



**BULLETIN**  
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## Editorial

### ISRAEL AND ANTI-COLONIALISM— CHAPTER II

In our last issue we dealt with one aspect of the Israelis' quaint claim—addressed mainly to certain countries in Africa and Asia, but sometimes also to anti-colonialist opinion in Britain and America—to be an ex-colonial people which suffered under imperialist oppression and, like the other subject peoples of the world, had to fight its way to freedom. We showed by an unanswerable appeal to the facts of history from 1917 to 1948 how far from the truth this claim was, indeed what a mockery of the truth it was and what violence it did to the accepted meaning of words.

In this issue we shall deal with Chapter II of Israel's close association and alliance with the forces of imperialism, namely the chapter which culminated in the tripartite Suez aggression against Egypt in 1956, when the gallant anti-colonial Israelis placed themselves entirely at the disposal of the conspirators of London and Paris in a cold-bloodedly planned attempt to subjugate Egypt by military action and reimpose colonial domination on the Arab world.

The facts, judgments and interpretations we shall adduce come entirely from Israeli sources, some of them from a no less authoritative Israeli source than the writings of Moshe Dayan, Chief-of-Staff of the Israeli armed forces at the time of Suez and now Minister of Agriculture in the Israeli Government. In a recent book entitled *Bridge Across The Mediterranean*, by the Israeli writer, Dr. Michael Bar-Zohar, a great deal of fresh light is shed on the story of Franco-Israeli military co-operation in the years that led up to the Suez attack. This book has been reviewed by Mr. Simha Flapan in the Israeli monthly *New Outlook* (volume 7, number 4; May, 1964).

The official Israeli thesis has always been that Israel sought the alliance of France in a defensive spirit and as a reaction to Egyptian-provoked tension on the Israeli-Egyptian border, to increased Fedayeen raids by Egyptians into Israeli territory, and to Nasser's Czech arms deal. This thesis is challenged by the revelations made by Dr. Michael Bar-Zohar in his book and by the conclusions of Mr. Flapan when reviewing the book in *New Outlook*. A few extracts from this review will suffice to support our case. Mr. Flapan says: "The impression the large majority of Israel citizens retain of the tempestuous years of 1954-56 was aptly described by Agricul-

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ture Minister, Moshe Dayan, in an article published by *Haaretz* on 17th April, 1964. He wrote:

The cause of the suddenly more acute security position at that time was increased military activity by the neighbouring Arab countries; these activities consisted of plain terrorism, infiltration and the establishment of special Egyptian units for this purpose—the *Fedayeen*—and also in preparations for all-out war against Israel. A joint military command was established between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan; the Czech arms deal was concluded, and this greatly increased Egypt's military supplies; military positions were established by Egypt in the Sinai peninsula and the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal was blockaded against Israel.

"This description of events has become a standard and virtually official one, advanced in the press, official publications and Government propaganda.

"Bar-Zohar belies this description on virtually every point—not out of a negative attitude to the Sinai campaign, but out of enthusiastic support for it. The author proves, on the basis of convincing facts, that a joint Franco-Israeli political and military strategy had already been evolved back in 1954, i.e. *before* \* the *Fedayeen* activities and the Israeli reprisal operations, which reached high tension point only in 1955, and *prior to* \* the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, which was announced in October, 1955. Already at the end of 1954, with the agreement of French Prime Minister, Mendès-France, and the approval of Air Force Minister, Catroux, a Franco-Israeli arms deal was signed. Under its terms France undertook to supply Israel with Hurricane jets, Mystère-2 planes, and AMX tanks, and even granted Israel an option of Mystère-4 planes. This deal was the outcome of lengthy negotiations strongly opposed by Quai d'Orsay officials who claimed that such a deal would 'force the Arabs to turn to the only remaining possible supplier, i.e. the Soviet Union'."

The reviewer of the book, Mr. Flapan, then asks how this common strategy between Israel and France was evolved, and finds his answer in the pages of Bar-Zohar's book. According to the author, Israel's relations with France had, since the establishment of Israel, existed on two separate levels. At the political level, Paris was markedly pro-Arab. France continued to regard herself

\* The reviewer's italics.

as a political power in the Levant and tried by every possible means to recover her former position there.† Quai d'orsay officials took the pro-Arab line and demonstrated their hostile attitude to Israel all through the years 1948 to 1954. France only accorded Israel *de jure* recognition in January, 1949, being one of the last major states to do so. Previously, she had concluded commercial agreements with Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, undertaking to supply them with arms. She had also demonstrated her support for Arab political demands and criticized the Israeli Government for transferring its seat from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, for which city France demanded international status. Even after according Israel recognition, France lent her support to Syria at the U.N. in most of its disputes with Israel.

But alongside these happenings in the political sphere, relations of an entirely different kind developed between Israel and France in the military sphere—unknown to the public at large. "Secrecy," says Bar-Zohar, "has been the characteristic feature of relations between the two states since the birth of Israel. . . . Unlike the diplomats who tried to reach an understanding with the Arabs through talk, the French Army was paid its wages for fighting the Arab liberation movements in North Africa, and Israel's parallel struggle in the Middle East created a feeling of solidarity, however weak at the time."

It was still "weak", because this was in 1952, i.e. before the outbreak of the Algerian revolt and before President Nasser came to power. These two events were to bind Israel and France strongly together in a common cause—the cause of two colonial states (despite the enormous disparity in size and strength between them) trying to suppress the legitimate forces of liberation that opposed them in the same area of the world. Thus, Mr. Flapan: "The growing conflict between France and the national movements of the Maghreb gave a powerful impetus to the emerging idea that France and Israel were facing a 'common enemy'. In August, 1955, Israeli Chief-of-Staff Moshe Dayan was received with pomp by his French counterpart and declared, 'We are up against a common enemy—you on the flanks and we face to face, on the front lines'."

