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News from Oman

(Dhofar Letter)

The newsletter analyses the development in Oman within the framework of regional and international development. These analysis build on direct information from the Peoples Front for the Liberation of Oman and other progressive movements in the area. Also the most important western sources of news are used, such as the Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) and BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts (which daily summarizes or cites all the radiostations in the region). In addition to this a wide selection of international newspapers and magazines are used as sources.

The newsletter also brings information about international support work done for the PFLO, and it brings extensive listings of recent books and articles on Oman.

Also substantial coverage of the events in Yemen.

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THE REVOLUTION IS ALIVE

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE
IN OMAN

KROAG 1979

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CONTENTS

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IN OMAN

APR 1968

CENTRE FOR ARAB GULF STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

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THE REVOLUTION IS ALIVE. THE LIBERATION
STRUGGLE IN OMAN

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

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
The majority of the photos in this pamphlet
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Exceptions to this are the photos on the pages
22, 47 and 61, which all are provided by CSRO.

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magazine News from Oman (Dhofar Letter).

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INTRODUCTION

The liberation struggle began in 1965 in Dhofar, in the mountains of Southern Oman. This struggle has always been "a forgotten war", because the Western news media has kept quiet about it. The Western news media was quiet even when the war was at its highest: While the mountains of Dhofar were being heavily bombed by the British air force, the Iranian air force, and the Iranian fleet; and while Iranian, British and Jordanian forces lost hundreds of men during the hard battles (pro-Western sources estimate that the Iranian forces alone lost more than a thousand men). After the military setback of the liberation movement at the end of 1975 the news covering has been even more scarce.

However, a single battle does not decide the fate of a revolution. In the years following the military setback, while "healing its wounds in revolutionary silence", the liberation movement, the Peoples Front for the Liberation of Oman, has made remarkable progress with re-structuring and rebuilding its organization. It is difficult to predict what will happen in the next few years in the Gulf area. The development in Iran has been a hard blow to the imperialistic control of the area, but there is no doubt that USA, Britain and their local allies are working feverishly to find new solutions. So the future of the area is uncertain. The Struggle in Oman represents only a small

part of the total development taking place, but it is a fact that the PFLO has been strengthened on all levels both militarily, politically and organization wise.

The Gulf area is of exceptional importance to the Western World because of its enormous oil reserves and its strategic important location. Therefore the anti-imperialist struggle taking place here may come to play a decisive role in the world-wide struggle against the imperialistic system of exploitation.

The PFLO is an important part of the Arab revolutionary movement. The PFLO has a high reputation for its fighting qualities; its ability to preserve national unity during 14 years of hard struggle; its policy concerning womens role in the revolution and in society; and its progressive health- and educational programs.

Work Being Done in Support of the PFLO

This pamphlet is a part of the support work done for the PFLO. It is published with the dual purposes of stimulating interest in the situation in Oman and the Gulf area, and with the hope that some people will carry their interest further and actively work in support of PFLO.

In the Western World there is a considerable tradition for support of the PFLO.

In the late sixties and early seventies several groups have carried out important pioneer work by collecting and publishing background information about the liberation struggle in Oman. Especially important was the work done by groups like: the Gulf Committee(London), Comite de Soutien a la Revolution en Oman(Paris) and Arbeitskreis NAHOST/GOLF(Berlin).

Since the middle of the seventies another dimension has been added to the work done in support of the PFLO by the build-up of a sizeable supply organization. The Scandinavian groups Emmaus Fhysinge, U-landsklunserne(Danish Emmaus), and KROAG form the core of this supply organization. These groups have built-up a high level of support by consistency and coordination. In cooperation with a number of other groups in Europa and the USA they have equipped the Fatimah Ghananah hospital run by the Omani Red Crescent, and they are continuously supplying a large

amount of the medicine needed by the Omani Red Crescent. Presently they are carrying out a largescale project for the Omani Womens Organization to establish a Womens Cultural Centre(see the chapter: The Revolution is Alive). In addition to this these groups are carrying out a number of other projects for the PFLO(For details on ongoing support projects, please contact KROAG).


List of Anti-imperialistic Groups in Western Europa and USA engaged in support work with the PFLO

AURORA, Box 22o49, S-1o4 22 Stockholm, Sweden

CSRO, 14 Rue Nanteuil, 75o15 Paris, France

Emmaus Björkä, Åkvarn, 36o7o Åseda, Sweden

Emmaus Fhysinge, 19o7o Fjärdhundra, Sweden



- Medicine and other supplies from Scandinavia in the Omani Red Crescent office in Aden -

General Union of Bahraini Students, c/o GUAS,
58 Old Brompton Road, London SW7, England

Gulf Solidarity, P.O. Box 756, Berkeley, CA 94701, USA

Gulf Solidarity Committee, P.O. Box 3784, Eugene,
Oregon 97403, USA

Gulf-Palestine Committee, P.O. Box 12072, Portland,
Oregon 97212, USA

Iranian Students Society in Great Britain, Box 75,
182 Upper Street, London N1, England

KROAG, Box 86, DK-1003 Copenhagen K, Denmark

League Against Imperialism, Box 2065, 1013 Copenhagen K,
Denmark

Liberation Support Movement, P.O. Box 2077, Oakland,
CA 94604, USA

Middle East Research & Information Project(MERIP),
P.O. Box 3122, Columbia Heights Station, Washington,
D.C. 20010, USA

Netherlands Palestine Committee, Postbus 193, Nijmegen,
Holland

Oman Hilfe e.V., 6 Frankfurt/M.1, Postfach 3892, BRD

South West Asian Committee, Box 15135, 10465 Stockholm,
Sweden

Tricontinental Group, 29 Islington Park Street, London N1
England

U-landskluserne(Danish Emmaus), Poppelgade 4 o.g.k.,
2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark

Financial Support for the PFLO can be sent directly to the
PFLO, P.O. Box 5037, Maalla, Aden, P.D.R. Yemen

You can also send money to Support People of the World,
Box 86, DK-1003 Copenhagen K, Denmark (by check or giro,
danish giro account no 7 30 33 00). This account has been
established in close cooperation with KROAG, and is used
to finance supplies for the PFLO.

BACKGROUND FOR AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

THE GEOGRAPHY OF OMAN

The Sultanate of Oman is situated in the south-eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. The total area is estimated to be 310.000 square kilometers, app.0.15% of which is cultivated. The official figure for the population is 1.500.000, but an unofficial examination in 1975 shows figures as low as 766.000. Beyond these there are app. 65.000 foreigners.

Oman is divided in the following areas:

The Ras Massendum Peninsula, situated by the Strait of Hormuz, is separated from the rest of Oman by the United Arab Emirates.

The Batinah Plain is a narrow fertile coastal area by the Omani Gulf. In this area a great proportion of the population lives. They mainly live by fishing and farming. Here you can find big mechanized farms growing dates, lemons and tobacco for export.

The coastal area around the capital Muscat and the port Matrah is the center for the economic development which has taken place since 1970 in the construction and industrial sectors and has attracted people from the interior Oman and from abroad. The population in the Muscat/Matrah area is app.80.000.

To the west of the coastal area in the interior of Oman runs the Hajar Mountains. This range, in the Jabal Akhdar massif, rises to 3000 m above sea level. The population is concentrated in the valleys - the wadis - where cultivation is possible. The farming is primitive and the greater part of the production is consumed locally. In Jabal Akhdar, the name means the 'green mountains', various crops are grown in terraced fields on the mountain sides. The fields are irrigated by the ancient but sophisticated falaj system. In this historic important area are the towns of Nizwa, Rostaq, Nakhl and Ibbi situated. In addition some nomadic tribes live in the interior of Oman. Around the towns of Fahud and Natih oil is found, the most vital export article for Oman giving 90% of the government incomes. In the western Hajar Mountains, near the town of Sohar, copper deposits have been found.

The province of Dhofar is situated in the most southern part of Oman. It is separated from the rest of Oman by a 800 km-wide desert. Along the coast of Dhofar there are plains of various widths. The most important is the plain around the capital Salalah (60 km long and 15 km wide). Some distance from the coast the plains meet the Qara Mountain-range. In the mountains the vegetation is luxuriant and most of the Dhofarians (app.150.000) live in this green zone and by the coast. The coastal population lives by fishing, farming and trading. In the mountains the population lives as nomads mainly by keeping goats, cattle, sheep and camels but also in some areas by cultivating the land during the monsoon.

Oman is situated in the tropics. The fall of rain is limited, and drought is frequent sometimes lasting for two years. Dhofar, however, is an exception to the rest of Oman, taking advantage of the south-west monsoon in July, August and September.

THE DEVELOPMENT IN OMAN IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN 1965:

Oman during the colonial time

In order to understand the background to the liberation struggle in Oman it is necessary to follow the historical

development of Oman. The history of Oman shows that the conditions and struggles here are not a result of a local isolated development but a result of the confrontation with the European colonialism. The international event decisive to the further destiny of Oman was the British intrusion into the Arabian/Persian Gulf in about the middle of the 19th century. At that time the Sultanate was a prosperous commercial centre and a big colonial power with colonies along the coasts of Africa and Pakistan. The Omani fleet was the largest in the Indian Ocean. But after few years British steamships with cheap industrial commodities had ousted the mercantile fleet of Oman and destroyed the Omani craft. The economy dissolved completely and was reduced to a subsistence level. On this level Oman stayed for the next 100 years. The economic break-down of Oman made the tribes from the interior Oman revolt against the Sultan, who resided in the coastal town Muscat, and dethrone him. The British took this opportunity to obtain a foothold in the area. They were especially interested in securing the sea-route to India. Therefore they expelled the rebels from Muscat and restored the Sultan in 1871. Since then Oman has in reality been a British colony, a fact which the British always have tried to hide. The successive Sultans could stay in power only through massive British economic and military aid, and their policies have been decided by British advisers. The British maintained a sort of status quo in Oman, partly through their influence on the Sultan and partly by bribing the leading tribal sheiks. Those tribes which had been privileged by the British maintained and defended the underdeveloped conditions and thereby secured the British control.

Two points characterize the period in question:

1. The demolition of the economy of Oman.
2. The introduction of the "divide and rule" strategy, which acts as a brake to all economic, social and political development.

