated and reaffirmed by the three revolutions, remains one of positive neutralism based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Resolutions of the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences. The Iraqi Government supports the struggle against colonialism in all its forms and wherever it may be going on. It aligns itself with all peace-loving nations and co-operates with all the forces motivated by good-will whether Eastern or Western, without distinction.

The Iraqi Government is opposed to military groupings and to the nuclear arms race, and supports the reorientation of this race for peaceful purposes and the welfare of humanity. It is also opposed to racial discrimination everywhere. Iraq's relations with all friendly powers continues to develop in a manner guaranteeing common interests and constructive co-operation. Her relations with the Soviet Union are progressing towards understanding and co-operation based on equality and mutual respect.

In Arab affairs the Iraqi Government adheres to the Charter of the Arab League, seeks Arab Unity and considers the agreement of 26th May, 1964,* as a first step towards comprehensive unity. The Iraqi Government pursues with determination its endeavour to liberate Palestine, establish the Palestinian Entity and give the Palestinian people the opportunity to regain their usurped land. All the commitments undertaken by the Iraqi Government in pursuance of the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference have been carried out.

Internally the Iraqi Government has taken all measures necessary to establish security and stability throughout the land as well as economic prosperity. It is also introducing a programme of comprehensive reforms aimed at raising the standard of living and realizing

*The agreement between the United Arab Republic and Iraq setting up a joint Presidential Council.

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progress in all the spheres of national life. The Provisional Constitution recently introduced is designed to secure in the best possible manner the unity and social justice desired by the Iraqi people.

ARAB UNITY

The process of paving the way for Arab unity in one concrete step after another has been steadily going forward since the conclusion on 26th May of the U.A.R.-Iraqi agreement establishing a joint Presidential Council for the two countries.

The practical and functional nature of this process is clearly seen in the joint communique issued in Cairo (see page 8) on 10th June by the U.A.R.-Iraqi committee which had been convened to coordinate plans for the economic integration of the two countries.

The resolutions of this committee are in fact intended to implement The Economic Integration Agreement concluded between the United Arab Republic and Iraq in November, 1958, but never enforced because of the subsequent deviation of policy under Kassim and the Baath from the true path of Arab unity. As we pointed out in our last issue, this deviation was, among other things, the cause and the justification of the Revolution of 18th November, 1963, by which the present Iraqi regime came to power, under the effective leadership of President Arif. The practical measures now being taken by Iraq and the U.A.R. to lay the foundations of Arab unity express the real aims of the Iraqi Revolution and are therefore only a resumption of what was started in July, 1958, in conformity with the wishes of the Iraqi Arab nationalists, whose leading representative in the Revolutionary Command was President Arif.

The creation of the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq and the nationalization measures announced as we go to press are, apart from their internal importance for Iraq, further steps towards unity through political and economic homogeneity.

Other steps in the same process was the visit to Algeria, also in June, of a delegation representing the Arab Socialist Union in the U.A.R. to discuss with the representatives of the F.L.N. the coordination of the socialist policies of Algeria and the U.A.R., and the measures taken to set up a Joint Presidential Council for the U.A.R. and the Yemen similar to the one set up for Iraq and the U.A.R.



Dr. Mohammed Noori Kadhim

Dr. Mohammed Noori Kadhim, who arrived recently in London to assume the post of Minister Plenipotentiary and Chargé d'Affaires a.i. at the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, was born in Basrah in 1926. He studied law at the University of Baghdad, obtaining his B.A., after which he proceeded to Oxford where, as a post-graduate student at St. Catherine's College, he gained first a B.Lit., and then a D.Phil. On returning to Iraq, he practised for some time as an advocate, became a member of the Iraqi Judiciary and a lecturer at the Law College of the University of Baghdad. His last official post before this present appointment was that of Attorney General in the Iraqi Government.

Dr. Kadhim was a member of the committee that drafted the Iraqi Interim Constitution, the new penal code of Iraq and other laws. He has attended several international legal congresses and published a number of articles and papers on legal questions.

Dr. Kadhim is married and has one child.

NEW U.S. POLICY ON ZIONISM

The American Council for Judaism, which is opposed to Zionism because of the Zionists' claim that there is a Jewish nationality based on the Jewish religion, has recently scored an important victory in its long struggle to persuade the Government of the United States to reject this Zionist claim.

In a new policy statement on relations between Zionism and the State of Israel, the United States State Department has announced that it does not recognize "the Jewish people" as a concept in international law. The position enunciated by Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and Asian Affairs, in a letter to the American Council For Judaism, supercedes that of earlier United States' administrations which recognized the existence of the "Jewish people" as a legal entity at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel. Replying to a letter from Rabbi Elmer Berger, Executive Vice-President of the American Council for Judaism, Mr. Talbot said; "The Department of State recognizes the State of Israel as a sovereign

state, and citizenship of the State of Israel. It recognizes no other sovereignty or citizenship in connection therewith.... Accordingly, it should be clear that the Department of State does not regard the 'Jewish people' concept as a concept of international law."

Commenting on the new policy, Rabbi Berger said: "The Talbot letter, declaring the inconsistency between fundamental Zionist-Israeli legal claims and United States concepts of full, individual, legal rights for all Americans, is the first such specific clarification in over four decades of Zionist diplomacy and negotiations with various branches of the United States Government. In effect a policy of apparent and illegal acquiescence through silence has been changed to a policy of specific repudiation of Zionist-Israeli nationality claims involving citizens or nationals of other countries who are identified as Jews. This letter is also the first specific declaration of a sovereign state which has been party to many Zionist-Israeli agreements that the fundamental legal-political claim to all Jews, through the 'Jewish people' concept, is invalid."

Since the United States Government has at last decided to repudiate the concept of the "Jewish people", the question inevitably arises as to what validity there was in the American or the British attitude when the Balfour Declaration was issued, when the League of Nations mandate for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine was drawn up, and later when the State of Israel was recognized, since all these declarations, undertakings and recognitions were made on the basis of the 'Jewish people' concept. The answer, as the Arabs have always maintained, is that there was no validity in any of these instruments or statements of policy.

COLLECTIVE ARAB ACTION IN WASHINGTON

The 1st June, 1964, was an important date in the history of collective Arab action, as decided upon at the Cairo Summit Conference of last January. For on that day the representative of The League of Arab States in Washington released a statement made by the Press Attachés and Information Officers of all the thirteen Arab Embassies in Washington. It was the first occasion on which such a move had been made in any foreign capital.

In releasing the statement (which we publish elsewhere in this issue), the representative of The League of Arab States said: "The Arab Information Center is pleased to release this statement outlining the Arab view on questions affecting the present course and future development of Arab-American relations. This endeavour is being made in the spirit, and pursuant to, the final communique of the Arab Summit Conference of 13th-17th January, 1964. Since the communiqué expressed hope for understanding of the Arab position among all free nations, it is to be hoped that the attached statement will receive the wide circulation it deserves and thereby contribute to the goal of Arab-American understanding and amity."

The statement did indeed cause quite a stir in American press and political circles, and was naturally attacked with vehemence by the Zionists and their supporters on the grounds that it was an interference in domestic American issues. It was, of course, no such thing, being only an appeal to the American people and the American Government not to allow Zionist or Israeli lobbying to influence the policy of the United States in a direction that would be prejudicial to American interests in the Middle East, which can only be promoted on the basis of friendship and good understanding between the United States and the Arab countries. In the past the Zionists have had things too much their own way in Britain and America, and by organized internal pressure at a high level they have frequently been able to inspire, and even in certain circumstances to force on the U.K. and the U.S.

Governments, policies designed to promote the interests of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel, regardless of whether such policies were in the true interests of Britain or the United States. When it is remembered that these policies were also basically opposed to the principles of justice and international morality their adoption and implementation by Britain and America appears truly astonishing. For it must be the only instance provided by history of great states pursuing morally dubious policies to serve not their own interests but those of a third party that has had the skill and influence to bamboozle them into a course of action that is neither profitable nor creditable. The present Arab endeavour is designed to counter this influence.

ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEK NORMALITY AND PEACE

Elsewhere in this issue we publish—reproduced from *Le Monde*—Mr. Uri Avnery's second article on the subject of the Arab refugees and the Israeli government's policy towards them. Briefly, Mr. Avnery urges that Israel should (1) recognize the unconditional right of the refugees to return to their homeland; (2) accord to those who return the same facilities for settlement and work and the same full rights of citizenship as are accorded to Jewish immigrants; (3) that those who opt for compensation as against return should receive such compensation; (4) that Israel should become a bi-national Middle Eastern State—the national "home" of its Arab citizens as much as of its Jewish citizens. Mr. Avnery, after discussing the point with some of the refugees themselves and with some Arab leaders, estimates that the number of those who will want to return will not be more than 400,000 and may be as low as 100,000; and he argues that spread over a period of ten years in annual quotas, the return of such a number of Arab refugees would not constitute either a military or a political danger to Israel, but that on the contrary it would go a long way towards taking the heat out of the Israel-Arab conflict and so help towards a political settlement. On the economic side, he argues, the return of a few tens of thousands of refugees annually for ten years would be of great advantage to Israel, who otherwise would be facing a severe labour shortage as a result of the drying up of present sources of Jewish immigration.

It is not a question here of whether the Arab States—or even the representatives of the Palestine Arabs—would or would not accept such an offer. The question of their acceptance does not arise, because the offer is not to be made conditional on a general political settlement, and the Arabs are not going to be asked to give anything in return. It is to be an entirely unilateral move by Israel—an offer to the refugees to return home or be compensated. We do not therefore have to debate the

question of what the Arab answer should be. The only question that poses itself in the circumstances is, why does not Israel make such an offer?

On Mr. Avnery's very able showing, the result would be very much to Israel's advantage whether the Arabs accepted the proposals or rejected them. If they rejected them they would clearly put themselves in the wrong since that is exactly what they have been demanding since 1948, namely that Israel should comply with the United Nations resolutions calling upon her to repatriate the refugees or compensate them. Indeed it could be taken for granted that the refugees would accept the offer and that the Arab States would endorse their acceptance.

The advantages then to Israel would be enormous. At one stroke the problem of the Arab refugees and the emotional bitterness surrounding it would be eliminated, and once it was eliminated the most intractable and explosive factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict would be removed. If the former Arab population of Palestine ceased to exist as a collective entity waiting to "return" and regain its homeland; if this population was broken up into individuals—as Mr. Avnery argues it would be if Israel were to make such an offer—some of whom were reabsorbed into Israel and some of whom took their compensation and went to live somewhere else in the Arab world, a possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict might come into view.

If Israel therefore really wanted to have peace with the Arabs and normalize her position in the Middle East, elementary logic would prompt her to do what Mr. Avnery is urging. It certainly could not lead to a worsening of her position or an increase of her peril. And conceivably it might bring her a far greater security and a peace that does not depend on a permanent aggressiveness towards her neighbours.

And, *per contra*, if Israel refuses to make this offer as she has done till now, the conclusion is inescapable that she does not want real peace or normal relations with her Arab neighbours. To the uninitiated, such a statement may seem incredible. Yet there is much to support it in the character and national requirements of Israel. To the Zionist and Israeli leaders a permanent state of tension with the Arab countries, recurrent crises and the impression of never-diminishing mortal peril on her frontiers are an essential condition of her ability to go on extracting financial and moral support from world Jewry. If, these leaders fear, she ceased to appear as a beleaguered and threatened State having always to fight for her existence against surrounding enemies, a good deal of the enthusiasm which keeps her now generously supplied with funds would wane.

And this is why voices like that of Mr. Avnery will continue to be mere cries in the wilderness. Western critics who blame the Arabs for refusing to consider peace with Israel should ponder this fact, namely that Israel, as a matter of deliberate and basic policy, does not want peace.

DR. JOHN DAVIS ON PALESTINE QUESTION

Dr. John H. Davis, the former chief of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Arab refugees, was the featured speaker at the annual banquet of the American Council for Judaism in New York on 9th May last. Speaking with the frankness, integrity and grasp of the situation which has always characterized his utterances during his tenure of office as U.N.R.W.A.'s chief, Dr. Davis dealt with several of the principal features and issues of the Palestine problem. He began by disagreeing with the Zionist premise that Arab-Israeli hostility was the outgrowth of a traditional hatred between Muslims and Jews. He maintained, as the Arabs have always emphasized, that the Palestine question was a political controversy which had nothing to do with religion or race. "Arabs," he said, "do not hate Jews as people, and many Jewish communities in almost every Arab country continue to exist, for the most part unmolested and with freedom to practise their own religion and to educate their children as they wish, so long as they do not become involved in the affairs of Israel or Zionism".

In another part of his speech, Dr. Davis said: "The central issue is the Arab opposition to the existence of Israel as a state which they consider an illegal colonial-type creation made possible through the intervention of 'imperialistic forces' from outside."

On the question of the Arab refugees, Dr. Davis stressed that Israel "has consistently disclaimed responsibility and offered no compromise on implementation of the annually reaffirmed U.N. resolutions calling for repatriation or compensation of the refugees" and he went on to say that the Arabs were willing to wait "a hundred years" to win the struggle.

Touching on the question of Arab unity, Dr. Davis gave it as his opinion that Arab unity could eventually include the Jews in Israel *if Western nations would first reassess their attitude towards Zionism* (our italics).

It is precisely this need for the West's reassessment of its attitude towards Zionism which Arab diplomacy and the Arab Information Services are now endeavouring to impress on the Western nations and their Governments. For without it there can be no permanent peace in the Middle East and no secure foundation for good will and co-operation between the Arab countries and the Western world.

"FRANCE'S FRIEND AND ALLY" AGAIN!

President de Gaulle's hailing of Israel—when receiving the Israeli Prime Minister in Paris a few weeks ago—as "France's friend and ally" has caused consternation and bewilderment throughout the Arab world—consternation and bewilderment far more profound than was felt when the French President referred

to Israel in these terms when receiving Mr. Ben-Gurion in Paris in June, 1961, although even then the phrase was astonishing enough and caused us to comment in the July, 1961, issue of this *Bulletin* as follows :

Ally against whom ? There can only be one enemy against whom this alliance is aimed—the Arabs. It is, of course, well known now that France did use Israel as an ally against the Arabs in the Suez aggression of 1956. But the French leaders responsible for this were Guy Mollet and Pinay ; and it might have been thought that President de Gaulle, with his greater realism and loftier conception of the destiny and honour of France, would have chosen to leave that disreputable episode buried in oblivion, and tried instead to open a new chapter in Franco-Arab relations, particularly at the moment when his Government was engaged, as a result of his own initiative and inspiration, in peace talks with the Algerian Provisional Government. . . . Why, then, did General de Gaulle say words which he must have known would provoke and alienate all Arabs whether in North Africa or the Middle East ? For every Arab will feel that if France is the ally of Israel, then she is the enemy of the Arabs. Does General de Gaulle want this enmity between France and the Arab peoples ? Does he think it would further the interests of France in North Africa and the Middle East, where only 2 million Israelis live as against 80 million Arabs, many of whom have old cultural and economic ties with France which they would like to maintain, or—where they have been severed—revive, if France is just and friendly in her dealings with the Arabs ?

On a rational analysis, the only reason why France should feel hostile to the Arabs and want to enlist "allies" against them is to be found in the Algerian war of liberation. The French leaders who made use of Israel against the Arabs in 1956 did so because they were unwilling to recognize Algeria's right to independence, and because they believed that if they inflicted a crushing defeat on Arab nationalism in the Middle East, the Algerian struggle for freedom would collapse. . . . General de Gaulle has seemingly rejected this view and recognized both the internal strength of the Algerian struggle and the inevitability of the emergence of an independent Algeria.