So, the people who claim—when trying to win favour among Africans and Asians and among anti-colonialists in Britain and the United States—that they belong to the ranks of the formerly subject peoples of the world, who had to obtain their freedom by fighting for it, were now in full alliance with one of the two great colonial powers of the world. Their immediate object was to destroy Nasser's Egypt, the headquarters and focal point of the Arab liberation movement. But it should also be carefully noted that in supporting the French militarists against Nasser, they were indirectly helping these militarists to crush the Algerian fight for freedom. That was the main reason why the French militarists wanted their

† i.e. after its eclipse during the war years.

help, and the Israelis knew it. Every Israeli bullet fired against an Egyptian soldier was a bullet fired against an Algerian freedom fighter. Strange way for an ex-colonial people to behave in the struggle between the colonial powers and their subject territories!

#### AMERICA AND THE ARAB REFUGEES

The *Jewish Chronicle* of 28th August jubilantly announced from Atlantic City—under the heading "Democrats' Policy Favours Israel"—that the American Democratic Party, at its convention, pledged itself to work for "a settlement of the Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity for them." The *Jewish Chronicle* described this statement as "eminently satisfactory to Israel" and predicted that it will undoubtedly bring howls of protest from the Arab leaders who will be meeting in Alexandria next week for their second "summit conference".

The satisfaction of the *Jewish Chronicle* is of course due to the absence from this Democratic manifesto of any reference to the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Israeli territory or (if they decline repatriation) to be compensated by Israel for the loss of their property and livelihood.

It is not necessary for us to emit any howls of protest at this piece of obvious electioneering in a country where the Zionist lobby is notorious for the electoral pressure it can exert. But a party convention is not the Government of the United States, and it is sufficient for us to remind the *Jewish Chronicle* and the American Democratic Party that this election manifesto is valueless against the official voice and policy of successive American Administrations at the United Nations. Year after year, since 1948, the Government of the United States, under both Democratic and Republican presidents, has supported the resolutions passed by the U.N. General Assembly calling upon Israel to allow the Refugees to return to their homeland, and to compensate those of them who did not wish to return. Last December the United States Government did not only support this resolution, it actually sponsored it, and so was the first of the eighty-three nations who voted in favour of it against the solitary opposition of Israel.

For a new American administration under a Democratic president to depart from this policy is manifestly unthinkable. Not only consistency but the preservation and promotion of American interests in the Middle East demand that this at least shall continue to be the policy of the United States. For a government is represents, though a party may only be interested in winning an election. There being no Arab lobby in the United States party manifestos are bound to outbid each other in promising favours to the Zionists. But in the Middle East, American interests will prosper more if the United States deals justly with the Arabs than submits to Israeli pressure.

## Release of Last Kurdish Detainees

On 24th February, 1964, Law number 16 of 1964 was promulgated. Under the heading: "For the amnesty bestowed on the participants of the rebellions in the north between September 10, 1961 and February 10, 1964."

The first article of this law read: "A general amnesty shall be bestowed on all those who participated wholly or partially in the rebellion that took place in the Northern District of the Iraqi

Republic between September 10, 1961 and February 10, 1964. All legal proceedings concerning the criminal acts they committed so far as this rebellion is concerned shall be stopped."

The release of the detainees began soon after the promulgation of this law and continued until the middle of August when the last batch of them was set free.

## A General Review of Iraqi Industry

IN view of the recent nationalization of several major industries in Iraq, it may be of interest to our readers to have a general picture of Iraqi industry, with facts and figures going up to 1962. We therefore publish below a statistical review which has been prepared by the Federation of Iraqi Industries.

The most important industries in Iraq are the following: cement, asbestos, tiles and mosaics, spinning and weaving (cotton, silk, and wool), sugar, vegetable oils, soap, tobacco, beer, mineral water, dairy produce, and matches. Their position in 1962 (the last year for which statistics are available) was as follows:

#### CEMENT

There were six factories producing cement in 1962, two of which were State owned while the others belonged to private companies. The annual output was not only sufficient to meet local requirements but also left a small surplus of about 8,000 tons for export. The aggregate capital invested in this industry was £11,000,000, and the workers employed by it 2,000. The productive capacity of the six factories in 1962 was 1,200,000 tons of both ordinary cement and salt-resisting cement. But the output actually achieved in 1961 was 883,244 tons of ordinary cement and 53,750 tons of salt-resisting cement. Sales were 875,158 tons of ordinary cement and 59,057 tons of salt-resisting cement. The excess of the quantity sold of this last over the quantity produced in that year was due to a surplus being left over from the previous year.

#### ASBESTOS

There was one asbestos factory in Iraq with a capital of £400,000. Its productive capacity for 1962 was 360,000 asbestos pipes and 15,000,000 square feet of sheet asbestos. But the actual output in 1961 was 224,450 pipes (both pressurized and unpressurized) and 1,633,045 corrugated and coloured sheets as well as 8,556 pieces of different kinds. Sales were: 131,969 pipes and 1,887,731 coloured and corrugated sheets.

Again the excess of sales over output was due to remainders from the previous year.

#### TILES

This industry is closely linked with those of cement and asbestos, each of them being complementary to the other two. In 1962 there were 150 factories in Iraq making both plain and mosaic tiles, with an aggregate capital of £750,000. Their productive capacity was 125,000,000 plain and patterned tiles and 45,000,000 mosaic tiles. Actual production for 1961 was 28,543,873 plain tiles, 868,123 patterned tiles, and 12,735,873 mosaic tiles.