The reason why the British, with this divide and rule strategy, created and maintained such a barbaric situation in the country can be found in the situation in the centre of the imperialist system at that time. The relations between the imperialist powers were characterized by strong competition over how to divide the world between them. By introducing

the "divide and rule" strategy the British secured the control of the area. Local powers were unable to grow strong because this strategy prevented the local social and economic development which otherwise would have been the basis for their growth and strength. The British therefore did not have any local rivals who could threaten their rule, and their European rivals got no chance to ally with local groups against the British rule.

However, everything did not go smoothly. The tribes in the interior of Oman under the leadership of the Imam - the religious leader - caused repeatedly troubles for the British. In 1920 a pact was made which gave autonomy to the interior Oman. The reason to this pact was partly that the British had troubles subduing the tribes militarily, and partly that this area was without greater interest for imperialism at that time. The aim was to secure the sea-route to India. The Imamate could not be any threat to the British, who controlled the coastal area and thereby kept the interior isolated from the outside world. This isolation hampered economic development and prevented contact with any of Britains European rivals.

The British kept Oman at this Middle Age level for almost 100 years through the "divide and rule" strategy. As a consequence one of the most barbaric rules in the world began in Oman during the last part of this "period of stagnation". In the period 1932-70 the tool of the British was Sultan Said bin Taimur who carried out their policy with brutality. Right up until 1970 there were almost no schools, roads or health services. Medicines, books, spectacles and radios were forbidden. These conditions created disease and illiteracy.

It was the population in the poor province, Dhofar, who called for an important change in this system. The two events decisive to the break with the past and the beginning to the development of a quite new situation in Oman was the starting of the liberation struggle in Dhofar in 1965 and the coup d'etat in 1970, provoked by the fighting and directed by the British, when Qaboos, the son of the old Sultan came into power. Both events have their roots in the international situation.

The neocolonial world-order

After the Second World War England was ruined and was no longer the dominant military and economic power in the western world. The USA was ready to assume world rule, being in the possession of an enormous, till now unseen, military and economic potential. The situation was precarious. England possessed most of the colonies in the world, colonies were pushing to regain independence, and USA was ready to take over the British role.

The neo-colonial world order, the "solution" to the problem, was established, paradoxically enough, in the name of decolonization. The new strategy was partly a continuation of the old "divide and rule" strategy favouring the friendly local upper classes which were provided with an effective army and police to subdue the opposition, and partly a new creation as the colonies obtained their formal independence. Limited reforms were introduced to redress the worst dissatisfactions, and the colonies were integrated into the new imperialist world economy.

In this periode oil becomes of great importance for the imperialist countries. Therefore the oil-boom in the Gulf, which began after the Second World War makes the whole Gulf-area a very important economic and strategic area to imperialism. The huge oil profits make it more easy for the ruling classes to introduce the neo-colonial system. The pacification of the national and progressive movements in the Arab World has, however, not succeeded smoothly, partly because of the establishment of the colonial settler-state Israel in a time of de-colonization.

The confrontation between colonial Oman and the neo-colonial world

The fact that USA took over the leadership in the imperialist world and the increasing imperialist need of oil are the two big changes in the imperialist system that have a direct influence on the situation in Oman. In the period 1954-59 the first serious attempt to overthrow the old kind of imperialism in Oman arise. Now it is no longer the coastal areas only that are important but the entire country. The hunger for oil makes the British oil-company PDO (Pe-

roleum Development Oman) go into the interior Oman, where they find oil in 1954. The autonomy treaty from 1920 is violated, and the British occupy the area. But now the Imam find strong allies. USA is willing to support him through their local ally, Saudi Arabia and the oil-company ARAMCO, hoping to get the oil-concessions for the interior Oman and attain control in the area. In 1957 the revolt in the Green Mountains (Jabal Akhdar) breaks out, but after two years of hard fighting the British crushed the rebellion through terror-bombardments of villages by the Royal Air Force and by using experienced anti-guerilla units from their other colonies.

Quite contrary to the development in the rest of the world, Britain and the old kind of imperialism stayed in power in Oman but, as it turned up, only for a short time. Though the factions in the imperialist camp took advantage of the revolt in the Green Mountains in their own internal fight, the revolt had great popular support because of the common opposition to the British occupation. The revolt was in fact an experience and inspiration to the later liberation struggle. In a genuine national liberation struggle, however, it is the people itself, who - after maturing experiences - take the leadership in the struggle. The further development of imperialism in the Gulf brings such maturity.

The oil-industry growing up in the Gulf is drawing workers from Oman to the oil-fields. It is especially the poor people from the southern province of Oman, Dhofar, who are emigrating in thousands during the fifties and the beginning of the sixties. Dhofar was an extremely poor province, because it was kept as a colony by the Sultan in the northern Oman, who taxed the population of Dhofar heavily. During their stay in the oil states the people from Dhofar came in touch with a completely new world with conditions totally different from the medieval conditions they were used to. They were inspired by the progressive and national currents passing through the Arab World, and when they later on return to Dhofar they are firmly determined to bring development and progress to Oman. In Oman the old kind of imperialism was still ruling in which the under-

developed conditions were a part of the strategy of the British and the local reactionaries towards the population. Therefore the Dhofarians were forced to start an armed rebellion, and on the 9th of June 1965 the struggle broke out.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

A struggle for liberation is not only a question of the military strength of the liberation army. The struggle is carried out on many levels of the social life, in a dialectical process between the two fighting parties. In the following it will be explained how the struggle between the people and its organization on the one side and the local reactionaries and the imperialists on the other side is waging up and down on the political, military and economic battle fields.

First Phase 1965-1968

On the 9th of June 1965 the armed struggle in Dhofar is started by Dhofar's Liberation Front, DLF. The core of the front consists of returned oil-workers and dissatisfied tribesmen from the area. The struggle is considered to be the last in a long series of encounters with the Omani colonialism, and the aim is a free and independent Dhofar. The united forces of the Sultan and the British (the Sultan's army consists mainly of Baluchi mercenaries, from this poor province of Pakistan. But all officers are British, from the sergeants to the Secretary of Defence) try to crush the revolt with the traditional imperialist methods. Villages and fields are burned, the rebel areas are blockaded economically, and the corpses of executed rebels are exhibited on the market in Salalah, in order to discourage the people. However, the imperialist forces did not prevent DLF from obtaining control of the western Dhofar.

Second Phase 1968-1974

For the Front this phase is characterized by the ideological change in 1968, which makes the revolution advance and take root. In the camp of the imperialists and the Sultan a new comprehensive anti-revolution

strategy is coming up, and renewed attacks on the revolution are started. At the congress of the Front in Hamrin in 1968 the left wing takes over the leadership. The defeat in Sinai in 1967 which led to a radicalization of the Arab Nationalist Movement and NLF's victory in Southern Yemen the same year were the external factors which influenced the ideological shift. The Front changes its name to the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) and adopts scientific socialism as its official ideology. The Front now opposes the separatist line and lays out a general anti-imperialist anti-reactionary strategy for the entire Gulf area. The main contradiction is between the oppressed population in the Gulf on the one hand, and on the other the local reactionaries and their imperialist allies. The military training now takes place parallel with political schooling, and women take part in the struggle on equal terms with men.

In 1971 an adjustment and realisation of the revolutionary slogans takes place, the revolution takes root and PFLOAG accomplishes a revolutionary transformation of the liberated areas. The land is collectivized and the nomads have the possibility to settle down and cultivate the land. A farm for experimental agriculture is established. The wells are collectivized and Dhofar's innumerable tribal quarrels about these wells vanish. Formerly each tribe owned its wells, exclusively for its own use. Popular democratic councils, consisting of elected representatives from the local population, the militia and the liberation army, organize the people cooperatively around the solution of daily problems. Literacy campaigns are carried through with the result that 70% of the People's Front and 50% of the local population learn reading and writing. Two schools for 2000 pupils are established. Health centers are started, and bare-foot doctors are trained. A united front is established between all progressive forces in the Gulf. In 1971 PFLOAG unites with NDFLOAG, which is struggling in the interior Oman. Also militarily the People's Front makes great progress. In June 1970 all Dhofar is liberated except the provincial capital Salalah, and the fighting spread to the northern and interior Oman. Oman is facing its total liberation.

The successes of the Omani people's attempt to change the Sultanate of Oman to the people's Oman makes it absolutely necessary to the counter revolutionaries - who most of all want to prevent that popular assumption of power will spread throughout the Gulf area - to bring about a new anti-revolution strategy which is in better accordance with the local and international situation. It had become obvious even to the British that the old kind of imperialism was no longer sufficient. In accordance with the change in the relative strength of Great Britain and USA, now with USA as the undisputed leader in the imperialist world, Britain must admit to not having the needed military, economic and political strength to suppress and control the population in Oman. New strong powers and more modern methods are needed. Oman must be subject to the common control and exploitation of imperialism. Neo-colonialism shall be introduced in Oman. Provoked by the spreading of the liberation struggle to the interior and northern Oman, the British are compelled to stage a coup d'etat in 1970. The old Sultan is dethroned, and his son Qaboos, who has passed the British military academy, Sandhurst, is put on the throne, as he can be used as a puppet to introduce neo-colonialism in Oman. He opens the country to foreign investments, and Japanese, American, West-German, British, Swedish and Danish firms make their entry. Financed by the revenues from some smaller oil-wells Qaboos begins the building of roads, and the first health and education system is started. Parallel with this apparently progressive development, army and police are modernised and heavily enlarged. A secret service is organised under the instruction of SAVAK, the notorious secret police of Iran. It is no longer the bribed tribal sheiks who control the population; this function is taken over by the state through the army and the police.