Three years have passed since President de Gaulle first used his unfortunate phrase and we commented on it as above. In these three years, as a result of President de Gaulle's realistic and courageous policy, Algeria has become independent and the last remaining cause of conflict or hostility between France and the Arabs been completely eliminated. Recognizing this fact, the French Government, acting no doubt under the inspiration of President de Gaulle, has been quick to seek a revival of friendly relations between France and the Arab countries. The Arab Governments for their part were equally quick to appreciate and respond to this fundamental change

in the situation and in France's policy towards the Arab world. All the bitterness felt towards France on account of Algeria evaporated with the settlement of the Algerian question. Diplomatic relations severed since Suez were resumed. Declarations of good will and renewed friendship were exchanged. Economic and cultural delegations from France visited the Arab countries. King Hussein of Jordan was invited by President de Gaulle to visit France on his way back from the United States a few months ago. He did so and was warmly received by the President. Also President Ben Bella paid a visit to the French President at the latter's invitation.

In this new situation President de Gaulle's repetition of his unfortunate phrase is not only astonishing ; it is incomprehensible. For elementary logic must show him that he cannot cultivate the good will of the Arabs while continuing to claim Israel as an ally. President de Gaulle may have performed a miracle in settling the Algerian question and saving France from civil war. But for an ally of Israel to be a friend of the Arabs will prove a miracle beyond even his powers.

THE NEW IRAQI CABINET

The Iraqi Prime Minister, General Taher Yehia tendered his resignation to President Arif on 17th June, and was immediately entrusted with the formation of a new cabinet, in which he retained in addition to the Premiership, the post of Acting Defence Minister.

Other Ministers in the new Cabinet are :

Sobhi Abdul-Hamid—Foreign Affairs.
Rashid Musleh—Interior.
Kamel Al Khateeb—Justice.
Abdul Kerim Farhan—Culture and National Guidance.
Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Wattari—Petroleum.
Dr. Mohamed Jawad Al Abousi—Finance and Acting Planning Minister.
Dr. Abdul Aziz Al Hafed—Economy.
Dr. Shamil Samaraai—Health.
Dr. Abdul Karim Hani—Labour and Social Affairs.
Dr. Abdul Fatah Al Alousi—Public Works and Housing.
Dr. Abdul Saheb Elwan—Agrarian Reform.
Dr. Abdul Rarzaq Moheddin—Unity Affairs.
Dr. Muselh Al Nakshabandi—WAKFS.
Abdel Ghani Al Rawi—Agriculture.
Mohsen Hussein Al Habib—Communications.
Dr. Abdul Hasan Zalzala—Industry.
Ismail Mustapha—Rural and Municipal Affairs.
Masoud Mohamed—Minister of State.
Abdul Majeed Said—Education.

The Arab Socialist Union in Iraq

Foreign Minister gives Interview

The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Lieutenant-Colonel Sobhi Abdul-Hamid, gave a television interview to Baghdad Radio on the 1st July, in which he answered questions on Arab Unity, the formation of the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq and other matters of immediate interest and importance.

The Minister began by saying that for the last three months a preparatory committee had been drafting the charter of the "One Arab Movement"—to be called the Arab Socialist Union—and had now completed the drafting of its basic rules. He announced that a conference would be held on 14th July, under President Arif's chairmanship, and that over 1,000 representatives of the various sectors would attend it to discuss and approve the charter and the basic rules of the Union. Membership of the Union, the Minister explained, would be open to all who believed in the aims of the charter, and elections would be held later to set up village and district sub-Committees from which the leadership of the Organization would emerge.

The Minister said the details of the Union's regulations would be announced on 14th July. Asked why the Organization was called the Arab Socialist Union and what was meant by the "One Arab Movement," the Minister explained that the One Arab Movement embraced all the national and patriotic organizations throughout the Arab homeland which believed in the same aim; and that following the Agreement of 26th May, the Iraqi Government had decided to call it "Arab Socialist Union" in order to standardize the name of the Organization. The Minister described the aims of the Union in Iraq as follows: (1) to unite the various groups within one organization, (2) to set up a solid public base which would adopt the aims of the Arab Revolution, (3) to work for the implementation of the Agreement of 26th May and accelerate the unity between Iraq and the United Arab Republic in order to bring about comprehensive Arab Unity, (4) to defend the people's rights and just demands, (5) to fight and expose Imperialist designs, (6) to defend the Revolution from its enemies.

The Minister said that the charter comprised of six parts: (1) Unity of the Arab Revolution, (2) the Socialist Arab Union in Iraq, (3) nationalism and Arab unity, (4) Arab socialism, (5) freedom and democracy, (6) the foreign policy of the Arab Socialist Union.

Referring to the principles of Arab socialism in Iraq, the Minister said that Arab socialism would create equal opportunities for all citizens, that it considered work both a duty and a right for every citizen, that it would

develop industry and agriculture, make the worker the master of the machine and the peasant the master of the land. He emphasized that Arab socialism believes in the necessity of the private and public sectors of the economy participating in the development of the country, and that Arab socialism did not call for the abolition of private property. Its general aim would be sufficient production and fair distribution.

Asked about the reasons behind the campaigns by the agents of Imperialism against the present Iraqi régime, the Minister said that the factions responsible for such campaigns were known: they were the Baathists, the Communists and the Shu'ubiyin, who aimed to over-



Iraq's Foreign Minister, Lt.-Colonel Sobhi Abdul-Hamid

throw the régime. There were also those who believed that their interests would suffer under socialism. The Shu'ubiyin were fighting against unity because they did not want a United Arab homeland. Imperialism, the Minister said, opposed the present régime because its interests had suffered under its nationalist rule and because it saw in the Agreement on 26th May a further threat to these interests, which caused it to intensify its opposition to the régime. Imperialism did not mind whether the Baathists, the Communists, or the Shu'ubiyin took over, since they all opposed Arab unity, and following the agreement of 26th May, it began to use its old and new lackeys to incite certain groups, sow discord and organize sabotage against the present régime.

Lt.-Colonel Sobhi Abdul-Hamid, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Iraq Government, was born in Baghdad in

1924. He graduated from the Iraqi Military College in 1948 and from the Iraqi Staff College in 1955, obtaining Grade A and being awarded two years' seniority. From there he proceeded to England where he graduated from the Staff College at Camberley in 1957. Returning to Iraq he was appointed Instructor and then Senior Instructor in the Iraqi Staff College for a period of five years, but left this post to become a Staff Officer after the Revolution of 14th July, 1958 in which he played a leading part. He was suspended immediately after the Mosul rebellion of 8th March, 1959, but returned to the Service as Director of Military Operations after the Revolution of 14th Ramadan (8th February, 1963), in which he had taken part—as he also subsequently took part in the Revolution of 18th November, 1963.

He is a married man and has five children. Apart from England he has visited India, Pakistan and Iran and is well acquainted with several of the Arab countries.



Iraqi High School Girls in Traditional Costumes and Dance

Economic Integration between Iraq and the U.A.R.

On the 10th June last, the Committee, which had been meeting in Cairo to co-ordinate plans for economic integration between the United Arab Republic and Iraq held its final meeting. The U.A.R. side was headed by Mr. Mohammed Ali Amer, Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Economics in the U.A.R.; and the Iraqi side was headed by Mr. Talib Jamil, Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Economics in Iraq.

At this meeting the final results arrived at were reviewed and a joint communiqué was issued of which the following is the translated text:

In an atmosphere of brotherly Arab feeling, in which the spirit of goodwill and good understanding prevailed; and in order to put into execution the Economic Integration Agreement concluded between the two countries in November, 1958; and in implementation of Article 5 of that agreement, and by way of completing the economic discussions that were held in Baghdad in February, 1964,

The representatives of the Iraqi Republic, headed by Mr. Talib Jamil, Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Economics, and of the United Arab Republic, headed by Mr. Mohammed Ali Amer, Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Economics, met in Cairo and held a number of fruitful sessions. The object of the meeting of the two sides, after the passing away of the deviationist régime in Iraq—that régime which ever since the conclusion of this important agreement had been preventing such brotherly meetings and doing its utmost to isolate Iraq from its sisters in the greater Arab homeland—was actually no other than to affirm a clear fact which is one of the demands of the Arab people in its comprehensive unity, and to go forward with the operation of planning development and construction with the advancing Arab cavalcade, in order to realize the aspirations of the Arab people, raise their standard of living and defeat their common enemy.