#### SPINNING AND WEAVING

##### Cotton

There are to-day in Iraq two principal cotton spinning and weaving factories and seven others of medium or small size. The aggregate capital of the two principal factories is £2,468,804, and the number of workers employed in them 3,300. The productive capacity at the end of 1962 was 41,500,000 metres of cotton material—plain white and brown, dyed and printed. The productive capacity of the spinning plants was 1,040,000 lb., but actual production in 1961 was 1,161,983 of spun thread and 39,083,666 metres of material—plain, dyed, or printed. Sales reached 1,103,312 lb. of spun thread and 31,194,056 metres of material.

##### Silk (artificial and natural)

There are in Iraq twenty-one silk factories with an aggregate capital of £2,963,784. They employ 2,803 workers. In 1962 their productive capacity was 12,046,450 metres, but actual production in 1961 had only reached 6,969,850 metres of silk rolls in addition to 876,265 headscarves. Sales reached 5,962,148 metres of silk rolls and 839,881 headscarves.

##### Wool

There are five factories in Iraq for the spinning and weaving of wool. Three of them are large factories, and


the remaining two of medium size. The three large ones have a capital of £2,050,000 and employ 2,252 workers. The productive capacity in 1962 reached 2,970,000 metres of woollen material, 636,000 blankets, 266 tons of spun thread, and 500,000 pairs of socks and stockings. Actual production in 1961 reached 978,810 metres of material, 33,930 blankets, 165,774 kilograms of spun thread, and 45,948 pairs of socks and stockings. Sales were: 732,045 metres, 312,430 blankets, 143,063 kilograms of spun thread, and 64,115 pairs of socks and stockings.

#### SUGAR


Conditions in Iraq favour the development of the sugar industry, since the hot climate of the southern region is good for sugar cane planting, while the temperate climate of the north is good for beetroot. There is in the country now only one sugar factory which is far from being able to meet the country's total requirements. This factory was state-owned even before the recent nationalization. It had a capital of £2,662,574, and employed 374 workers. It had in 1962 a productive capacity of 35,000 tons, but actual production in 1961 reached 33,149 tons.

#### VEGETABLE OILS

This is a leading industry in Iraq, employing a large number of workers and totally satisfying the needs of the internal market. There are nine factories for producing



Drill Operator



Operator at Lathe

the various kinds of vegetable fats. They employ 1,500 workers. The productive capacity in 1962 reached 300,000 tons of hydrated fats and 720 tons of liquid fats. Actual production in 1961 reached 24,807 tons of hydrated fats, 690 tons of liquid fats, 223 tons of linseed oil, and 18,270 tons of unhydrated fat. Sales reached 22,750 tons of hydrated fats, 639 tons of liquid fats, 122 tons of linseed oil and 19,600 tons of unhydrated fats.

#### SOAP

Again this industry meets the total requirements of the internal market with, sometimes, a surplus for export. There are nineteen soap and detergent factories in the country, whose productive capacity in 1962 reached 4,100 tons of shaving soap, 16,500 tons of detergent, 3,900 tons of domestic soap and 3,700 tons of toilet soap. Actual production for 1961 was: 18,400 kilograms of shaving soap, 456,966 kilograms of detergent, 1,335 tons of domestic soap, and 1,005 tons of toilet soap. Sales were: 18,050 kilograms of shaving soap, 456,966 kilograms of detergent, 1,227 tons of domestic soap, and 710 tons of toilet soap.

#### SHOEMAKING

Shoemaking is an old traditional industry in Iraq. It uses local raw material (skins prepared in Iraqi tanneries) as well as important leather and other material of finer quality. There are twenty large-scale factories engaged

in this industry as well as a large number of small-scale factories and individual workshops. The aggregate capital employed in all these is £1,687,000. The productive capacity in 1962 reached 7,260,000 pairs of shoes and boots (leather, rubber, canvas, and plastic), and actual production in 1961 reached 4,939,927 pairs of shoes and boots of all kinds. Sales were: 1,250,393 pairs of leather shoes and boots, 1,410,241 pairs of canvas and rubber shoes, 369,209 pairs of plastic shoes and 5,190 pairs of rubber boots.

#### TANNING

Owing to the abundant supplies of hides and skins in Iraq several tanneries have been established and there are now seven major enterprises in this industry, whose output meets local need. They have an aggregate capital of £821,295 and employ 600 workers. The productive capacity in 1962 reached 11,940,000 square feet of leather, while actual production in 1961 reached 6,288,605 square feet of leather. Sales were 5,363,698 square feet.

#### TOBACCO

Large quantities of tobacco are grown in Iraq, both of the ordinary and the improved varieties, which meet and exceed local requirements. The manufacture of

cigarettes started in 1930 and several factories have been established since then. Of these seven are major ones, including a state-owned factory. In addition, there is a large number of small individually owned factories. Their aggregate capital is £3,765,000. Actual production in 1961 reached 4,441,091,000 ordinary cigarettes and tobacco for 2,157,702,000 hand-rolled cigarettes. Sales were 4,417,672,000 ordinary cigarettes and tobacco for 2,152,537,000 hand-rolled cigarettes. The surplus is usually exported to countries of the Arabian South. Iraq imports only a limited quantity of foreign cigarettes and tobacco, which are subject to high customs duties, imposed for the protection of the local industry.

#### SPIRITS

The distilling of spirits and alcoholic drinks is an old industry in Iraq because of the abundance of its raw materials—dates and grapes. It used to be a manual industry but has evolved into the mechanical age, and there are to-day two large distilleries in the country as well as a number of unlicensed small distilleries in the suburbs and in the villages. The fewness of distilleries is due to social and religious reasons. The aggregate capital of the two licensed distilleries is £170,253 and the number of workers employed in them 132. Productive



Exhibition of Iraqi Textiles



capacity in 1962 reached 7,200,000 litres. Actual production in 1961 was: 2,615,208 litres of Arak and 672,424 litres of alcohol. Sales were 2,534,482 litres of Akar, 675,416 litres of alcohol.