This paradoxical build-up of the country is characteristic of neo-colonial development. With one hand the rulers try to ingratiate themselves with a part of the population through limited reforms, the building of an education and health system and high wages to state employees. With the other hand they subdue any kind of opposition, forbid the most elementary political rights, and operate with a secret police, specialised in torture and murder. This

new strategy has earned the title of the "carrot and stick" strategy. The strategy suffered a temporary defeat in Oman, where the revolution had gained a foothold in the population and was spreading throughout Oman. A reconstruction of strategy by the rulers was necessary in order to dam up the revolution. This reconstruction came in the military field. Up to 1970 Britain was the only foreign power having military personnel in Oman, but the British alone could not restrain the revolution. The conflict is internationalized. The internationalization takes place in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, developed on the basis of the US defeat in the Vietnam War. The participation of USA with its own troops in the war aroused opposition on the home front and reinforced Vietnamese nationalism. In order to avoid these difficulties in the future, the task of suppressing national revolts is to be left to local governments. USA/Britain should no longer be visible on the battle-field, but act as instructors in the background. Iran was built up militarily by USA in order to act as a policeman in the Gulf.

In December 1973 about 3000 Iranian special units are landed in Dhofar. Several thousands Jordanian troops had already been brought into the struggle against the People's Front. Especially decisive was the co-operation between Iran's airforce and fleet and the British Royal Air Force (based in Salalah and on Masirah Island) regarding bombardments of the liberated areas. Beside the population; buildings, wells, roads, dams, fields and cattle were systematically bombed. By completing the "scorched earth" policy the imperialists prevented the population from building up the area. The popular councils of the liberated areas now had to concentrate on self-defence and cultivation of small well-hidden fields.

In spite of the intense attacks by the Iranians, the Sultan and the British on the liberated areas, the People's Front retained control of the area in the period 1970-75. In the same period the Front makes several attempts to spread the struggle into the interior and northern Oman, but without success. The last is in 1974, when one of the leading cadres of the Front was killed during an encounter close to the town Rustaq in the in-

terior Oman. Four days later the inhabitants attack an Iranian military camp outside the town, and many Iranian soldiers are killed and military equipment destroyed. The incident is followed up by the Qaboos government by arresting campaign in all of the interior Oman.


In an attempt to isolate the People's Front, Qatar and the UAE are separated from Oman in a de-colonization-process, and together with Bahrain they receive their independence in 1971. These are three small and politically weak states but with great oil-incomes which makes it possible for them in variable extents to pay off the popular dissatisfaction and develop their own conditions, different from the rest of Oman.

Third Phase 1974-

After 1974 the Iranians multiplied their troops, and in 1975 a total of nine nations were involved with military personnel on the side of the Sultan. The internationalization was accomplished.

Facing these serious attempts to quash the revolution, the People's Front holds a congress in 1974. After the Iranian occupation of Oman, the national contradiction is considered the main contradiction. The Front will conduct a defensive nationalist policy and will try to unite all national groups of Oman against the Iranians and the traitors in Muscat, in the defence of an Arabian Oman. Because of the Iranian presence in Oman itself and the formation of three small new states with special conditions, the People's Front is divided into independent organizations, the purpose of which it is to create a programme corresponding to the conditions in their area. The People's Front for the Liberation of Oman, PFLO calls for strengthening of the military defence of the liberated areas in an attempt to prevent once again an imperialistic intrusion.

At last at the end of 1975 after prolonged heroic resistance causing heavy losses to the Iranians and the British, the PFLO is forced by overwhelming military superiority to evacuate the liberated areas in order to avoid physical destruction. It would be to fight on the conditions of the enemy to continue the fight in the former way. It does not seriously weaken Iran's military power to lose 1000 men



- Pupils from the school of the PFLO -



- Family in Dhofar, taking a short rest during the flight from the British and Iranian terror-bombardements -

because these can be replaced easily, but to the PFLO every single martyr means a great loss.

PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE

Today the main forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and 3-5000 refugees are in the border area in PDRY. Here an essential task of the Front is to organize the life of the refugees. The organizing work has both material and political aspects, which after all are different aspects of the same matter. PFLO has a school in Al-Gheida (150 km from the border), the School of Revolution with app.550 pupils. PFLO's health organization, the Omani Red Crescent runs a hospital in Al-Gheida, the Fatimah Ghananah Hospital, and a clinic in Hauf (a few kilometres from the border), the Martyr Habkook Clinic. To serve the needs which are special to the women and the youth, the Omani Womens Organization (OWO) and the Omani Youth Organization, have been started. (Learn more about the situation in the border area in the chapter, The Revolution is Alive). This organizing and mobilizing work is necessary if the refugees, when time comes, shall be able to continue the direct struggle to liberate their country.

Dhofar is occupied by overwhelming enemy forces, and the liberated areas no longer exist. During the evacuation of the liberated areas, smaller units were separated from the PLA and are now operating on their own in the central and eastern part of Dhofar, performing smaller operations, such as ambushes and laying out mines. As an example, one of these units on the 1st of June 1978, attacked a bus from the Sultan's air-forces by the town, Taqah, east of Salalah. Six British officers, working for Qaboos at the bases of Thamrit and Salalah, were killed. The Sultan and his foreign allies continue their attempts to pacify the population in Dhofar by tempting and threatening (i.e. continue the "carrot and stick" strategy), but they don't really think themselves that they can buy the confidence of the Dhofarians. For instance we know from a former officer in the Sultan's army, now in the PFLO, that the soldiers are told by their trainers that people in Dhofar still sympathize with the revolution and the PFLO, and that they must be seen as opponents to the government. The fear of the Sultan and the imperialists is not without reason. The life in the liberated areas is still in the thoughts

of the Dhofarians, and part of the organizational structure from that time has survived the occupation. In different ways the government tries to gain control of the population in Dhofar. They try to concentrate them in strategic settlements, chasing, arresting, inquiring and torturing people, who are suspected of working with the revolution.

In addition to this, new methods are used to try to solve the problems in Dhofar. In a new conspiracy against the revolution Qaboos was, according to Saut al-Thawra No.10, Jan.78, held in the background for tactical reasons because of his obvious alliance with the Shah who had just visited Oman. Instead of Qaboos, his mother Maizon, who herself is from Dhofar and belongs to the tribe of Beit al-Maashani, entered the stage. She called together the leaders of her tribe and suggested they form a tribal council, which shall consist of sheikhs only. It is intended that the other tribes in Dhofar shall form similar councils, and later on there will be a superior sheikh council with delegates from all tribal councils.

In a proclamation from the People's Liberation Army in eastern Dhofar the purpose of these tribal councils is described as follows:

- 1) to hide the present national conflict by giving the people the impression that they participate in the development of the country and that they can get their demands fulfilled through this council.
- 2) to buy themselves free from the sufferings of our people and the blood of our martyrs by bribing those who are discontented, through the sheikhs in this council.
- 3) to chase and liquidate the revolutionaries by organizing the sheikhs and the members of each tribe, and use those means necessary for oppression in their area.
- 4) to destroy the national and patriotic spirit of the tribes by humiliating them towards the colonialists and the local puppets connected with the treacherous Muscat regime.
- 5) to create antagonism between the tribes and also between the revolutionaries and the people.
- 6) to dissolve the firqat divisions gradually and recruit

the young men for the army to get trained and brainwashed by the British. Then they will be put under the authority of the tribal councils and will get their tasks through these. This is to control the firqats better and turn them against the revolutionaries.

Although some of the sheikhs had been given expensive gifts and money, many of them refused to sign the plan. The People's Liberation Army warn everyone not to participate in these councils and called upon the people to reject such plans aiming to break the unity of the people (Saut al-Thawra No.10,Jan.78).

The neo-colonial development, starting in Oman when Qaboos took over the rule, continues and means on the one hand that the government can extend its class-foundation by buying supporters from the newborn petit bourgeoisie. On the other hand a continued neo-colonial development will cause an aggravated situation in Oman, as this capitalist development cannot be harmonic but creates tensions in the society. When Qaboos introduced the neo-colonial era, and foreign capital began to overflow the country, and ambitious development projects were started, many began to believe in the promises of Qaboos. But as time goes by this belief becomes smaller, and tensions arise everywhere in society.

The development is mainly taking place in the construction and building-sector and not so much in the industrial sector. The work in the former sector is often of short duration. Further an important part of the construction and building activities concern prestige and luxurious buildings - hotels, palaces etc. - and buildings used for repression - policestations, military-barracks, prisons etc. In addition the industrialization is limited geographically to the Muscat/Matrah area. For political and economic reasons a large number of foreign workers are imported while simultaneously the neo-colonial development causes migration to the towns and creates large slum areas, unemployment, poverty and misery.

The inflation is enormous, the import of agricultural products increases, the military takes almost half of the state-budget, and Oman's large asset for the moment, the oil-revenues, are expected to go down drastically in a few years when the now-known oil-deposits are emptied.

That means no coherent economic system is created that can function after the finishing of the oil. The Sultan's economic adviser in the period 1972-1975, John Townsend says that there is "no control other than the will of an impulsive man and the deviousness of one or two ministers with self-interest at heart" (John Townsend, Oman. The Making of the Modern State. London, Croom Helm, 1977, p.151).

The old tribal leaders feel challenged and outraged by the new development influenced and dominated by foreign interests. The new-born petit bourgeoisie will gradually, as it becomes better educated, want political rights and will no longer be interested in supporting an autocratic Sultan and might begin to feel pressed by the many foreigners called by Qaboos. Corruption flourishes. Further the repression grows and the number of police-officers and political prisoners have been multiplied since the time of the old Sultan.

Other Gulf-countries have alleviated similar dangerous effects through the oil-revenues. Oman has no longer this possibility, but other rich reactionary regimes in the region probably will be eager to subsidize the Sultan in an attempt to keep the reactionary rule in Oman (Oman receives already economic support from Saudi Arabia).

These tensions - results of the neo-colonial development - are strengthened by the open presence of foreign military forces, and this can encourage the break-out of an open confrontation.

In the period 1974-78 the Iranian occupation of Oman has been the paramount obstacle to a popular revolt. The Iranian occupation looked after the vital interest of imperialism, to secure the control of the oil-supplies to the West, which depends on the fact that the Gulf area stays under reactionary rule. USA gives the local reactionary regimes, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, military equipment and know-how in military, police and secret service matters, and train them locally and in USA. The intention with this is to make these reactionary powers able to fight a popular revolt in the region. Thereby USA does not need to engage too much directly and avoids the problems related to this. Today Oman, being a strategically important part of the Gulf area, is in the US sphere of interest, both politically and economically. The US military has also established it-

self at the Masirah Base, which they share with the British. Thus it is a strong enemy the Omani people are facing, not only the Sultan and his British allies, but all reactionary forces in the region and the whole imperialist system under the leadership of the USA. It becomes obvious why you cannot predict quick victories, but only point out the perspectives that appear in some of the defects build into the imperialist conspiracy.