At its first meeting the Committee decided to form from among its members nine specialized sub-committees, entrusted with the task of studying the various means necessary to the achievement of economic integration between the two sister countries in the various fields of economic life. These sub-committees were as follows: (1) for customs and transit trade; (2) for financial affairs; (3) for currency affairs; (4) for commercial affairs; (5) for agricultural development; (6) for industrial, mineral wealth and petroleum co-ordination; (7) for labour and social questions; (8) for economic planning; (9) for communications. In addition a tenth

sub-committee was to draw up rules for internal procedure to govern the work and meetings of the permanent Committee for Economic Co-ordination.

Each one of these sub-committees put forward important recommendations, among which were those adopted by the Customs and Transit Trade Committee for removing the barriers and abolishing customs duties between the two countries, except for the minimum limit required to protect local industries in each of the two countries.

Other important recommendations were those adopted by the Commercial Affairs Committee for raising the restrictions on import quotas between the two countries and for giving import preference to the products of the two countries and encouraging the formation of joint exploitation companies; and for considering industrial products in whose production local labour and raw material reach 25 per cent of the total as originating from one of the two countries—instead of requiring a 50 per cent proportion as previously.

The sub-committee for commercial affairs also recommended that all the machinery for foreign commercial representation, commercial centres and exhibitions of the two countries should act in complete co-operation and continuous contact in the service of the two countries together; and that the import and export apparatus in the two countries should co-operate in the widest possible manner and co-ordinate the two activities in such a manner as to prevent their competing with one another in foreign markets and to secure the best terms and prices.

In implementation of the resolutions of the Summit Conference of the Arab Kings and Heads of State, the Committee recommended that each of the two countries should reconsider their economic and commercial relations with all other nations in the light of the attitude of these nations towards the legitimate Arab struggle against Zionist ambitions. It also recommended the co-ordination of the economic policy of the two countries towards economic blocs.

The communications sub-committee recommended wide co-operation between the Iraqi Maritime Transport Company and the General Egyptian Organization for Maritime Transport as a nucleus for the co-operation of the commercial fleets of the two countries. It also recommended that the land route Baghdad-Aman-Aqaba-Suez-Cairo be used to connect the two countries geographically despite the barrier of Israel which has been set up by imperialism to separate the Arab countries.

New Oil Projects in Iraq

ACCORDING to a recent statement by Dr. Abdul-Aziz Al-Wattari, Minister of Oil in the Iraqi Government, a sum of £7,206,500 will be spent in the course of the current year on thirteen new Iraqi Government oil projects covering the different stages of the process of oil production.

The most important of these projects is a new refinery for lubricating oils at Daura in Baghdad with an annual productive capacity of 36,000 tons, at a cost of £4,000,000. The Oil Refineries Department of the Iraqi Government is at present drawing up specifications and conditions for the tenders which are to be invited from all over the world in the near future for the extension of this project.

The second project is that of the Zaafraniyah Oil Depot, which is to meet the rising local consumption of oil products—a rise which has led to increasing pressure on present oil depots, particularly those in Baghdad. The Zaafraniyah Depot is to be only the first of a chain of similar depots to be built in the principal towns of Iraq in order to ensure plentiful supplies of oil products all over the country and decrease the pressure on the present depots.

In order that the Zaafraniyah Depot should be provided with the most up-to-date storing equipment, the services of a world-famous firm of consultants have been secured and it is expected that the invitation to tender for the construction of the depot will be issued as soon as the plans have been prepared. It is hoped that the project will be completed by January 1967, at a total cost of £2,500,000, of which the department for the distribution of oil products has allocated £632,000 in its budget for the current year to cover the costs of the first stage and part of the second stage.

The depot will be constructed in the Zaafraniyah quarter of Baghdad where 200 Dunums of land have been allocated for it, and its storage capacity will be 22,000,000 gallons of the various kinds of oil products, which will be received from the Daura Refinery by means of pipes. As for distribution from the depot to branch depots and stations, this will be done partly by pipes and partly by rail, road and river transport.

The depot is also to include repair and maintenance workshops to service the distribution equipment as well

as a repair and maintenance workshop for servicing all motor vehicles employed by the department. The depot will further have a clinic and a restaurant for the workers in it, and houses for the employees and workers are to be built in its neighbourhood.

Another scheme is for a factory to produce the oil equipment needed at the Daura Refinery, at a cost of £271,000. The main building of this factory has already been completed, and work is in progress on the erection of its machinery. Yet another project is for a grease factory at Daura with an annual productive capacity of 4,000 tons at a cost of £200,000.

£1,600,000 are to be spent on a building for the Ministry of Oil and its ancillary departments. A contract has been signed with a Belgian firm of consultants for making the necessary studies and preparing the specifications and detailed plans preparatory to the invitation of tenders for the execution of the project. The work of the consultants is expected to be completed within eight months.

£100,000 is being spent on sixty workers' houses, which will be completed next October, at Daura; and an equal sum goes to the improvement of the heavy oils refinery at Daura.

The remaining projects are as follows: (1) Enlarging and filling the Liquid Gas Unit at the Daura Refinery, where work is in progress on the construction of the storage tanks, at a cost of £42,000, (2) Workers' houses, storage buildings and roads at the refineries, at a cost of £131,500, (3) various other projects for laboratories, workshops, etc., serving the Petroleum Improvement Unit, at a cost of £123,550.

Four projects, the plans for which have been drawn up since the Revolution of 18th November, are for erecting fire-fighting towers, building secondary power stations and asphalted roads, at a cost of £108,250. Four other oil projects have actually been completed since 18th November at a cost of £344,466. These were the construction of two additional storage tanks for white oil at the Daura Refinery, the construction of a steam boiler for the Daura electric generator. The building of eighteen houses for the engineers at the Daura Refinery and the addition of a reserve press for the wax-removing unit in the lubricating oils refinery at Daura.

The sub-committees for planning and industrial co-ordination recommended the co-ordination of development plans between the two countries.

The other sub-committees recommended the unification of laws and regulations and the co-ordination of machinery between the two countries, as well as the

exchange of experts and the seconding of officials for training in the various fields to ensure the realization of full economic integration between them.

Thus the fruit of these meetings has been the laying down of the foundations of economic unity to support the desired political unity.



Installations at the Iraqi Government's Oil Refinery

Sir Hugh Foot on Palestine

IN our issue for May we reported a session of the B.B.C.'s Arabic Service programme "Open Forum", in which Lord Thomson, the well-known newspaper proprietor, answered questions put to him by Mr. Hazim Mushtak, the Press Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy, London, on the subject of the freedom of the press in Britain.

Today we report another Open Forum session held on the 26th May, at which Sir Hugh Foot was one of the platform speakers and answered, *inter alia*, a number of questions put to him by Mr. Mushtak on the Palestine question:

Q. In his latest book *A Start In Freedom*, Sir Hugh Foot says: "Diplomats may have to lie for their countries, but they are usually speaking only to other diplomats. Politicians sometimes speak not for Governments but for their parties or only for themselves. But an official can only speak for his Government. He has an absolute obligation never to raise false hopes. He must never make a promise to the people unless he is absolutely sure it can be carried out. The failure of British administration in Palestine was inevitable. The double sin had been committed of raising false hopes both with the Arabs and with the Jews. The hopes were false because they were conflicting. The Arabs who fought with Great Britain in the first world war to throw off the yoke of the Turkish Empire were led to believe that they were fighting for their freedom. The Jews were led to believe by the Balfour Declaration in 1917 that they would win a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Relying on British assurances they too fought and worked with us. But Palestine was populated and owned by Arabs."

This is what Sir Hugh Foot says in his book. I should like to ask him which of the two hopes for freedom finds a stronger justification from the moral, legal and factual points of view in Palestine—the hope of the Arabs, the original, genuine and legitimate inhabitants of the land, or the hope of the Zionists who are foreigners, intruders and aggressors.