#### BEER

Again for social and religious reasons brewing is not an encouraged industry and there is a high excise duty on it, which is borne by the consumer. There are in the country three breweries, one of which has been out of production for some time. The aggregate capital invested in this industry is £1,375,000, and the number of workers employed in it 230. The productive capacity of the two active breweries in 1962 reached 14,500,000 litres, and actual production in 1961 was 4,447,791 litres of ordinary beer and 16,317 litres of stout. Sales were 4,425,642 litres of ordinary beer and 12,323 litres of stout.

#### MINERAL WATERS

There is a great demand in Iraq for mineral water (soda, lemonade, etc.) because of the great heat of the summer. Twenty large factories for producing such drinks have been established as well as nine of medium and small size. The aggregate capital invested is about

£2,000,000. Productive capacity in 1962 was 400,000,000 bottles; actual production in 1963 was 251,206,942 bottles.

#### DAIRY PRODUCE

The modern dairy industry is of recent origin in Iraq, but it has developed rapidly owing to the high quality of its products and increasing demand. A start has also been made in exporting milk and its products to Kuwait and Jordan.

There are nine enterprises in Iraq engaged in this industry, the largest of which from the point of view of productive capacity is the one operated by the government. The aggregate capital invested is £1,670,000. Productive capacity in 1961 was 134,250,000 litres of milk, while actual production in the same year was 44,743,94 litres of sterilized; 618,805 of yogurt; 5,416 kilograms of dried milk, 210,219 kilograms of butter; 46,175 kilos of cheese, and 94,304 kilos of cream.

#### MATCHES

Not long ago Iraq used to import all its requirements of matches. Now it has six match factories, with an aggregate capital of £545,518. Productive capacity in 1962 reached 400,000,000 boxes.

## Arab Common Market

COMMENTING on the signing in Cairo on 13th August by Iraq, Jordan, Syria, the U.A.R. and Kuwait, of the convention for the creation of an Arab Common Market, *Le Monde* of 26th August discusses the complementarity which exists between the economies of the various Arab countries and brings out the following facts:

The average annual cereal production of all the Arab countries is 17,000,000 tons, or 200 kilograms per head of population. Of these 17,000,000 tons, 7,000,000 are of wheat, that is to say 3/5 of the total world production. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and to a certain extent Iraq are wheat exporting countries, while the U.A.R., Jordan and Lebanon are importers of it. But in the absence of a central co-ordinating organization, Arab wheat exports are not destined for the markets of the importing Arab countries.

Apart from cereal products, the Arab countries provide 8 per cent of the world's consumption of wine, 9 per cent of its consumption of citrus fruits, and 85 per cent of its dates.

The livestock of the Arab countries totals 56,000,000 sheep, 27,000,000 goats, and 17,000,000 cattle.

Iron ore exported by Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria represent 12 per cent of the world total. According to United Nations' experts the mines of Tindouf alone

could produce 5,000,000 tons of iron per annum. The Arab countries export also manganese, lead, phosphate, and cotton. 85 per cent of the world's long staple cotton is produced by Egypt. If Egypt manufactures to-day 900,000,000 metres of cotton textiles per annum this quantity hardly covers one half of its internal requirements and does not absorb more than 20 per cent of its total cotton production.

As for petrol, the principal wealth of the Arab world, it represents 90 per cent of world reserves. If the world had to confine itself to exploiting only existing and actually explored oilfields, the Arabs could, during the next one hundred years supply annually a quantity equal to that which is produced today. In 1962 oil production in the Arab countries totalled 272,000,000 tons, that is to say 23 per cent of world production. Only one tenth of this quantity is consumed in the producing countries, the remainder being exported. The total annual sum received by the Arab countries in the form of oil rent and royalties is \$1,500,000,000. On the other hand, Europe buys 4,500,000 barrels of oil every day from the Arab countries. The cost price of the barrel in the Persian Gulf is 16 cents. In Northern Germany it is \$2.30, and in Texas it is \$2. According to the Saudi oil expert, Abdullah Tourayki, France, for instance, would have to pay out another \$500,000 daily if she had to buy her oil from a non-Arab source.

## The 1952 Revolution Made Possible The Birth of An Authentically Egyptian Theatre

by Professor Louis Awad

(An article contributed to the special supplement on the United Arab Republic, published by *Le Monde* of 24th July, 1964, and reproduced in the following translation by the kind permission of the Director of *Le Monde*.)

THE discovery in the twentieth century of the Egyptian theatre of the Pharaonic civilization by Kurt Zetke, Father Driston, and other Egyptologists has considerably modified our ideas not only of the Greek theatre, but also of the artistic potential of the Egyptian people.

It is an established fact that the traditional and official culture of Egypt, namely Arab culture, never knew the theatre in the proper sense of the word before the Arab world came into direct contact with the West in the nineteenth century. The Arab translators of the classical era, under the Caliphs, turned their attention to Greek philosophy, rhetoric, and science but were completely indifferent to Greek literature, particularly on its dramatic side. No doubt the mythological basis and sense of cosmic disintegration so obviously characteristic of Greek dramatic literature gave it a pagan flavour in a world which was both medieval and strictly monotheistic. Thus, when Matta Ibn Younis undertook, under the Abbasids, the translation into Arabic of the *Poetics* of Aristotle, the basic conceptions of Greek drama escaped him to such an extent that he translated the term "tragedy" by the word "satire" and the term "comedy" by the word "panegyric".