The upheavals in Iran has shown such a defect in the imperialistic system of control. A vital link in the regional imperialistic power-structure has fallen apart, which at least temporary means a very serious weakening of the imperialistic control in the area. But there is no doubt that USA and Great Britain are working energetically to find new ways to impose their control.

An alternative to Iran has already for some time been under development in Egypt. Egypt has the potential to become an ideal sub-imperialistic power if it gets heavy financial support from Saudi Arabia. It has the necessary large population, industrial base, and military tradition. In the period following the October war in 1973, and in agreement with the new close alliance between Egypt and the US, Saudi Arabia has financed a heavy build-up of the Egyptian army. This build-up makes it an efficient intervention force, which can be employed elsewhere in the Arab world and in Africa. At the same time the ability of the Egyptian army to fight a war against Israel (which demands other types of sophisticated weapons) has been considerably reduced. (See a most interesting article in "The Middle East", August 1978: Egypts 'other' armed forces).

Therefore it was no surprise, that when the Iranian troops were pulled out of Oman in the beginning of 1979, they were immediately replaced by Egyptian troops (See News From Oman no. 33, June 1979).

There is no doubt that the US in the future will rely more and more on Egypt to do its dirty work. But at the same time, there is no doubt either that the visions of future popular uprisings in Egypt must cause the imperialist strategists many a nightmare, especially after what has happened in Iran. As a consequence of Egypt's unique cen-

tral position in the Arab world, a popular uprising here would no doubt have immense consequences all over the Arab world.

On the Arabian Peninsula the USA has problems - in addition to their problems in Oman - to keep the situation in North Yemen under control.

In Oktober 1977 saudi-agents murdered the popular North Yemeni president, al-Hamdi. Since then Saudi Arabia - and thereby the USA - has been strenghtening its control over the contry. This development culminated when their agent, Ali Salih, took over the power in July 1978.

These imperialistic manoeuvres was however met with a growing popular opposition under the leadership of the Democratic National Front(DNF). In the beginning of 1979 DNF report in radio Aden, that they are controlling large areas in the central, eastern and south-western parts of North Yemen. DNF say that they receive total support from all national tribes and that units of the army have joined the revolutionary forces.

Under growing revolutionary pressuere, the North Yemeni president Ali Salih in February 1979 provoked a border conflict with P.D.R.Yemen in order to legitimate the interference of his imperialistic allies. The USA fulfilled its obligations and supplied 500 mill. \$ military equipment, including a number of aircrafts which was to be operated by Egyptian pilots.

It is in the light of the sharpening class struggle in North Yemen, that one has to look upon the agreement about a unification of Yemen made in March 1979. There can be no doubt, that for Ali Salih this is only a tactical manoeuvres, an attempt to survive in a critical situation. Therefore the efforts towards unification is likely to be replaced with new violent developments in the area.

The goal for the revolutionaries in Yemen is a real political and economic unification. North Yemen is the most densely populated part of the Peninsula, and a unification with the progressive South will create favourable conditions for a progressive development in the whole area - (For details on the events in North Yemen, see News from Oman No. 32 January 1979 and following issues).

The destinies of the people in each country in this region are increasingly linked together. In order to lead every single national struggle to victory, it becomes more and more important for the popular movements in all of the countries to work together in the struggle against the common enemy, the local reactionaries and the worldwide imperialist system under the leadership of US-imperialism.

For the PFLO it is an important task in the present phase of the struggle, to sum up gained experience and formulate a new strategy, which takes into consideration the new situation, and to strengthen the organization of the Front. In a situation where the contradictions in the Omani society are sharpened, and where weaknesses appear in the imperialist camp, the existence of a revolutionary organization with a correct analysis and the needed political and military experience, can be fatal to the Qaboos-regime.

THE REVOLUTION IS ALIVE

In December 1977 representatives from KROAG visited PFLO in the border region of Democratic Yemen. This chapter is their report.

Among the Omani Refugees in Democratic Yemen

Today there are 3-5,000 Omani refugees in the border area of Democratic Yemen. Some live in AlGheida, the main city of the 6th Governorate (150 kilometers from the border with Oman) and the rest live close to the border near the town of Hauf.

In general the whole 6th Governorate is a barren, dry desert area, with almost no agriculture and very limited potential for raising livestock. Only in the far eastern part, where the mountain range of Dhofar runs more than 100 kilometers into Yemen along the coast, does a part of the area benefit from the monsoon rains. But all along the coast you find some of the best fishing in the world and many people depend on this for subsistence.

As for communication with the rest of the country, most goods are transported by ship to AlGheida or Hauf. Larger equipment cannot be unloaded in AlGheida's small harbor so it is sent by lorry. There are no roads but it is possible to drive in the wadis. Several civilian and military planes fly in every week.

AlGheida

The main city of the 6th Governorate is a large sprawling village of 10,000 inhabitants. 1-2,000 are Omani. The houses are spread at random and there are no streets between them. In a recessed area is a small lake created by last year's heavy rains, and there is some cultivated land nearby.

Many houses have electricity, but only between 6pm and 11pm, and even then somewhat unreliably.

A modern 85-bed Yemeni hospital was recently constructed (and paid for by Kuwait) but it will not be in full operation until the GDR medical mission arrives to manage it.

In 1977 the first secondary school in the 6th Governorate was opened, a project funded by Libya.

We spoke to Mohammed Ahmed, a member of the PFLO's Central Executive Committee. He acknowledged that the revolution is passing through a difficult stage. The PFLO is much weaker militarily than before 1975, compared to the enemy forces. Since November 1975 the PFLO has been rebuilding their organization at all levels: military, political and economic. The army has better training and more advanced weapons. The experiences of the past are being discussed and new strategies and organizational forms implemented. Especially important in this process is the creation of new cadres to overcome their terrible losses. The PFLO explains the present situation and previous faults of the revolution to the people.

The Schools of Revolution

One day we visit the Schools of Revolution situated 5-8 kilometers from AlGheida. There is no road to the schools, only a rough track.

The school camp is much larger than we imagined. Clusters of low buildings spread over a wide area with football fields between.

Recently an old well with good drinking water was rediscovered close to the camp and a water basin has been constructed in the hills above the schools. Water will

be pumped by motor pump to the basin and from there it will flow to the various buildings.

Everything is kept clean, and the last few years have witnessed a considerable decline in the number of sick children.

The life of the students is simple. They live about 7 people to a room of approximately 20 square meters. The only "furniture" is the rolled up sponge mattresses and a small bag or box for each pupil's personal belongings. A major problem is the lack of protection from the many biting insects at night.

The food is monotonous: rice with onions and tomato paste; sometimes fish, seldom meat. Vegetables are also rare. The food is cooked in big pots over an open fire and is eaten with the bare hand from plates.

The camp has a library/reading room where 30-40 children are studying the latest "Saut Al Thawra" (Voice of the Revolution, the PFLO magazine) and other literature.

The schools are divided into 2 sections: the primary "People's School" and the intermediate "9th of June School". These schools are administratively and physically integrated.

Today there are 550 pupils staying at the schools, of which 60 are girls. 47 students are attending their 1st year in the new Yemeni Secondary school in AlGheida. A further 100 students stay in other governorates and follow the secondary education there and further a number attend high school in Aden and universities abroad.

The recruitment of new students has been limited in the last 2 years since the loss of the liberated areas. An immediate effect of the military setback was the demobilization of many women and girls who fell back into the traditional role as wives. This tendency has been felt not only in the schools but even more so in the army. Now the Front has taken measures to counter this by strengthening the Omani Women's Organization (OWO) and by implementing a new law that forbids women to marry before they have completed secondary school.

The curriculum of the PFLO schools is adapted to the Yemeni education system. But in addition to the standard courses the Omani students undergo 1-2 hours of political

education and 3 hours of political meetings on various subjects per week. During the summer holidays the students also receive military training in the camps.

Most schoolbooks come from the progressive Arab countries but the history of Oman and the Gulf area is taught from the PFLO's own text.

It's a fine example of international solidarity that of 14 teachers, 9 are from Palestine (from Fatah and PFLP) and 1 from Bahrain. More teachers should have arrived from Bahrain but they were held back by the government so there is a shortage of teachers this year. After next year the reliance on foreign teachers will be less because Omani students who complete high school will teach for 1 year before being sent abroad to continue their studies.


Most children at the schools are sons or daughters of revolutionary martyrs; there is hardly anyone who has not lost members of their family in the struggle. They have strong ties to the revolution, and there are even examples of families joining the regime while their children refuse to abandon the struggle.

In the evening the choir of the schools gave a performance of revolutionary Omani songs and music. This choir is an important part of the work to preserve and develop a national Omani culture.


Omani Women's Organization

We meet several times with the Omani Women's Organization (OWO). The Organization was established in late 1975 by a decision of the 4th Congress of the Front but has faced many difficulties since then.

From early in the revolution women have played a very important role in the struggle against imperialism. Hundreds of young women have received military training and have been fighting the British and Iranians on equal terms with men. Some women have played a leading role in the armed struggle, and many have been martyred and imprisoned. But in spite of this role, none of the leading cadres or Central Committee members of the Front have been women. This is mainly due to the lack of education and political experience among the women. While in the 1950s and 60s thousands of Dhofari men emigrated to the Gulf states to work



- A section of the Schools of the Revolution -



- From the refugee camp close to AlGheida. The tent in the background has been set up by the Omani Womens Organization and is used for their illiteracy classes -

and there received education and political organizing experience, revolutionary women had their first political experience after joining the Front and their first elementary education in the people's army.

The OWO was established to change this situation, to promote politicization and education among Omani women. The emancipation of women is seen as a precondition for their participation in the struggle for the complete liberation of Oman, itself a precondition for the full liberation of women. However, the OWO was set up in a very critical period - the military setback in 1975 - when many people were confused. As the urgent daily military pressure ceased, women tended to leave the army and schools to get married. This was especially true in the western border region; in the east of Dhofar women still play an important role in the army. But the OWO is still only beginning its work and badly needs educated cadres.