A. I have an idea as to the answer which the questioner wishes or hopes to receive. But that is a difficult and complicated, if not impossible, thing. What criterion can we use in determining the rights and aspirations of that party or this party to life and freedom? If we think of the terrible persecution inflicted by the Nazi régime on the Jews in Germany and Europe, we have to admit the rights and aspirations of the Jews to life and freedom. But this does not mean that I deny in any way whatever the rights and aspirations of the Arabs to freedom.

Q. We do not deny the right of the Jewish citizens in every country to freedom and life, but we ask: Is it right that the rights and aspirations of a human group which follows the Mosaic religion and belongs to different nationalities in the world—is it right that their rights and aspirations to freedom and life should be realized at the expense of the rights and aspirations of the Palestine Arabs to freedom and life? And does justice or humanity permit that the rights and aspirations of the Jews to freedom and life should be realized in the homeland of another people after its forcible expulsion and its deprivation of all its rights and aspirations, as happened to the Palestine Arab people, especially when it is remembered that the Arabs have never practised or tolerated racial discrimination or religious persecution.

A. I am going to be frank and speak with a full awareness of my responsibility before my conscience. The first and foremost responsibility for the regrettable situation that developed in Palestine rests on the mistaken policy followed in it by the British Government. And I feel ashamed of what my country did in that part of the world. As for my attitude towards the Palestine partition scheme, I think that is clear from my subsequent attitude towards partition in Cyprus when I was Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in that island which gained its independence in my time. I opposed partition in Palestine as I opposed it in Cyprus.

It is interesting in this connection to quote some of the other views expressed by Sir Hugh Foot in his book *A Start in Freedom*. On page 51 he says: "The struggle grew fiercer still, and I later heard that after I left Palestine in 1938 the methods used by some of our troops became more ruthless. For many years afterwards I heard stories of our patrols led by Wingate (afterwards to become famous in the war in Burma). He formed his own gang mainly composed of Jewish volunteers and went out to beat the Arab gangs at their own game. His methods were extreme and cruel. He had many successes, but he forfeited our general reputation for fair fighting." Sir Hugh Foot is referring here to the great Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936, and it is noteworthy that General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff to the Israeli armed forces in 1949 and a minister in the present Israeli cabinet, started his military life as one of the Jewish volunteers in Wingate's gang.

On page 57 Sir Hugh Foot says: "Many years later in Cyprus I saw again a conflict between two national claims. I could not forget Palestine and throughout my time in Cyprus I was obsessed with the need to take and keep the political initiative, to avoid at all costs the bloody partition which Palestine endured."

Statement by
The Arab Press Attachés and
Information Officers
in Washington, D.C.

THE Arab Press Attachés and Information Officers in Washington, motivated by the desire of their countries to maintain and promote friendly relations between the Arab and American peoples and conscious of the nature of their mission in fostering mutual goodwill and understanding between the two nations, view the present mounting anti-Arab campaign in certain quarters with concern because it threatens the atmosphere of good relations between their countries and the United States. With this in mind, they call attention to the following points :

(1) The Arab people throughout the Arab homeland have been and continue to be basically united in their aspirations and objectives. Whatever differences may arise from time to time in their relations ought not to overshadow this fact.

(2) As a vital force representing the Arab identity, Arab nationalism seeks to mould a regenerated, progressive and liberal society capable of meeting the challenges of modern life and contributing to the safeguarding of world peace and universal human betterment. Thus from the standpoint of its role in the emergence of the new Arab society, Arab nationalism parallels American nationalism at its inception, drawing as they both do on common principles of human dignity, self-determination and human welfare in peace and freedom.

(3) Not only are there basic differences between American interests and Arab nationalism, there is also a basic necessity for future Arab-American co-operation. At present, there are more American economic interests in the Arab world than ever before. American capital investments in the Arab world are larger and more important to the United States than their equivalent in any other non-Arab part of the Middle East. Their continued security and future enhancement are continuing considerations in the context of Arab-American relations.

(4) In recent years, an American policy of friendship and understanding toward the Arab world has realized for the United States more success in the foreign policy field than in any other area of the world. It is not surprising therefore that through this approach of sympathy and understanding toward the Arab people, limited though it remains, American policy has earned relatively more dividends in the Middle East than have accrued from heavy outlays in other parts of the world.

(5) The trend towards harmonious Arab-American relations which is sustained by mutual interests in certain areas, common purposes in others, and continued efforts on the part of the governments concerned is now seriously threatened by the present consistent anti-Arab campaign conducted by the Israeli-Zionist complex and by the British.

(6) Since the collusion of 1956, the bankrupt policy of the Israeli-Zionist complex, having failed to produce any positive results, is now concentrating on damaging the very state of relations which the Arab and American peoples have sought to foster in recent years. In seeking to promote their selfish and narrow purposes, the Zionists act as if the only way they could preserve their position is by creating an atmosphere in which the United States would have no friends in the Middle East except Israel, thereby forcing a reliance and a relationship which the logic of facts and interests so clearly contradicts.

(7) Within this context, the visit of Mr. Eshkol, timed as it is before the elections, may have, in view of what has already been published, serious implications to the future of Arab-American relations. For, according to these published reports and some views recently expressed by anti-Arab quarters, he will ask the United States for arms and the conclusion of a bilateral security treaty.

(8) It must be realized by now that Israel needs neither of these two requests. Already she is armed to an extent which renders her a continuing threat to regional, and consequently world peace. Furthermore, the United States is aware, as Israel must be, that should any aggression occur in the Middle East, it will, as experience has shown, be initiated by Israel and not by the Arabs. The Israeli diversion of Jordan river waters and her refusal to allow international inspection of her atomic reactors are only two recent examples of Israel's aggressive conduct and intentions.

(9) Yet Mr. Eshkol will doubtless argue on behalf of arms and the security treaty if only to create the impression among Arab public opinion that the United States remains basically partial to Israel, thereby to damage the element of confidence in Arab-American relations.

(10) Apart from the continuing Zionist efforts to poison the atmosphere of relations between the Arab world and the United States, attempts have been recently made, according to published reports, to involve the

United States in a colonial dispute between the Arabs and the British over South Arabia.

(11) It should by now be manifest that Colonialism cannot maintain itself against the will of populations determined to be free, particularly when they enjoy a natural sense of identity deriving from their historical and cultural legacy and their participation in creating ancient civilizations which have contributed to the present values of mankind. It is obvious that British colonialism in South Arabia is maintained for the sole purpose of exploiting the oil resources of that region. The British argument claiming that protection of their interests in the Middle East justifies their military control over South Arabia typifies an outmoded colonial mentality. The fact that American and other legitimate interests are maintained on the bases of international law

and mutual consent not only disproves the British contention but also demonstrates the soundness of their attitude as opposed to the British.

(12) In conclusion, the Arab Press Attachés and Information Officers in Washington believe that Arab-American relations and friendship should be vigorously promoted in the fields of trade, economic co-operation, tourism and educational and cultural exchange. In issuing this statement, they hope to invite attention to the present state of Arab-American relations as well as to the dangers threatening the orderly development of these relations. In addressing themselves to the American people, they wish to assure them of the Arab world's genuine desire to promote the best possible relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and mutual interest.



After signing the U.A.R.-Iraqi Agreement (preceding Economic Integration)

Britain and the Middle East— A Perspective

By Dr. Fayez Sayegh

In our May issue we referred to the article by Dr. Fayez Sayegh on the McMahon-Hussein controversy, published by the Oxford weekly Isis in its issue of 23rd May. In this article, which we reproduce below, Dr. Sayegh surveys the whole controversy, citing the new evidence which had led to the entire re-examination of this controversy and replying to all the letters that appeared in The Times, disputing the authority or significance of this evidence.—EDITOR.

THE Libyan parliament formally calls upon its government to arrange for immediate liquidation of British bases; British bombers attack a Yemeni town; reinforced British troops fight dissident tribesmen in Southern Arabia; the Presidents of the U.A.R. and Iraq vow—in San'a, in Baghdad, in Cairo and at Aswan—to eliminate all remaining British outposts in the Arab world; the Arab press, from Morocco to Kuwait, enthusiastically echoes the call: the front-page headlines of the past two months attest clearly to the upsurge of a new wave of Anglo-Arab hostility.