However, on the popular plane, the Arab world in the Middle Ages knew at least of the Chinese shadow theatre, if not other kinds of performance in dramatic form, but this literary genre never had any influence on classical Arabic literature, which confined itself to penatonic, satirical, elegiac, and lyrical poetry. One may also add another literary genre which made a comparatively tardy appearance when the Arab Empire was approaching its decline, namely mystical and metaphysical poetry. Nearly 1,000 years of Mamluk-Turkish domination in the Arab world accentuated the difference between classical culture and popular, or "vulgar", culture.

It is therefore extremely difficult to determine the beginnings of the modern Egyptian theatre.

Gerard de Nerval tells us in his *Journey in the Orient* that the Egyptians had a first idea of the theatre in the reign of Mohammed Ali (1804-49). He tells us of a popular show with a dialogue which he saw at the Court during the ceremony of the circumcision of the son of Mohammed Ali. It was a scene between a poor fellow, a pitiless tax-collector who commits the insolvent fellow to prison, the tearful wife of the fellow, and the jailer up to the tax collector by settling part of his debt. Nerval calls the actors of the troupe "Moabbezins", a rather interesting appellation because it has no meaning at all today either in classical or colloquial Arabic. One cannot therefore say whether these "Moabbezins" represented a long popular tradition going back well into the past, or an entirely new activity which came to be known only under Western influence since the French expedition to Egypt.

#### THE PRECURSORS

In any case, the beginnings of the Egyptian theatre in the real sense of the word can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Two eminent Leventines, Marun Nakkash and Abu Khalil Al-Kabbani, formed in Egypt theatrical troupes consisting principally of their compatriots, and they themselves produced the plays to be acted. These were mainly very rudimentary imitations of the French classical theatre, adapted to subjects taken from Arab history. Until 1892 or 1900 boys famous for their beauty were engaged to play the female parts. Yacoub Sannou, an Egyptian Jew of undoubted genius who bore the *nom de plume* of Abu Naddara, and who lived for a long time as an exile in Paris, wrote plays with a revolutionary social and political content. The most serious work of this period is that of Mohammed Osman Galal, an Egyptian notable attached

to the Court of the Khedive Tewfik, and therefore politically reactionary. About 1870 Osman Galal translated four tragedies of Racine's and four comedies of Molière's not into classical Arabic verse but into popular Egyptian poetry. Incontestably one may call him the "Father of the Modern Egyptian Theatre". I have had the opportunity of comparing his versions of *Tartuffe*, *Ecole des Femmes*, *Les Femmes Savantes*, *Esther*, *Iphigénie*, and *Alexandre le Grand* with the original and I have been struck by his faithfulness as a translator. *Tartuffe* though adapted or Egyptianized under the title of *Sheikh Malouf*, remains faithful to the original in spite of the change of characters and climate.

Osman Galal and Yacoub Sannou (Abu Naddara) are the real precursors of the Egyptian national theatre, their claim to this status deriving from two facts: the adoption of the vernacular or spoken Egyptian language, and the presentation of scenes from Egyptian life. The Syro-Lebanese school, which adopted the classical Arabic language and took Arab subjects from the time of the Caliphs, was able to stifle this tradition of indigenous drama for a quarter of a century, that is to say until the revolution of 1919. Iskander Farah, Tanyoun Abdu, and Georges Abiad—a new wave of Levantine emigrants—continued between 1900 and 1919 the tradition of the classical theatre which had been started by Maron Nakkash and Abu Khalil Al Kabbani, whether in translation, adaptation, or original work. This was the period of *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Oedipus Rex*, *Louis XI*, etc., side by side with subjects taken from classical Arab history. The classical repertoire of the troupes of Iskander Farah (about 1900-05), Georges Abiad (1910-18), and the Egyptian singer Salama Higazi (1905-17) considerably enriched the Arabic theatre in Egypt, but it also considerably impoverished the indigenous Egyptian theatre. The use of the classical Arabic language and of classical subjects caused a separation between the theatre and life.

#### 1919 to 1936: A NATIONAL THEATRE TIED TO THE WEST

It was the Revolution of 1919, nationalist and liberal at once, that gave the first impetus to the Egyptian national theatre. The foundation between 1918 and 1924 of the comic theatre of Kihani and of the lyric theatres of Sayed Darwish, Munira Al-Mhdiya (1920-22), and also of the dramatic theatre of Yusef Wahba, called the Ramses Theatre (1924), marked a revolution in the world of the arts and letters and particularly of the theatre. For the first time the theatre became a national and social institution, addressing itself to Egyptians in spontaneous Egyptian dialect and not in classical Arabic; and dealing with political and social subjects. On the comic plane, the most popular themes were the parodying of the Turkish character often represented as stupid,