The work of the OWO today is divided into two main categories: work in the border area and external work. The Organization arranges meetings and cultural activities to mobilize women. It is responsible for the literacy classes in AlGheida for approximately 60 women who are taught by Omani secondary school students. The OWO helped refugee families construct shelters in the camp near AlGheida, and they have arranged care for the children of the widows of martyrs. In all this work they try to visit and talk with as many families as possible, a very difficult task because of the dispersed population.

The establishment of a Women's Cultural Center in 1978 will be a major break-through for the OWO. The Center will house most of the activities of the organization, including a kindergarten, maternity ward, and a sewing workshop. Here the 20 sewing machines recently sent by Emmaus Fnysinge will be placed.

The second major area of work for the OWO is the creation and maintenance of relations with other women's organizations in the Arab countries and around the world to promote the cause of the Omani revolution.


The Refugee Camp

A few kilometers from AlGheida we find the remains of the

Omani refugee camp. After the heavy imperialist bombardments of the Hauf area in late 1975, many Omanis fled to AlGheida. Now most of them have moved back to the Hauf area. During the last heavy rain most of the camp was washed away and today only about 60 people remain, living in small huts built of wooden boxes covered with tent canvas. The OWO constructed a big shelter in the camp to house literacy classes for the women who have children and cannot attend school in AlGheida.

The Martyr Fatimah Ghananah Hospital

In the town of AlGheida we visit the main center of the Omani health system, the Patimah Ghananah Hospital, named after a famous woman martyr. The hospital is housed in a group of low buildings, formerly a British military installation. The hospital has its own supply of electricity and is clean and well run. It is run by the Omani Red Crescent (ORC) with the help of a Cuban mission of 5 doctors, laboratory staff, and technicians. The Cubans also do a great job educating the Omani nurses, laboratory staff and technicians. There are 40 beds in the hospital and they are most of the time fully occupied.



- The Martyr Fatimah Ghananah Hospital -

Close to the hospital is a policlinic where many patients come every day for treatment. Several times a week some of the doctors go to the Schools of Revolution and to the army camp. The most common diseases are TB, malaria, diarrhoea, whopping cough and anemia.

Regularly the ORC arranges meetings, informing the people on the importance of hygiene, mother- and child-care, good nutrition etc.

Omani Youth Organization

While we are in AlGheida the first Congress of the Omani Youth Organization is held, with delegates from other youth organizations in PDRY, Libya, Iraq, Soviet Union, Vietnam and POLISARIO. It is characteristic that this organization, like the OWO and student's organization, puts great emphasis on establishing relations with similar organizations, mainly in other Arab countries and within the socialist camp. The aim of this policy is to promote the Omani revolution and maintain relations of importance for future material and moral support. An example of the remarkable success of this strategy is that the OWO represents Oman in the Union of Arab Women while Sultan Qaboos' women's organization has not been accepted.

Another important aspect of the work of these mass organization is the educational experience many young Omanis receive.

Hauf

After a one hour drive from AlGheida we reach the end of the mountain range stretching into Yemen from Dhofar. The hills follow the coast, and for the last 4-5 hours of our journey to Hauf we drive along the edge of the hills, close to the sea. The road is unbelievably horrible, a very rough track, full of holes, winding up and down the hillsides. Many times we think the Toyota Land-cruiser will have to give up, but every time we manage.

We see some strange sights; it is sardine season and big sharks and dolphins are cruising along the shore. Once we see scores of sharks splashing at the surface like rising trout on a summer evening.

On the way we pass several small fishing hamlets on the coast, and finally we reach Hauf. It's the largest of

the villages we have seen, with a few thousand inhabitants. It is situated on the shore, and with very few exceptions - a small clinic, school, and running water - seems unchanged since the 15th Century. The water comes from an underground spring far up in the hills. The pressure of the spring is enough to bring water through a 5 kilometer pipeline to the houses.

Many houses still lie in ruins after the heavy bombardment of the whole area in 1972 and 1975, among them the 2 previous offices of the Front.

Most of the Omani families live in the hills where conditions are much like in western Dhofar. Thousands of Omanis live here in the mountains. The inhabited part of the mountain range is 10 kilometers wide and stretches 30-40 kilometers into Yemen. Some families, mainly black people from the coastal town of Rakhuyt, have built houses in Hauf. The mountain people of Dhofar prefer the mountains when living in Yemen too.



- Refugee in Hauf. Until the liberation of Rakhuyt in 1969 she was a slave for the Sultan -

The Martyr Habkook Clinic

First we visit the Martyr Habkook clinic, situated close to the border. The "responsible" for the clinic greets us with, "Long live the support committees and the Omani revolution"! He informs us that the clinic receives most of its medicine from international support groups.

The visit to the clinic is very inspiring for us. The clinic consists of 7 shelters of corrugated iron and a kitchen built of mud. One of the shelters is used for consultation and a pharmacy, one for a laboratory, and another for patients. Usually between 50 and 70 people arrive every day for treatment. The most common diseases are tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhoea, whooping cough and anemia. Severe cases are usually transferred to the hospital in AlGheida after a few days here.

Two male nurses and a laboratory worker staff the clinic, and for 10 days every month a doctor from AlGheida comes with a laboratory and transportable operating room. Also in urgent cases, such as a caesarean operation, the clinic cables to AlGheida and a doctor drives out in the Landrover.

The Omani Red Crescent plans to build up the clinic to a full hospital with a permanent doctor. This improvement was started several years ago but most of the clinic was destroyed by British and Iranian bombings in 1975. The plan was postponed and the clinic was just rebuilt like it had been. We visited the caves close to the clinic used for shelters during air attacks.


Families in the Mountains

After seeing the clinic we move up into the hills and visit approximately 15 families in 2 days.

The terrain, with steep hillsides, makes access difficult and we must clamber up like goats. The people live in caves; everywhere we go there are well-hidden caves. The shelters are very plain, with roughly smoothed floors and openings protected by branches and tent canvas, in a few cases built up with stones. In a big cave where several families live, they build partitions of branches and stones. The "furniture" is simple: a mat on the floor and a few suitcases or wooden boxes for their belongings.



- The Martyr Habkook Clinic -



- A patient with malaria under treatment in the Habkook Clinic -

As well, most people have a thermos flask and many have transistor radios.

The radio is an important link to the outside world in this isolated place. Through the radio they listen to the broadcast of the PFLO for 45 minutes every evening, and follow international events via the Yemeni, Kuwaiti, and other Arab stations.

It's a hard and simple life. Most families have a few goats and perhaps a cow, and they receive a little money and some supplies from the Front. So they usually have something to eat but it is monotonous fare: rice, bread, fish, and milk. During the monsoon season when fishing is impossible, most meals are just rice. Water is scarce, and many families walk for hours every day to get it.

In this area the people, the militia, and the people's army mingle freely together. Several times we meet armed men, mainly from the militia.

We talked with some of the families.

"Long live the revolution"

A woman greets us, "we are old, we are poor, and we are sick, but long live the revolution - and welcome". She tells us that 2 families live here, 11 people. They come from a small village in western Dhofar where they lived off their animals. Her family had 25 camels and 50 goats but they were all killed by the British bombings. Their village was destroyed and some of the family killed so in 1973 they decided to flee. They walked 10 nights before they reached here, and the last stretch was continuously shelled from Sarfeet, every five minutes all night long.

Now they have nothing but receive help from the Front: food, a little money, and health services.

Before she was married the woman was trained by the liberation army and fought with them. The husband has not been in the army.

"In the end the revolution will win"

In another cave, the husband tells us 6 people live together: he and his wife, their 2 small children, and his sister and her son. They came from the central region of Dhofar.

Before leaving Oman he owned - together with his brother - 200 cows and 300 goats, but many of them were killed and they were forced to leave the rest behind. He was in the liberation army. Because of the bombings they decided to bring his family here in 1973 while he went back to the liberated areas.

They tried to bring some animals with them to Yemen but during their flight they were bombed for 2 days and lost all the animals. He stepped on a mine and was wounded in the foot, but not seriously.

Now he is in the militia and works for the Front. His wife and sister are also in the militia; his sister was in the army before. Both women are members of OWO and go to meetings about twice a month. The sister is in literacy class. He learned how to read in the army and can follow "Saut Al Thawra", but can only write a little.

The day we visit his sister is at the hospital in AlGheida with her son, and his wife is out with their animals (they



- Family in the mountains. Referred to in the section 'In the end the revolution will win' -

have a cow and two goats), so he is looking after the small children.

He tells us that Qaboos is tied to international imperialism while the PFLO is with the people and helps them when they face difficulties. "In the end the Front will win", he assures us.

"It's the revolution that makes the heroes"

We visit 3 families that live close together and spend the night with them. They number 18 people. All 3 men are among the founders of the revolution. They came from Nhiez in central Dhofar on the Red Line, an important strategic and political place in the revolution. It was in Nhiez the Front held its first congress in 1965.

They are very political people. All the grown-ups can read and write Arabic, and all men and women have fought in the liberation army. Today all the men are in the militia while one of the married women is still in the army.

Before the revolution each family had about 100 cows and camels, but they were all lost. Here in Yemen they have gradually been able to buy some goats and today they have 10-20 per family. They receive some help from the PFLO, the little the Front can afford. The PFLO feels it is a duty to help the refugees as it is these same people who safeguard the revolution.

One of the men tells us that in 1972 his family moved from the central area to western Dhofar, and in 1973 they moved across the border to the Hauf area. They came with a larger group, carrying one wounded woman and 4 children, and they were bombed for 5 hours while walking toward the border.

Another man tells us that he married in 1969. Then in 1970 his wife went to the school of revolution and afterwards to the army. They did not see each other for 3 years. In 1974 they moved here and had their first child. Today they are both in the militia.

He says that the revolution is very difficult, that it does not fall from heaven but is the work of man and in the end it will triumph. It's the revolution and not the individual that is important. During the struggle you see people doing great and heroic things; it is the revolution that makes them act like this.