The current outbreak is in fact only the latest acute manifestation of a chronic condition. Underlying the continuous, deep-rooted, and widespread hostility is a real crisis of confidence: a loss of Arab faith in British intentions, British policies, and British declarations. By far, the most potent single cause of this Arab distrust is Britain's conduct in Palestine.

Important new evidence, drawn from secret Foreign Office documents not released by the British Government, has been recently placed on the record. This hitherto-suppressed evidence illustrates the special experience which the Arabs have had with the British Government in relation to Palestine, and illuminates a small corner of the background of Arab distrust of British proclamations.

Brought to light for the first time in an essay I published in the January-February issue of *Hicvar*, a Lebanese bi-monthly journal, the new documentary evidence was subsequently cited and discussed by *The Times*' Special Correspondent in a "special article" based on the original *Hicvar* essay, which appeared in *The Times* of 17th April, 1964. The publication of this article aroused some debate, and was followed by the publication of several letters and two editorial articles. Since the Editor of *The Times* was "unable to find a place" for my comments on points raised in the letters

for which space was available, I am happy to have the opportunity to discuss those points more fully now in *Isis*.

* * *

THE DOCUMENTS

The Foreign Office documents consist of a Memorandum on "British Commitments to King Hussein", prepared by the Political Intelligence Department, and an Appendix on "Previous Commitments of His Majesty's Government in the Middle East", intended as a supplement to a proposed "Statement on British Policy in the Middle East". They were prepared by the Foreign Office for the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and, as such, were intended to remain secret. They have not been released by the British Government. But they were somehow acquired by the late Professor William Linn Westermann when he served as adviser to the American delegation to the Conference, and were donated as part of the "Westermann Papers" to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, California, with the stipulation that they would not be opened before his death.

While the first document registered British wartime commitments to King Hussein only, and the second catalogued British undertakings to all parties in relation to any Middle Eastern territory, the contents of the two documents overlap in several respects. The portions they contain concerning the bearing of the "McMahon pledge" on Palestine are essentially the same; and they are of supreme importance in view of the great debate which has been going on since 1922 over the precise scope of that pledge and its inclusion of Palestine in, or exclusion of Palestine from, the area of promised Arab independence.

At the outset of wartime Anglo-Arab negotiations, in his letter of 14th July, 1915, Hussein requested in the name of "the Arab Nation" that the British Government undertake to recognise and support Arab independence in all Arab territories then ruled by the Ottomans, and proposed a definition of the boundaries of those territories which had been formulated by a central committee of Arab nationalists. The British Government reacted with ill-disguised hesitation to the Arab territorial demand. But, in the face of repeated Arab insistence, the Foreign Office finally reversed itself and instructed Sir Henry McMahon, then High Commissioner in Cairo, to issue the requested pledge with certain specified modifications affecting the north-western boundaries of Syria. These modifications, which were never interpreted by the Arabs as jeopardising the inclusion of Palestine within the area of recognised Arab independence, were provisionally accepted by Arab leaders; and soon Anglo-Arab agreement was reached and the Arab Revolt was declared in June, 1916. The British pledge to uphold Arab independence continued to be reaffirmed intermittently; and in November, 1918, a joint Anglo-French declaration was issued, in which France for the first time joined Britain in proclaiming as their common goal "the final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks" and the setting up and recognition of "indigenous governments and administrations".

CLEAR PROMISES

Notwithstanding these clear promises, and despite faithful fulfilment by the Arabs of their obligations under the Anglo-Arab Agreement, Britain and France disposed differently of the Arab countries after the war. Instead of gaining independence, the Asian Arab countries outside the Arabian Peninsula were placed under British or French Mandates; and, instead of enjoying the unity they had been led to expect, they found themselves placed under separate administrations. Palestine was singled out for special treatment. Not only was it placed under British rule, but its doors were opened for massive, organised Zionist immigration, in accordance with a British declaration made in November, 1917, without prior consultation with, or notification of, the Arab inhabitants of the country—who comprised then over 90 per cent of its population and owned over 97 per cent of its land. Not content with this dual breach of its promise regarding Palestine, the British Government proceeded soon after the end of the war to "add insult to injury", by denying that it had ever promised the Arabs independence in Palestine. This denial, first made in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 and repeated in successive White Papers and policy-statements, started the controversy which came, before long, to acquire the proportions of a *cause célèbre*, and which contributed

more than any other factor to the loss of Arab faith in Britain's word.

While the British Government has repeatedly denied, since 1922, and the Arabs have with equal emphasis affirmed, all along, the inclusion of Palestine in the area of promised Arab independence, some students of British wartime diplomacy have seen the dispute as an unfortunate misunderstanding made possible by the clumsy wording, and the less-than-precise language, of the McMahon pledge. But the new evidence sheds a different light on the controversy. For the two definitive Foreign Office documents leave no room for doubt that the British Government was indeed conscious, at the time the promise was made and throughout the war years, that its promise to Hussein did include Palestine, and that Hussein and the Arab nationalist groups so understood it. Neither ambiguity in the text of the pledge, nor differing interpretations of its intent, was behind the post-War Anglo-Arab differences: these differences were caused by nothing less than a conscious lie, made and maintained by the British Government from 1922 onwards, regarding the scope of its 1915 promise. This is the only conclusion one can derive from the clear testimony of the two Foreign Office documents—written, as they were, long before the British Government decided to deny its promise, and in any case intended solely for internal use by agencies of the Government and not for publication. The *Memo-randum* asserts (on page 9).

"With regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir H. McMahon's letter to the Sherif on the 24th October, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence."

And the *Appendix* affirms (on page 11):

"The whole of Palestine, within the limits set out in the main body of the memorandum, lies within the limits within which His Majesty's Government have pledged themselves to Sherif Hussein that they will recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs. This clear revelation of bad faith adds a new dimension to Arab hostility to British policy in Palestine. Until now, this hostility was inspired mainly by three factors: (1) British usurpation of the inalienable right of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, who were the overwhelming majority of the population when Britain unilaterally and secretly promised alien Zionists access to Palestine with a view to establishing a national home for themselves on its soil; (2) Britain's betrayal of its Arab wartime allies; and (3) British breach of a solemn pledge given to the Arabs in 1915. But now a fourth charge is hurled by Arabs at Britain: Successive British Governments have consciously misrepresented the facts about their commitment to the Arabs, and have knowingly lied about that commitment.

* * *

DISSENT

As soon as *The Times* cited the passages quoted above, in its article of 17th April, objections were raised in readers' letters.

Two readers promptly protested the reopening of the debate. Mr. Norman Bentwich, who had "fondly thought" that the Anglo-Arab discussions of 1939 had provided the "last word" on the controversy, was apparently distressed to see the question raised all over again. But he is mistaken about the results of the London discussions. Far from pronouncing "the last word", those discussions ended inconclusively; and the White Paper of May 1939, issued after the termination of those discussions, sadly admitted that British and Arab representatives "were unable to reach agreement". Mr. Elie Kedourie, on the other hand, advanced the novel doctrine that the question as such "is historically meaningless" and that, since "the controversies of the thirties are dead and gone", it is "regrettable" that *The Times* should, "to no purpose, encourage their exhumation". This pronouncement may come as a surprise to those who have been trained to view the re-examination of past events and beliefs as a not too reprehensible concern of historians, particularly if fresh evidence has been brought to light.

Realising, perhaps, that some readers might not dutifully endorse his wish to obstruct the reopening of the debate, Mr. Kedourie proceeds to attack the subject from a different angle. He disputes the statement that the passages on Palestine contained in the documents constitutes new evidence, claiming that one of the two documents was "by no means unknown" since he had "discussed" it in a book he had published in 1956. Obviously, such a claim could in no way affect the substance of the issue, even if it were true; but it is not true. Though he did cite in his book a Foreign Office document bearing the same title as the *Memorandum*, he himself later admitted that the document he cited was an abbreviated version of the original, which he had not seen when he wrote his book. (See *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 11 p. 164, fn. 6.) Not did he in any way "discuss" its summary in his book; he merely cited or otherwise referred to some of its contents, without any discussion of the document itself. And, since he carefully abstained—for reasons known only to himself—from making any mention of the sections on Palestine, the testimony of the two documents regarding the bearing of the McMahon pledge upon Palestine remains in every sense of the term "new evidence", notwithstanding his selective references in his book to the summary of one of the two documents.