arrogant and arbitrary and of the character of the big Egyptian landowner, who sold his cotton crops in order finally to dissipate his fortune on women of easy virtue, mainly foreigners. Other popular themes were those that emphasized national and civil liberty; and brotherhood between the Copts and Muslims of Egypt and between the Egyptians and the Sudanese. But, like the national revolution of 1919, this literary and artistic revolution was bourgeois, liberal, and romantic. And like it, it remained an uncompleted revolution, because of the dialectic of Egyptian history. Between the revolution of 1919 and the Independence Treaty of 1936, Egypt continued to look to the West for her national and social renewal. In the sphere of tragedy it was the period of romantic drama and melodrama. *The Lady of The Camellias*, *L'Aiglon*, *Cyrano de Bergerac*, *Louis XI* (by Casimir Delavigne), *Rasputin*, etc., were produced with great success. In the archives of the period, it is reported that *The Lady of The Camellias* alone had a box office intake of £12,000 in one year. Yusef Wahba and other writers tried for the first time to write tragedies on Egyptian themes, but these were rather romantic melodramas on the disastrous consequences of mixed marriages between Egyptians and foreigners, or on the tyranny and debauchery of the Egyptian Pashas. In the sphere of comedy, or rather vaudeville, the partnership Rihani-Bade' Khairy adapted Georges Feydeau and Marcel Pagnol. Perhaps the greatest contribution to the national theatre in this period is to be found in the lyric dramas of the great poet Shawky Bey, *The Death of Cleopatra*, *Majnun Laila* (Laila's Crazy Lover), and *Cambyses*, as well as in the metaphysical dramas of Tewfik Al-Hakim, chiefly *The Seven Sleepers* and *Sherezade*.

With the defeat of Egyptian liberalism, between the 1936 Treaty and the Revolution of 1952, there only remained of the Egyptian theatre the Rihani vaudevilles, which became enormously popular under the decadent monarchy of Farouk. Plays like *Topaze*, adapted by Khairy and Rihani, had remarkable success. It is, however, important to note that the seething social criticism of corruption, opportunism, and debauchery in the comedies adapted by Bade' Khairy and Rihani amused both the discontented classes and the ruling classes, including the aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie. The fact that Farouk conferred a decoration on Rihani was not without significance. The *ancien regime* found in the theatre of social satire an anti-revolutionary political weapon—that is to say a safety valve very useful in allaying the anger of "good" bourgeois. The effect was very similar to that of the criticism of Congreve, Wycherley, and Vanburgh in the English Restoration—a kind of self-criticism or self-denunciation of the aristocracy, which the oppressed classes accepted as a sufficient proof of good faith and recognition of the need for reform. In reality, it was only a temporary sedative.



Scene from Egyptian production of *Macbeth* in Arabic

#### 1952 TO 1964: A PRE-SHAKESPEARIAN EPOCH

For reasons which have not yet been thoroughly studied, the Revolution of 1952 gave a tremendous impetus to the Egyptian theatre. Of all literary genres, the Egyptian theatre is the legitimate child of the Revolution of 1952. The story is almost dead. The novel remains stationary and if one may say so "frozen". The new poetry, like the phoenix, is only just being reborn from its ashes. Only the Egyptian theatre has known a remarkable flowering. One can even say that truly Egyptian theatre is born, and that Egypt finds herself today in a period similar to that which preceded Shakespeare, during which several men full of talent, devoted and determined, prepare the way for a flowering era.

Since 1952 a new development has taken place in the world of the Egyptian theatre. Instead of depending on translations of the masterpieces of dramatic art or adaptations of the theatre of the Street, a school of dramatic authors of great diversity and creative power has appeared. It is no longer a question of imitating such-and-such a model. Of course, these writers are still subject to the influences of world literature; but it is no longer imitation. It is a process of *cosmosis*. Inspiration is no longer drawn from outside; the Egyptian soul is contemplated, the Egyptian personality is brought out and a native "fable" or "myth" in the Aristotelian sense is created.

These new writers read everything, from the Greeks to Brecht, Beckett, and Ionescu. And they forget what they have read. They even go to the point of proudly

pretending that they have not read any of these authors. The result is a genuinely Egyptian dramatic harvest. Although exaggerated, this pride is healthy. The essential thing is that contact should be maintained with world literature.

In less than twelve years this group of dramatic writers has made its mark. The most important are: No'man Ashour, author of bitter comedies such as *The People Downstairs*, *The People Upstairs*, *The Feminine Sex*, and *The Doghri Family*; Yusef Idris, writer of tragic comedies with a content that is social and philosophic at once, such as *The Republic of Farahat*, *The Cotton King*, and *The Critical Moment*; Sa'd Al-Din Wahba, a writer of tearful comedies with a socio-political trend, which have a symbolic and sometimes an astonishingly lyrical structure, such as *Al-Mahroussa* (meaning "God's Protégée"—name given to Egypt), *The Tail Waggon*, and, very recently, *The Mosquito Bridge*; Alfred Farrag, a lyrical writer and the author of the following tragedy and comedy, both of which have a hidden socio-political intention: *The Fall of The Pharaoh* and *The Barber of Baghdad*; Mahmoud Al-Sa'dany, a comic and misanthropic author of painful bitterness—which has prevented a number of his plays from being put on the stage: *Panayoti's Fief* (meant to represent Egypt), *The Prescription*, *The Crooks*; Loufi Al-Kholi, a writer of plays with a proletarian or reformist theme: *The Café of Kings*, *The Trial*, *The Guinea Pigs*; Rashad Roushdy, author of the following psychological bourgeois dramas: *The Butterfly*, *The Game of Love*, *Journey Beyond the Rampart*; Mustapha Mahmud, an able story-teller who has recently become a philosophic tragedian: *The*



*Earthquake*, etc. In leaving this new school of writers we must be careful not to forget the great master of the Egyptian theatre, Tewfik Al-Hakim, who, though comparatively old, has recently outdistanced all the others in the *avant garde* theatre. His *You Who Are Climbing The Tree*, an adventure in the absurd tradition, which appeared in 1963, is probably his most mature creation.

Let us take a few examples which may help to throw light on this contemporary Egyptian theatre.