- Cave in the mountains. The home of one of the families from Nhiez -



- The goats of the family are milked in the early morning -

The Revolution Continues

There is no doubt that the military setback led to considerable confusion in the ranks of the PFLO. Some wavering elements decided to leave the revolution. But today the Front has overcome these problems and we were left with the impression of a strong, disciplined movement; everywhere we went we witnessed a determined will to continue the struggle. This will to continue the fight is combined with a realistic appraisal of the situation in the whole area and the dependency of the Omani revolution on international developments.

THE FOREIGN TROOPS

In 1977 a staff officer in the Dhofar Brigade(also known as the Salala Brigade) of the Sultan's Army, Captain Rabia Awadh Marzooq, joined the PFLO.

The following statement by Rabia Awadh was originally published in Saut Al Thawra(Vol 5, No 5, November 1977). We have however added new information given in an interview with representatives from KROAG in December 1977.

It must be kept in mind that some of the informations given have become out of date, because of the withdrawal of the Iranian troops in the beginning of 1979, followed by imperialist employment of Egyptian troops instead.

But in spite of this, the statement gives some valuable insight into the military side of the imperialist presence in Oman.

Rabia Awadh says

I joined the Sultan's Army in the first week after Qaboos became Sultan. My joining the Army did not mean that I was loyal to Qaboos or the British, but was due to other reasons: making a living was difficult, particularly in that period, and because I was unable to understand the real nature of the change in authority.

First I served in the Dhofar Gendarmery, a guard corps. After this corps was dissolved in 1973 I was assigned to



- Rabia Awadh -



- Colonel Cooper, one of the many British officers commanding the Sultans army -

the headquarters of the Dhofar Brigade as a staff-leader. In 1975 I was sent to England on a 7-month course and after returning to Oman I was appointed General Staff Officer of the 3rd Degree (GSO 3) at the headquarter of the Dhofar Brigade. I was there until I joined the revolution in the middle of 1977.

Following my promotion to the rank of officer, and consequently my closer contacts with the British and foreign officers, I discovered many things about the Qaboos regime and came to know who really holds power in Oman. My resentment against the authorities increased after the Iranian occupation of the Omani Islands, the flagrant Iranian invasion of Oman, and the handing over of Masirah Island to the Americans.

For all these reasons I decided to join the Omani revolution, and the armed struggle, to liberate the land from all forms of colonialism, and to establish a just and progressive national government in the country.

I am happy now, living a simple and plain life here among my comrades, finally free from alienation.

Structure of the Sultan's Army

The Sultan's army is formed of three main forces. These are the land forces, the air force (SOAF), and the naval force (SON). The percentage of Omanis in the army is only 50%; the rest are mostly Balush, about 40% (not including the Omani Balush who won Omani nationality). The remaining 10% come from different nationalities, mainly British, Pakistani, and Indian.

Although nearly half the troops are Omani, they are deprived of any key positions and influence. The army commander is British, and his appointment is made by the British Defence Ministry. The commanders of the navy, air force, and Dhofar Brigade are also British while the staff officers are nearly all British, Pakistani, and Indians. In a few infantry units the command has been handed over to Omani officers, not because of their brilliance in military skills (they are semi-literate) but because of their loyalty to the British.

As for the educated Omani officers, they are scattered in the units with no high positions and without influen-

ce at all in the army command. Every Omani officer receiving the command of a unit has a British deputy. The latter has full authority from the general command to pass orders to the Omani commander because the Omani officers are considered under training.

It is difficult to estimate the numbers of the Sultan's Forces, but in Dhofar alone there are 4 infantry divisions (the Dhofar Brigade). Of these almost 2 divisions are operating in the Western region. There are various smaller units such as guard units, the Royal Guard, and the Firqats. The Firqats are estimated at more than 600, operating in small groups of 30-50 men. In all, the forces in Dhofar total not less than 5000, probably more.

British Forces in Oman

British air, naval and land forces operate from Masirah Island and the Salalah air base, side by side with the local army. On Masirah there is an air base as significant as any British base in the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean. At the beginning of 1977 it appears the British withdrew some of their equipment prior to handing the base over to the Americans, with whom they will share it in the future.

The British forces at Salalah air base were renamed the "Sultan's Air Forces". All posters and signs about the RAF have been changed to posters and signs reading "Sultan's Air Forces", but the British still run the base completely. Besides the personnel at the base directly under the control of the RAF, there are nearly 150 pilots and administrative officers of different nationalities working in the air force. Most of them are British; the remaining are Ceylonese and Australians. In addition there are nearly 50 British officers who run the sophisticated Anglo-French made Jaguar planes and Rapier anti-aircraft rocket systems.

In the navy there are about 200 British, Pakistani, and Indian commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Most of these are Indians and Pakistanis. Some are seconded from the armies of their countries while the others are there on contract. The number of British in the navy is

decreasing but they still hold the command positions.

The British also provide the British Army Training Team, a Special Air Service (SAS) commando unit. The SAS forces are highly trained commandos with anti-guerrilla experience in Greece, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen and Ireland. This unit, estimated to number 500, provides advanced training to the Sultan's army and the tribal divisions (Firqats) in addition to being the vanguard of the local army. In every infantry operation carried out by the Sultan's army, SAS commandos precede the main force together with a unit of Firqats.

Under BATT command is the Second Information Team - 2IT, sometimes called Psychological Operations - Psyops, with headquarters at Um al-Ghawaref at Salalah. Their job is to fight the psychological war, the "hearts and minds" campaign. This includes propaganda activities. Some years ago they established a local broadcasting station in Salalah and distributed small radios to the population, radios so small that they could only pick up this local station.

Several field artillery batteries protect the Salalah air base. A special battery called the Sound Ranging Battery has equipment which enables them to locate the source of artillery and mortar attacks. It was established some years ago when PFLO attacks on the base were the order of the day.

There is also a British engineering battalion which operates independently but in coordination with BATT. This battalion is under the command of a major or lieutenant-colonel.

In addition to these regular forces there are nearly 800 British officers seconded to or on contract with the Sultan's Army. They are responsible for training and administration. As well there are another 500 officers of different nationalities, mostly Australian, Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylonese.

Iranian Forces in Oman

Iranian land, air, and naval forces are present in several parts of Oman and particularly in the southern area in

Dhofar. There is a mixture of infantry and special forces stationed in the western area of Dhofar close to the border with Democratic Yemen. This force is known as the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF) with its command in Hairoon (sometimes known as Manston), north of Rakhzut. This force constitutes the well-known Demavand Line which stretches from the town of Rakhzut to Hairoon in the north.

In January 1977 the withdrawal of some Iranian forces from western Dhofar was announced; it appears some of this force was withdrawn. I do not know of the extent of that withdrawal, if they returned to Iran or were placed in another area of Oman. But it is certain that there are still thousands of Iranians along the Demavand Line.

There are air defence batteries in Salalah, Thamreet, Sarfeet, Makinat Shahn, and Hebroot, i.e. along the border with PDRY and around important positions. The Iranians operate radar systems at the Thamreet air base and north of Qairoon Hariti - the highest point of the Red Line - almost halfway between Salalah and Thamreet. They direct planes from both Thamreet and Salalah air bases.

Iranian "Phantom" military jets are stationed at Thamreet. These planes do not stay for long periods at the base but return to Teheran via Masirah Island. The Iranian air attacks against the population, the PFLO, and across the border into PDRY were carried out by these planes.

Iranian C-130 transport planes and helicopters operate with the Qaboos air force at Thamreet.

I do not know much in detail about Iranian forces in north Oman. But I learned from official and non-official sources that they have land and air forces at Ras Massendum at the Hormus Strait (where no Omani force is based) and also at Um alGhanam Island.

The Iranian forces operate independently, under their own command, and there is very limited daily contact between the Sultan's Army and the Iranians. Of course, there is cooperation and coordination at the higher levels.

The Jordanian Forces in Oman

There are many Jordanian officers in Oman. They are spread all over Oman, most of them as intelligence officers training the civilian and military intelligence services of the Sultan. They are responsible for the torture of political prisoners at Jallali and Ramees prisons. A number of Jordanians are in charge of training the army after the example of the Royal Jordanian Army; some are instructors in the Royal Guard of Qaboos. There are also Jordanian officers in the Sultan's artillery and general command.

A Jordanian engineering battalion works in Dhofar. Its task is to plant mines, clear mines from advanced positions, build military roads, and to train the local engineering battalion.

When the Iranians moved from the Red Line to western Dhofar, a regiment of Jordanian special troops took over their positions along the Red Line. However, this regiment has been removed by now.

The Revolution Continues

Despite all the announcements by the puppet Qaboos and other reactionary members of his regime about the defeat of the revolution, the army is mobilized because the revolution continues and a full resumption of military activities by the Front is imminent. The soldiers are told they should be ready to enter a war, perhaps of a different kind than the one they have been fighting. They are taught by the British trainers that most people still sympathize with the revolution and therefore are considered against the government.

On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army's recent military operations in central and eastern Dhofar (June 1977) have proved to everyone that the authorities' phony announcements about the end of the revolution are only part of the colonialists' plan to deceive the Omani people and to isolate the revolution from its natural supporters. These actions also proved the revolution is still alive, and it will fight on until victory despite Qaboos, the Shah, and their bosses.

PFLO STATEMENT

Following a long period, while the Omani Revolution "healed its wounds in revolutionary silence", the Central Executive Committee of the PFLO has issued an important statement on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of the 9th June Revolution.

It is a comprehensive review and analysis of the revolution today, discussing such topics as: the national problem of Oman, the temporary military setback of the revolution, its rebuilding, the future forms of struggle and the perspectives for the revolution, as well as evaluation of the situation in the whole Gulf area and the lines of direction for the revolutionary struggles here.

Below we have tried to present the main points in the statement by means of quotations, and to a lesser extent summaries (to a limited extent we have tried to improve the English of the statement).

First the PFLO describes the situation in Oman. About the national problem:

"Here the revolution enters its 14th year while "Oman" the sultanate is still occupied and lies under the weight of a number of foreign British, Iranian and American bases, and the Shah's invasion forces are still keeping the areas occupied by them, and the treaties of subordination and the harsh agreements concluded with Britain, Iran and America are still valid between these countries and the puppet Muscat regime, and the British commanders and advisers are still occupying sensitive positions in the country-mili-

tary and civilian- and the British Ambassador in the capital Muscat is still the real sultan and the real ruler and not Qaboos who is nothing but the facade and tool."