If he cannot convincingly disqualify the two documents from offering *new* evidence, perhaps he can meet greater success in his endeavour to discredit them if he shows them to be *unreliable* sources of evidence. This he attempts to do by charging the authors with "imperfect

command of the issues" and "imperfect" judgment. But the two illustrations he offers only reveal his own imperfect familiarity with the documents or with the facts.

We are told that the document was in error when it stated that Hussein was violently disturbed by Jamal Pasha's revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in November, 1917, since Hussein was allegedly "quite well aware of the Sykes-Picot arrangements". But the evidence contradicts this unsupported assertion. Hussein himself publicly denied that he had been informed of the Agreement prior to Jamal Pasha's revelation; no British or French official has asserted the contrary; and the British Government, in two messages sent to Hussein in 1918 in reply to his enquiry, directly or by inference denied that such an Agreement existed at all—a response which is hardly reconcilable with the supposition that Hussein had been previously informed by the British Government of the Agreement.

Mr. Kedourie's second illustration pertains to the alleged failure of the *Memorandum* to indicate that, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Palestine Holy Places were destined to be administered jointly by a number of Powers. He is wrong. The *Memorandum* does cite the relevant provisions of the Agreement in Section iii (page 5).

* * *

"DELIBERATE IMPRECISION"

Contrary to what the foregoing observations may suggest, some significant contributions to the substance of the discussion have been made since the publication of *The Times'* article. Specially noteworthy is the letter written by Miss Elizabeth Monroe, a Fellow of St. Antony's College and a serious and well-informed student of British policies in the Middle East. Miss Monroe advances a theory which may well serve as a useful starting-point for understanding Britain's sorry record in Palestine, and consequently in the Arab world as a whole. Unfortunately, however, the promise latent in this wholesome beginning is all too soon blighted, as Miss Monroe's analysis is not allowed to take its full course.

Arguing, rightly, that the passages on Palestine contained in the documents must not be viewed in isolation from, but in the light of, the total context of Britain's wartime search for a suitable formula for the administration of Palestine, she goes on to suggest that Britain's uncertainty demanded that, in the meantime, a strategy of "deliberate imprecision" be adopted. Accordingly, she suggests, McMahon's undertakings to the Arabs "can be read as including or excluding Palestine, according to taste". Finally, she argues that the available evidence (which shows that some British statesmen continued, after 1915, to contemplate arrangements for

the future of Palestine which were irreconcilable with Arab independence) would not "make sense" if the McMahon pledge of 1915 had already firmly committed Britain to a policy of supporting Arab independence in Palestine. (A similar view is expressed by Mr. Leonard Stein in a later letter to *The Times*.)

It is quite true that, at the beginning, uncertainty about its future policy in Palestine had led the British Government to attempt to remain uncommitted. Kitchener's message of 31st October, 1914, which opened Anglo-Arab wartime contacts was silent on the question of boundaries. The Foreign Office telegram of 14th April, 1915, to the High Commissioner in Cairo sought to postpone commitment on the territorial issue: "It is not possible to define at this stage exactly how much territory should be included in this State", it said. Even when Hussein, in his first letter to McMahon (dated 14th July, 1915), listed a number of "fundamental provisions" regarding which he requested British assurances of consent (while leaving "matters of relatively small importance" until "the time comes for their consideration") and assigned to the territorial question first place on his list, the British Government tried to remain uncommitted: "As for the question of frontiers and boundaries", wrote McMahon on 30th August, 1915, "negotiations would appear to be premature and a waste of time and details at this stage". But Hussein's rejoinder came quickly. On 9th September, he gently rebuked McMahon for "the signs of lukewarmth and hesitancy we detected in (your letter) in regard to our essential clause", he wrote; and, after warning that the territorial question could not "await the conclusion of the war", he stated meaningfully that "the result of the present negotiations" would "depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed frontiers".

It was clear, from that moment on, that if Britain wished to continue negotiating with the Arabs, it had no alternative but to admit the question of boundaries as "item number one" on the agenda.

At that point, British representatives in Cairo learned from other sources that the central committee of Arab nationalists, which had originally proposed the frontiers, suggested by Hussein, had in the meantime sent emissaries to Jeddah with instructions "to insist on a general acceptance (of the territorial demand) as a condition of continuing negotiations". The same sources also informed British representatives in Cairo that, while the Arabs might "accept some modification of the north-western boundaries", they would oppose certain other changes "by force of arms".

According to the *Memorandum*—which records and documents these facts—McMahon conveyed the substance of Hussein's letter of 9th September, 1915, to the Foreign Office in telegram No. 623 on 18th October; and, in a private telegram of the same date to Sir E. Grey, he reported the supplementary information. It was the Foreign Office that then decided that continued evasion

was no longer possible, and that the undertaking demanded by the Arabs should be made, with such modifications as were deemed desirable and possible in the light of the information gathered in Cairo about minimum and maximum Arab desiderata. Wasting no time, the Foreign Office telegraphed its instructions to McMahon to this effect on 20th October; and these instructions were embodied in McMahon's famous letter of 24th October.

Miss Monroe's theory, that British uncertainty about the future of Palestine led to attempted non-commitment and deliberate imprecision, applies therefore only to the period ending on 20th October, 1915. The McMahon pledge was a product not of this period (of evasive non-commitment) but of the new period (of recognition that commitment, however undesirable, was nevertheless inescapable).

* * *

THREE CHARGES

It is now established that the Foreign Office had come to realise, by October, 1915, that evasion and non-commitment were no longer workable. It is also established that the formula devised by the British Government for meeting Arab territorial demands and securing Arab collaboration was based on the knowledge, obtained in Cairo, about those modifications in their territorial demands which the Arabs might accept and those which they would oppose. The question then arises: was the McMahon pledge, so devised, intended to lead the Arabs to understand that Palestine was included in the promised area? To this question, the Foreign Office documents give an unqualified, affirmative answer. But how can this be reconciled with other evidence which shows that, notwithstanding the McMahon pledge, some British statesmen continued to countenance other arrangements for the future of Palestine? Miss Monroe and Mr. Stein choose to answer this question by virtually dismissing, or discounting, the authoritative testimony of the Foreign Office documents under discussion—based though these documents were upon the entire files of the Foreign Office, including the reports, explanatory memoranda and other intra-governmental messages exchanged before the issuing of the pledge, and including also a complete historical narrative compiled by the Arab Bureau at Cairo. But there is, I submit, another (and far less arbitrary) explanation. The British Government did, as the Foreign Office documents affirm, include Palestine in the area within which it assured the Arabs it would recognise Arab independence: but it did not necessarily intend to honour its promise, and therefore it continued to consider other arrangements calculated to satisfy other parties or to safeguard Britain's own imperial interests. This is, of course, tantamount to charging the British Government with deliberate and conscious deception in

its wartime dealings with the Arabs. Is such a charge warranted? The record shows that, in more ways than one, the charge is not only warranted, but also inescapable.

First: It is a matter of record that other portions of the McMahon pledge, over the interpretation of which there has been and can be no controversy, were clearly contradicted by later British undertakings secretly made to other parties (such as some provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement). If deception is manifest and undeniable in regard to Arab areas other than Palestine, why rule it out as unthinkable in regard to Palestine?

Second: It is also a matter of record that Britain made several official statements to the Arabs, on issues other

than Palestine, which were patently misleading and false: the statement of 1918 denying the very existence of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and the successive British assurances of support for Arab independence which were made in 1917 and 1918 despite known designs to the contrary, are a few samples of conscious deception.

Thirdly: No less informed a statesman than Balfour has candidly admitted that, regarding Syria, "we had not been honest with either French or Arab", and that, "so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate".