*The Republic of Farafar*, of Yusef Idris, a play in one act, deals with a young communist student arrested by the police. At the police station, among the prostitutes, the pickpockets, etc., he awaits his turn to be interrogated. He starts a conversation with the sergeant, who is a poor devil with a typically peasant outlook. The sergeant, wanting to preach morality to a thief, forgets himself and launches into a long fantastic story picked up in the countryside during his childhood; the story of a young man who was so honest that the good God had rewarded him by bestowing upon him a great fortune. The hero of the legend found a precious ring, which he wanted to return to its unknown owner. During his search he passes, like Ulysses, from one adventure to another. Finally he comes to found a republic which is based not on justice, like that of Plato, but on honesty. The Utopian dream of the sergeant is remarkably parallel to that of the young communist student. When the young man is called for his interrogation, the sergeant hears the word "communist"; he stops dreaming abruptly and his friendly attitude towards the young man changes. "Son of a dog! So you're only one of these sons of a dog!" he exclaims. The cruel irony is striking.

#### IS THE DOMINATION OF ONE CLASS BY ANOTHER ETERNAL?

The most mature work of Yusef Idris is his latest drama, *The Farafar*. A *farafar* (singular of *farafar*) in Egyptian folklore literature, is a valet, generally of the king, who is at once a charming clown and a wise confidant. His words represent the *vox populi*, or the choir in classical drama. Idris uses the *farafar* as a symbol for the subaltern. His play deals with the theme of the relations between master and slave. We are in a world of fantasy. The *farafar*, in the play, has to look for his master. In the end he finds him. The master holds that his role is to do nothing. The *farafar* considers, on the contrary, that even the master must work. Together they examine all possible and imaginable trades but find nothing suitable for the master except the trade of gravedigger. It is the trade of all masters from Tothmes and Ramses, from Alexander and Caesar, down to Napoleon and Hitler. The *farafar* is not content with his fate as a slave, because it is he in the last resort who has to do all the work. When the *farafar* protests, master and slave come to agreement in order to suppress the established

régime. Their first step is to change roles, the *farafar* becoming the master and the master becoming the *farafar*. But the new order does not work. Then they try to create a republic, the Great Farfarouia, where there is no master and no *farafar*. This also fails to produce any results. Finally it is realized that the master-slave relationship is an established and inexorable order, even in the physical world. The electron must forever circle around the nucleus of the atom, and can never escape. The two characters die. In the last scene (in the hereafter), the master is seen standing motionless and the *farafar* turning in circles around him while imploring the audience to free him from this infernal and ineluctable circle. As for the public, it leaves the theatre profoundly upset by the problem of the *farafar*, which is equally its own problem. According to Yusef Idris, no political system has succeeded in solving the problem of the master-slave relationship—neither the egalitarian régime, nor the dictatorship of the *farafarouia*. Even death has not solved it; it is there to be confronted in the next world. Anarchist ideology? Perhaps not. But in any case very acute metaphysical pessimism.

The most notable work of No'man Ashour is entitled *The Dog's Family*. There are no metaphysics here. It is the bourgeois family of a deceased baker who left a small fortune and big debts. The members of the family, selfish and lazy, quarrel incessantly among themselves about money and the legacy. The principal character is the old family servant, called Al-Tawwaf, seventy years old. It is he who trudged hard, barefooted all his life, to make the baker's fortune. It is he too who has more or less brought up all the members of the family, one after another, from early childhood to adolescence, shepherding them to school and telling them fairy stories. All his life Al-Tawwaf had but one dream—to wear shoes. All his life he had walked barefooted, and he is afraid that he will die without ever having worn shoes. When he heard that a revolution had taken place which would render justice to the poor, his hopes rose. He went to one member of the family after another, but they remained indifferent to his modest desire. In their selfishness and ingratitude they make fun of the old man and of his naive dream. At last one of them takes pity on him and buys him a pair of shoes. Unfortunately they are not his size and they make him suffer. So he cannot wear them and so, the poor Tawwaf, born with bare feet and having lived all his life with bare feet, also dies with bare feet in spite of the revolution. The story is somewhat similar to that of *Death of a Salesman* by Arthur Miller. Like him, he spends his life walking the streets of the town to deliver the baker's bread. Like him, he is without bitterness and believes in the goodness of masters. His final disillusionment is less tragic than that of the salesman, but very moving.

#### TORN BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

The themes of Sa'd Al-Din Wahba are all about an

Egypt torn between two worlds. In *The Tail Wagon*, a bomb is discovered in a small village symbolizing Egypt. In the absence of the real culprits, the police make several arbitrary arrests: a peasant, a worker, a student and a gypsy. The bomb disappears, and the police, terrified, put a piece of iron in its place. Meanwhile the experts and the police officer, all corrupt, give evidence to the effect that this piece of iron is a very dangerous bomb of the same kind as those which had been discovered at Alexandria and Tanta, etc. It is claimed that the connection indicates a vast conspiracy whose object is to overthrow the Farouk régime. The experts and the police officer are decorated for their diligence. The only honest man among them is the police constable who discovered the real bomb. He is tormented by the idea that all those people were arrested on account of a piece of iron, while the bomb is left hidden somewhere in the village, putting in danger the lives of all the inhabitants. He is threatened by the officers so that he should not divulge the truth. At last he can bear it no longer. He proclaims the truth, but that leads nowhere. The constable is considered to be mad, and this "comedy", if one may call it so, ends with the sending of all the culprits to Cairo in a "tail wagon", to be tried. The constable also goes on this journey but in a strait-jacket. The final scene consists of a sort of prophecy foretelling that the tail wagon will shortly be at the head of the train going in the opposite direction, from the corrupt capitol to the innocent village.