The reforms of Qaboos are evaluated like this:

" The British and their puppet Qaboos have ever since 1970 upto this day carried out a collection of administrative, economic and social reforms with the aim of winning the Omani people to their side, and blocking the road in front of the development of the revolution. But they did not introduce anything at all on the road of solving the national issue of Oman and realising its freedom and independence. But alternatively, side by side with their administrative, economic and social reforms of limited size, they have deepened the national problem further and further and added new chains and new catastrophes to the freedom of Oman and its independence, and the safety of its territories. "

As examples the statement mentions the Iranian annexation of 3 strategic important Omani islands in the Straits of Hormuz, invasion by the Iranian army, and the handing over of the important base on the island of Masirah to the USA, who will build huge military installations on the island, threatening the security of the whole area.

The statement continues about the reforms:

" Today, and after the elapse of eight years since the start of the British and Qaboosite reform programmes, it becomes clear strongly and plainly and year after year the extent of great illusion in which the British, Qaboosites and their allies have fallen in through their plans and programmes in Oman. The passing days reveal with more clarity the extent of the weakness of the reform programmes and the inability of these programmes to solve the real problems from which the sweeping majority of the poor and toilers of the Omani people including workers, peasants, fishermen and shepherds as well as students, women and youth suffer. With the exception of the collection of schools and hospitals the real beneficiaries from the entire other reforms are the foreigners, the puppet al-Busaid family, the major merchants and landlords. "

In the economic field, the situation is evaluated like this:

" The opening widely of the doors of Oman in front of the world monopolies, and the American, British, French, Japanese, South

Korean, and Iranian multi-national foreign companies in the field of agriculture, fish wealth and animal wealth in addition to the oil, copper, and other minerals, has placed the wealth of the country for condensed imperialist robbery and looting and added new problems and catastrophes to the life of the Omani peasants, workers, fishermen and shepherds as a result of deadly competition, inconvenience and confiscation and exploitation of fertile agricultural lands and fish resorts and exploitation in all forms. In addition the strength of repression and terrorism increases further and further and escalates along with confiscation of the simplest public and individual freedoms. The repressive and fascist nature of the regime also increases and escalates. "

On the strategy of the British and Qaboos:

" They have imagined that our Omani people will abandon to them their right to independence and freedom in return for obtaining and getting administrative, economic and social reforms. "

" They have completely ignored that the Omani people have carried out the revolution in the first place for freedom and independence, and that the people cannot accept anything else than freedom and independence, and that freedom is the dearest and first and basic demand amongst all demands for which this people fought and still fights ever since 1965 upto this day. "

The conditions which caused the revolution remain in main unchanged, and therefore the revolution has to continue. In the following the PFLO analyses the various aspects of the revolution. First they speak about the ability and will of the people to continue the revolution:

" Our militant people and its armed revolution under the leadership of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman have incurred, during the past thirteen years, thousands of martyrs, detainees and prisoners most of whom are still in the prisons upto now, and many of these prisoners have been martyred under torture and death sentences. Villages, rural areas, farms and grazing places of the people, particularly in the southern region of the homeland, were subject to collective annihilation and extermination raids and burning and extensive destruction. Yet our people demonstrated that they can greatly tolerate and shoulder such acts for the sake of waging the revolutionary war and facing the highly developed weapons of destruction

of the imperialists and the Iranian invaders and their puppet the Muscat regime, and to incur many sacrifices and make great efforts on the different fronts of confrontation, making by that a wonderful, huge revolutionary experiment for the whole national movement in the entire Arabian Gulf and Peninsula. Our people are still marching on its combative road with firmness fully determined to develop this revolutionary experiment until it is crowned with final victory. "

Then follows a review of the background for the military set-back in 1975/76:

" The strategic position of Oman, which controls the entrance into the Arabian Gulf, and the danger of the Omani revolution to all huge oil interests of imperialism in this area, pushed the American and British imperialists in this area and their local puppets to mobilise huge potentialities, weapons and forces for the war against the Omani revolution and the Omani people, and to launch an extensive and fierce annihilation war against the peaceful and militant people, which is fighting for its legitimate rights. Such acts in addition to a number of mistakes and shortcomings on the side of the Front at the political, military or organisational level and on the tactical level led to a noticeable progress in the side of the enemies in the conflict, and to the realisation of important military gains in their favour, which were resembled in the outcome of the extensive military campaign in the Western area of the Dhofar Region at the end of 1975 and beginning of 1976. "

Qaboos of course took advantage of the set-back and presented it as the final defeat of the revolution. He started a diplomatic offensive to break the isolation of Oman. But still he tries to reach a political settlement with the revolution. The statement says:

" The puppet Muscat regime and its masters realise thoroughly well that the revolution is still continuing and is still constituting a danger to their presence. Therefore, their dreams and efforts about reaching a political solution with the revolution that clears its presence from the foundation did not stop. They have imagined and particularly after the failure of the efforts of the Arab League and the Arab mediation committee during the years of 1974-1975 that, by weakening the revolution militarily, they will realise their objective to reach a political settlement with it in return for giv-

ing it some ministerial positions and posts. They moved and still move their allies from the oil countries towards this direction which proves in fact and remarkably their firm belief and feeling that the revolution is still continuing and still constitutes real danger to them and their interests. "

This proves that Qaboos in reality shares the analysis of the PFLO that the military set-back is only temporary. To enable the PFLO to revive the fighting on a larger scale it is necessary to sum up the experiences of the set-back and rebuild the organization. The statement says:

" The interim military setback at the end of 1975 and beginning of 1976, have had in addition to its clear interim negative effects, also positive effects: it was an alarm for us and a valuable occasion for standing in front of the past years of the combative experiment and for studying that experiment and extracting the valuable lessons from it positively and negatively with the scope of revolutionary scientific criticism. "

The results of the rebuilding are described like this:

" The period of one a half years for rebuilding our own revolutionary conditions has realised remarkable successes and accomplishments at the level of promoting the political, military, organisational and ideological conditions of the front. "

About the future forms of struggle the PFLO says:

" We have come an important distance on the road of completing the essential conditions for escalating the confrontation anew between us and the enemies of the people, at all levels and in all fronts and with all combative forms, " and " ..the development of the struggle will this time be more decisively, comprehensive, varied, organised, firm and fierce, " and " ..while we heel our wounds in revolutionary silence, we are at the same time continuing to wage the struggles with their various forms including the armed struggle and we are still believing and firmly feeling that the organised revolutionary violence in spite of all its huge hardships, is our basic and correct and effective means for realising our ambitions and making our people get rid of their enemies and expel the British, Iranians and Americans from Oman, and we are still determined as we have been but even more to wage the struggle in all its forms topped by the armed struggle for the establishment of a free, independent and democratic Oman. "

The perspectives for the struggle are evaluated by the PFLO on

the background of the complicated and sensitive conditions in the area. The importance of the area is not just due to Oman, but to the fact that it is situated close to the Gulf area. The more the energy crises escalates, the more important this area becomes for the imperialists, the PFLO says. This is the reason behind the open and often repeated US statements about the incorporation of this area into the defence strategy of the US, which is considered by the PFLO as open interference in the internal matters of the area. On this background, the statement discuss the perspectives of the struggle:

"We do not expect at all that the imperialists and their ally the Shah regime would leave Oman to its people through short-term struggles or confrontations, but we have for this to get ready and make thorough preparations for waging a comprehensive, long, fierce and tough confrontation. A confrontation of such type will be imposed upon us certainly by the imperialists and reactionaries, and we must be in full preparedness to wage it with braveness and firmness, depending in the first place upon the creative forces and vast energies of our people with all its classes and national and democratic groups, and also upon the valuable lessons obtained from the experiment of the past years, and also upon the justness of our cause and the soundness and firmness of the political line of the revolution, and also upon the great support and backing and solidarity from the groups of the revolution at both Arab and international levels and the supporters of freedom, independence, democracy and peace in the world. In accordance with the struggle on this line and with this attitude, our confidence and the confidence of our people is high over the certainty of victory and over the future. A confidence which is more firm and consolidate today than any time before, no matter how great is the size of the sacrifices and difficulties and hardships awaiting us on the road. "

The forms and perspectives of the struggle must be seen in connection with the approaching imperialist offensive. The statement reviews the first signs of this offensive:

" The Omani revolution is today facing difficult political circumstances, which perhaps is more difficult than any it has faced before. On one hand calls are renewed and increased along with contacts and activities for bringing out the project for the so-called Gulf security, which project is being planned by the United States of America, and the call for it and its

execution are being adopted by its tools and major allies in the area in a bid to encircle and liquidate the national movement in the entire area of Oman and the Gulf and in Iran and the Peninsula and to protect the huge oil interests of imperialism in this area. The national movement, including the revolution of our people, is facing now coordination at the level of internal security amidst all reactionary countries overlooking the Gulf as a first practical step on the road of bringing out the imperialist Gulf security project. The revolution of our Omani people under the leadership of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman comes undoubtedly in the forefront of the national movement aimed at behind such suspected moves and coordinations. On the other hand there is an increase at this period of political manoeuvres and pressures of various forms, for reducing the isolation around the puppet regime in Muscat and giving it further international legitimacy along with the Iranian invasion of our country and the British and American foreign presence. If all these conspiratorial pressures of heavy and numerous nature succeeded in affecting the allies of the Omani revolution in the area or even some or one of them, it would undoubtedly harm the Omani revolution and its people and militants in one of the most delicate stages being passed, and would push the Omani revolution and the entire national movement in the area steps backward, and would extend an outstanding and invaluable service to the imperialist-reactionary plan in the area and the Shah-in-Shah expansionist greeds in the area. "

Seen on the background of the above description of the situation today, the PFLO put forward the following guide-line for the Arab nationalist movement:

"Any form of submission at present, in front of the imperialist-reactionary offensive in the area, will inevitable lead to more and further imperialist-reactionary offensives with greater pressures and more fierceness. In the face of the American-Israeli-Sadat plan for liquidating the Palestinian issue and the American-reactionary plan against the groups of the revolutionary movement in the Gulf and the entire Arabian Peninsula, there is no other possibility for the groups of the Arab revolution, than to pile up their ranks more than any time before and to create superior and superb forms of coordination, solidarity and cohesion between them continuously, and to establish a progressive national front in every area of the Arab arena

prior to the establishment of the Arab progressive national front, and to place under consideration especially at this circumstance that the best means for defence is the attack and not retreat or demonstration of any sign of weakness. The slogan of Arab solidarity and Arab reconciliation is now a reactionary slogan one hundred per cent and does not serve but the interest of the reactionaries and their imperialist masters, and cannot lead to anything except the come-back of reactionary hegemony and control over the total Arab political conditions. "

At the end of the statement, PFLO extends its greetings to all national and democratic movements in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and to all peoples, countries, groups and individuals, who supports freedom, independence, justice and progress and peace in the world.