New Housing Estate in the Yarmuk Quarter of Baghdad

The Arab Refugees: Obstacle to Peace in Palestine

Recognizing Their Right To Return

Below we publish—translated and reproduced from Le Monde of 10th May—the second of Mr. Uri Avnery's two articles on the subject of the Arab refugees and Israel's policy towards them.

THE impossibility of the return of the Arab refugees is considered today as a veritable article of faith by official Israeli circles. Many reasons have been advanced on the subject—political, military and economic. It remains nonetheless true that most of these reasons are basically unconvincing.

From the political point of view, nothing could be worse for Israel than the existence of nearly 1,000,000 veritable human castaways in its neighbourhood. The Arab refugees are, in fact, the carriers of an infectious germ which has the name of "anti-Israelism". They are the living witnesses who recall incessantly to the Arab world that the war against Israel has not ended. Militarily speaking, the refugees constitute a permanent danger.

In the economic domain, the gulf between the argument and the reality exists in a much more evident manner. In fact, one hears the same Zionist leader affirm passionately that Israel can easily absorb 3,000,000 Jews from Russia, and reject with no less passion the idea that Israel could absorb even 100,000 of the Arab refugees.

THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM

Here we touch upon the heart of the matter, for illogical as the Zionist attitude towards the problem of the Arab refugees might appear, it remains nonetheless true that this attitude rests on a basis at once solid and unconscious.

Zionism is the moving idea of the present regime in Israel. Its political parties, its educational system, its newspapers are for the most part Zionist. But Zionism rests entirely on the doctrine of a Jewish State, "as Jewish as England is English." It assimilates the Jewish State to Europe, thus isolating it from the Arab Middle East.

This ideology, whose strength must not be underestimated, is therefore fundamentally opposed to the conception of a bi-national State, even one that would be preponderantly Jewish. It does not look with a favourable eye on the existence of an Arab minority even though representing not more than 10 per cent of the total population of the country, as is the case at present. And, according to the Zionists, the doubling or the quadrupling of this percentage would constitute a national calamity. All the other opinions are no more than a rationalization of this basic instinct.

But this way of looking at the matter does not in our opinion correspond any more to the realities of the day. A new conception of things is in process of gaining ground in Israel, chiefly among the youth. This vanguard, while defending the principle of the integrity and the independence of Israel, believes in the possibility of collaboration between Israeli and Arab nationalists, in the framework of a free, unified and socially advanced region. In this totality, Israel would be the national "home" of both its Hebrew and its Arab citizens, the loyal ally of the Arab countries and an integrated part of the Afro-Asian world.

BASIS OF A RECONCILIATION

The wished-for reconciliation can and must be realized on the basis of a just solution of the problem of the refugees. One could envisage the following project :

(a) Israel recognizes the principle of the right of the Arab refugees to return to Israeli territory.

(b) Every refugee could opt as an individual whether to return or to receive compensation.

(c) Compensation, according to a scale agreed in advance, must be given to every refugee renouncing his right to return. The payments will be in hard currency, and will cover abandoned property as well as loss of livelihood, interruption of studies etc.

(d) The refugees opting for return will be admitted over a period of ten years according to an annual quota.

(e) They will be settled and provided with new means of existence, in the cities and the villages, in the same manner as Jewish immigrants arriving in the country.

(f) The refugees returning to Israel would automatically become citizens enjoying all civil rights, and that from the first day of their return.

(g) The resettlement and the compensation of the refugees would be financed with the help of international funds.

(h) The repatriation will not in any way be conditional on a political settlement.

(i) The Arab refugees will freely set up a body of representatives who will co-operate with the Israeli delegates with the aim of realizing this project.

EXERCISING A POWERFUL MYTH

There could be no solution to the problem unless the right of the refugees to return home was recognized in principle. To ignore it is to defy psychological and political realities. The idea of the return has become a powerful myth. No Arab government dare ignore it, any more than any of the refugees themselves.

It would be enough therefore to recognize this right,

even in an abstract manner, for the formidable obstacles that stand in the way of a concrete solution of the problem to be swept away. In fact, what is today a big collective problem would be broken up and transformed into hundreds of thousands of small individual problems. Freed from the oppression of the myth, freed from the feelings of frustration and injustice, every head of family will ask himself this simple and meaningful question: "Now that I can go back, should I re-make my life in Israel or somewhere else?"

It is not of course easy to predict the number of the refugees who would in these circumstances opt for return, and those who would prefer to receive compensation and go to establish themselves in some Arab country.

I have asked many experts as well as some Arab leaders as to the number of refugees who, according to them, would choose to return. They placed this number, going by conjecture, at between 100 and 400,000.

THE NIGHTMARE OF THE ISRAELIS

When they think of the possibility of the repatriation of the refugees, the Israelis often imagine that that would be a nightmare: a tide of refugees devoured by hatred of Israel suddenly flooding the country, undermining its security and perhaps destroying its very existence. This is why all those who plead in favour of the return of the refugees are considered either as traitors or as dangerous lunatics.

It is enough however to consider the problem of repatriation in detail and as a process consisting of multiple phases and ramifications, for this nightmare to disappear automatically. The repatriation will not be either sudden or catastrophic. It will be gradual and will be based on many stipulations calculated to defend what must be safeguarded.

During the first stage, the refugees must be accorded the possibility of freely exercising their choice and submitting their claims. This means that mixed commissions, composed of Israelis and of delegates of the refugees, will be able to move freely in the refugee camps in order to collect information given in all freedom; and that refugees will be able, as individuals, to enter Israeli territory in order to be able to prove their rights.

Naturally, this would involve a radical change of atmosphere in the region. Even without there being anything consciously done in this direction, the climate of tension will go by being automatically dissipated. The Israeli frontiers, hermetically closed for ten years, will cease to have the warlike character which they have had for a decade.

A question here arises with regard to the Arab governments: will they accept such a solution? If they were to reject the project, Israel would have nothing to lose. But the result would be a fundamentally altered climate, as every refugee would henceforth know that it was not Israel but the Arab governments that opposed his

return to an honourable and fruitful life. In fact, wireless wavelengths do not know frontiers.

ISRAEL HAS NOTHING TO LOSE

However, the risk of a rejection of this project is minimal, there being no Arab leader who could resist the immense pressure that would come from the refugee camps. Moreover, all the Arab leaders view with apprehension the revolutionary potential inherent in the prolonged existence of large masses of unemployed refugees who lead a life without hope. These refugees are a menace to every established government, whether at Gaza, in Syria or in Jordan.

One could even argue that the solution of the problem would be advantageous to Israel from an economic point of view. For the creation of productive units for and by the refugees, with international financial aid, would help the Israeli economy. And at least a part of the compensation money that would be paid out to the other refugees would be represented by Israeli products and services.

A few weeks ago, General Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour, declared in the Knesset that in two years Israel would suffer a catastrophic shortage of labour because of the drying up of present sources of Jewish immigration. This is why the return of tens of thousands of refugees annually could be a real blessing to the Jewish State.

There remains the problem which always confronts the Israelis—that of security.

Military security is not a static conception. It is dynamic, depending as it does on the changes that take place in political and psychological conditions.

The refugees and their children have absorbed during the past ten years an immense dose of anti-Israeli propaganda. They hate Israel. But the solution of the problem of the Arab refugees will change the climate in the camps as well as in the whole Arab world. The machinery put in motion for the repatriation of the refugees and the payment of compensation money will embrace the whole of the Middle East, thus changing, by the very nature of things, present psychological realities. The effect on the security of Israel will therefore be concrete and visible. On the other hand, the Israeli security services are equal to the task of detecting spies and saboteurs who may try to infiltrate into Israel under cover of the repatriation operation.

The solution of the problem of the refugees is a moral and political imperative. It is not a question that should become part of the bargaining at an imaginary peace conference of the future. This solution will not be the result of a formal peace treaty. On the contrary, a formal peace treaty could be the result of the great revolution that would be effected by the launching of the practical solution of the problem of the refugees.

The refugees are human beings. In the days to come they could give a new meaning to the Biblical prophecy (psalm 118, 22):

"The stone which the builders refused is become the headstone of the corner."