PFLO affirms to the Omani people, the comradely Yemeni people, the masses of the Arab nation, and friends and allies all over the world, that the revolution will continue until victory no matter how great the difficulties.

PFLO declares its solidarity with the progressive regime in PDRY and promises to fight alongside the Yemenis against all imperialist conspiracies against the Yemeni revolution. PFLO expresses its solidarity with the armed Palestinian revolution for its steadfastness against the American-Israeli-Sadat liquidatory plan, and declares its solidarity with the Lebanese nationalist movement which is closely linked to the Palestinian revolution.

PFLO greets the national and democratic movement on the Arab Peninsula, in the Gulf and in the northern part of Yemen.

PFLO declares that they stand side by side with the national movement in Egypt struggling against the reactionary regime of the puppet Sadat, and with the revolutionary movement in Iran whose heroic struggle against the Shah no doubt soon will succeed.

Further the PFLO expresses its solidarity with the Eritrean revolution and the Ethiopian revolution and calls for a peaceful democratic solution between the two revolutions on the basis of self-determination for the people of Eritrea. The blood which is shed in the struggles between the two revolutions only serves the common enemy of the two revolutions and the two peoples, and serves the imperialist-reactionary conspiracy.

The new progressive regime in Afghanistan is greeted.

The national Arab regimes Libya, Iraq, Algeria and Syria, as well as the friendly socialist countries are greeted for the support and solidarity they have extended to the struggle of the Omani people.

PFLO expresses its solidarity with the democratic and national movements in Africa, Latin America and Asia in their struggle against new and old forms of colonialism and US conspiracies.

"Long live the 13th anniversary of the glorious 9th June revolution. Let the just struggle for a free and independent, democratic and united Oman achieve victory. "

(For those who are especially interested, we can supply a photocopy of the full statement (11 pages), if you send us the amount of 10 Danish kroner, 1 £, or 2 US \$ by cheque, giro, or International Postal Money Order).



BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list is a survey over a number of essential books and magazines, mainly about Oman, but the survey also includes background literature which generally treats the Gulf area and the role of imperialism there. The list is far from being complete. It is however meant to introduce some important sources of information.

General Literature:

- 1 Halliday, Fred
Arabia without Sultans. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974. 528 p. (A Pelican Original)
This book is the principal work to read in order to get a reliable and qualified introduction to the area. It has a very comprehensive and profound description of the economic, social and political development on the Arabian Peninsula. It also treats the background for the struggles for national and social liberation which is taking place in and near the oil-rich Gulf area; it especially stresses the revolutionary movements in North Yemen, South Yemen and Oman.
- 2 The Middle East and North Africa 1978-79. 25th edition. London, Europa Publications, 1978.
An annual up-to-date handbook. Contains the following parts: Part 1 (general survey), part 2 (regional survey) and part 3 (country surveys). Part 3 is the main part of the book. It contains for each country:

Sections on geography, history, economy, statistics plus directory information including the government, the foreign representations, the press, the banks etc. Furthermore a Who's Who section. Literature references.

- 3 United States. Department of the Army
Area handbook for the Persian Gulf States. By Richard F. Nyrop et al. Washington, D.C., 1977. 448 p. (Department of the Army Pamphlets, No 550-185).
An useful handbook containing a lot of basic data on social, economic, political and military affairs in the different countries. Includes Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Full literature references.
- 4 Amin, Samir
The Arab Nation. London, ZED Press, 1978. 116 p.
An important analysis of the development of the Arab world. It mainly emphasises the period following the rise of Nasserism.
- 5 Kazzuha, Walid W.
Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World. Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism. London, Charles Knight, 1975. 118 p.
The history of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) from its foundation in 1948 until about 1973 when ANM as such was dissolved. Its local organizations continued to exist, most actively in Palestine, South Yemen and Oman. The book contains important background information which helps to understand the national trends in the Arab world both historically and today. Literature references.
- 6 Anthony, John Duke
Historical and Cultural Dictionary of the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates of Eastern Arabia. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow, 1976. 136 p. (Historical and Cultural Dictionaries of Asia, 9)
An alphabetically arranged dictionary on historical and cultural subjects, for example geographical information, organizations, firms, personage, political events, tribes etc. With full literature references.

- 7 Halliday, Fred
Iran. Dictatorship and Development. Harmondsworth,
Penguin, 1979. 348 p. (A Pelican Original).
New important book analysing the economic, social,
and political developments in Iran until late 1978.
Contains a wealth of background information
which will help understanding the current develop-
ments.

- 8 Halliday, Fred
Labor Migration in the Middle East. In Merip Reports
no 59, 1977. p. 3-17.
A profound economic, social and political analysis
of the employment of migrant workers in the Middle
East. These workers play a very important role in
the economic structure of the countries, especial-
ly in the Gulf area.

Oman:

- The most important book on Oman, is Fred Hallidays:
Arabia without Sultans (reference no 1)
- 9 Documents of the National Struggle in Oman and the
Arabian Gulf. Edited by the Gulf Committee. London,
1974. 106 p. (9'th June Studies).
This important collection of documents illustrate
the development of the liberation movement both
ideologically and militarily from the outbreak of
the armed struggle in Oman in 1965 and until the
congress of the PFLO in 1974. (Available from the
CSRO).
- 10 Townsend, John
Oman. The Making of the Modern State. London, Croom
Helm, 1977. 212 p.
A profound and critical exposition of the economic
and political changes in Oman since 1970, written
by Qaboos' economic adviser from 1972 till 1975.
- 11 Halliday, Fred
Mercenaries: "Counter-Insurgency" in the Gulf. Notting-
ham, Spokesman, 1977. 80p.
Two articles on respectively the methods used by
Britain in its colonial war in Oman, seen in in-
ternational perspective, and on the employment of

mercenaries in the Gulf area.

- 12 Women and the Revolution in Oman. Edited by the Gulf
Committee. London, 1975. 43 p.
Documentation illustrating the changing role of
women in Oman during the revolutionary process.
- 13 The Oman War: 1957-59. A Critical History. London, The
Gulf Committee, 1974. 24 p. (9'th June Studies).
About a national revolt in the interior of Oman
against the Sultan and the British.

Magazines:

- 14 Saut al-Thawra. PFLO Information Committee, P.O. Box
5037, Maalla, Aden, P.D.R. Yemen. Approximatly 10
issues a year.
An English translation of the most important artic-
les in the weekly magazine of the PFLO. Brings
statements and comments from the Front; analyses
the development in the area; and publishes the
latest information about the political and mili-
tary struggle (available through the CSRO).
- 15 News from Oman (Dhofar Letter). KROAG, Box 86, DK-1003
Copenhagen K, Denmark. 6-8 issues a year.
Background information and current accounts of the
development in the area and of the support work in
Scandinavia. Also published in Danish and Swedish.
- 16 Merip Reports. Middle East Research and Information
Project, P.O. Box 3122, Columbia Heights Station,
Washington, D.C. 20010, USA. 10 issues a year.
The most important magazine about the Middle East
in general. Each issue usually contains a profound
political and economic study of a certain country
or topic. The Gulf area, especially Iran is often
treated.
- 17 Oman en lutte. Comité de Soutien a la Révolution en
Oman (CSRO), 14 rue Nanteuil, 75015 Paris, France.
1-2 issues a year.
- 18 Gulf Solidarity. Bulletin on Oman and the Gulf. Gulf
Solidarity, P.O. Box 756, Berkeley, CA 94701, USA.
1-2 issues a year.

19 The Middle East, 63 Long Acre, London WC2E 9JH, England. 12 issues a year.

A well-established magazine like "Time" and "News-week", treating the Arab world politically, economically and culturally. It brings current information as well as background analysis.

20 Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 21 John Street, London W1N 2BP, England. Published weekly.

An economic magazine especially written for business people. It contains mainly current information by country. It regularly brings special reports on different issues or countries. For instance a special report on Oman was published in September, 1978 (Can be ordered seperately for £ 3.50).

21 Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 4, The Middle East and Africa. BBC Monitoring Service, Caversham Park, Reading RG4 8TZ, England. Published 5 times a week.

Publishes reports and quotations by country mainly from the local Middle Eastern radiostations. Gives a current picture of the daily political developments in the area. (There is a similiar US monitoring service called Foreign Broadcasts Information Services)

If you wish to make a more extensive information search, you can use the bibliographies included in some of the books listed above. Furthermore we can refer you to a newly published bibliography by Michael Owen Shannon: Oman and Southeastern Arabia. A Bibliographic Survey. Boston, G.K. Hall, 1978. 165 p.

To keep in touch with new publications/reports/articles on the economic, social and political development in Oman, you need to consult several current bibliographies. The most important are 1) the bibliographical listings in the Middle East Journal (1761 N St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA), and 2) the Quarterly Index Islamicus (Published by Mansell, 3 Bloomsbury Place, London WC1A 2QA, England).

However for most purposes, it will probably be sufficient to rely on the bibliographic surveys in our newsletter "News from Oman".

MATERIALS FROM THE CSRO

The french support group for the PFLO, distributes a number of materials:

- "Oman en lutte" (Magazine)
- 2 records in Arabic with the choir of the Schools of Revolution.
- Set of 8 colour postcards
- Beautiful colour and black/white pictures
- Magazines of the PFLO: Saut al-Thawra (Arabic and English) and 9'th June (Arabic).
- Various books and documents, posters, key-rings etc.

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