#### AT THE CROSS-ROADS

*The Namous Bridge* (i.e. *The Mosquito Bridge*) of Sa'd Al-Din Wahba is also concerned with the theme of Egypt at the cross-roads. A young fellaha (a peasant woman) chooses as her dwelling place a small cabin near a bridge which separates the great city from the countryside. She is surrounded by idlers, profiteers, men of pleasure, pickpockets, thieves, dervishes, unemployed workers, and young university students who believe they can save Egypt by assassinating ministers who betray the country. It is a strange bridge which no one really wants to cross, either towards the countryside or towards the city. The young fellaha, who repulses all her admirers of doubtful character, has a vision of a husband yet unknown and who has virtues which are also unknown in the milieu in which he lives. She is a visionary. She is in love with the student who is planning the assassination of the minister. After the commission of the crime it is discovered that it was a poor innocent man who had been murdered. The young man, tormented by remorse, gives himself up to the police. The fellaha, out of her mind, chases everybody in the neighbourhood away from the bridge, as one chases away mosquitos. She understands nothing of politics, but when they explain to her the reasons for which the traitors are assassinated, she

says to the comrades of her beloved that there is another way of escape from this hell: neither to live idly in a moribund condition, nor to assassinate individuals. The only good way was that of the revolution of the masses that would put an end to injustice and free the country. In the final scene, she has a vision of crowds surging to free her beloved.

*The Trial*, by Loufi Al-Kholy, is this author's best play. Its subject is a dispute between a young revolutionary and a reformist who firmly believes that social and civil justice can be realized within the framework of the law. When the reformist is disillusioned, he loses his mental balance and abandons himself to an incoherent dream of a paradisaical future which unfortunately is still very far away and almost chimerical.

*Panayoti's Fief and The Prescription*, by Mahmud Al-Sa'dani, both deal with the struggle of the *Feda'i'in* (Egyptian commandos) against the British at Tel-El-Kebir just before the revolution. Sa'dani paints a very disenchanted picture of the national struggle, during which not only the Pasha, but also the Bey, the Effendi, and the common people hypocritically and cynically confuse their patriotism with personal interest.

#### NEITHER COMEDIES NOR TRAGI-COMEDIES

These then are a few examples of contemporary Egyptian drama. Rich, diverse, spontaneous, and almost always having a social content, the Egyptian theatre has taken a characteristic turning of its own. It is very rare to come across a tragedy pure and simple. It would seem that its dramatists are afraid of the responsibilities of tragic art. Most of our plays are neither comedies nor tragi-comedies. They are tragedies full of humour, or else comedies which end tragically. It is obvious that there is there a tragic and often bitter vision which the Egyptian dramatic author cannot or does not wish to express in the classical manner.

The Egyptian theatre is technically far from being mature, and the Egyptian dramatists have much to learn yet. However, there is no doubt that they have achieved a tangible result thanks to the agitated climate of the revolution, and thanks also to the encouragement of the Ministry of Culture, which has maintained a remarkable impartiality towards the different literary schools. This impartiality has made it possible for our dramatists to solve once and for all the problem of the language of the Egyptian theatre. They instinctively came to understand that classical Arabic with its obsolete vocabulary, its complicated conjugations, and its archaic syntax, and also because of its general character which is too noble and far-removed from daily life, paralysed the theatre. They have not hesitated to use the spoken language, which gave them the spontaneous expression necessary to dramatic art. In making this choice, they reflected the birth of a theatre at once original and reflecting the social and individual life of the Egyptian citizen.

# This Is Our Nationalism\*

by Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz

(Continuation of the lecture delivered in Baghdad on 30th May, 1955,  
the first half of which was published in our last issue.)

## FOREIGN POLICY

In the foreign field our nationalism requires that our policy should be based on the following facts: that we are one nation; that we have one ultimate interest; that our aim is complete independence and union between the different parts of the Arab homeland, and that we should deal with other nations on a sincere basis of mutual respect and with a view to the furtherance of national interests.

This makes it incumbent upon us that we take a firm and vigilant stand towards all the international currents that are tossing the world today, and requires of us that we should not declare ourselves the enemies of this side or that, nor throw ourselves into the embrace of this or that party or that without having a clear reason for and a sure interest in doing that.

It is astonishing that some of the statesmen of the Arab countries are ignorant of the most elementary truths and lessons of history—lessons and truths which history taught in the past and continues to teach every day: that states, and particularly great powers, have no permanent enemies or friends, but only permanent interests. Therefore our national policy—if we have one—should be based on this fact. We have to know what we want, to make what we want clear, and to demand and make known the minimum of what we want, below which we will not concede an inch. And after that we must declare without fear or embarrassment that we stand with this side or this state because our national interest demands it. But before that we have to make a correct appraisal of our material strength, our natural resources and the interests of the other states in our country, in order to be able to define our national requirements.

Also we must realize that while generosity, forbearance and leniency are virtues in the individual raising him among his fellows, they are among nations an indication of ignorance, foolishness and stupidity. There are no magnanimities in the international field, because as an English scholar says, "States are not charitable institutions." States—all states—seek to achieve their aims by every possible means, though they

\* It was incorrectly stated at the end of the article "Islam and Arab Nationalism," published in our issue for June that that article concluded the series of articles on Arab nationalism by Mr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Bazzaz which we have been publishing since September, 1963. It is the present article which concludes the series, and we propose to publish the whole series in a special brochure which will be obtainable from this and other Iraqi embassies as well as from the Ministry of Guidance in Baghdad.—EDITH.

may appear sometimes to be following contradictory policies. They do not concede anything to other states except in return for a reciprocal benefit—in other words a *quid pro quo*. It would therefore be foolish of us and a sign of political immaturity to maintain that because such and such a state was our enemy yesterday or committed such and such dishonourable act we cannot accept its friendship now. The correct way of looking at the question would be to find out what benefit that could gain from such a friendship. If we make sure that such a reciprocal and comparable benefit can be gained, there is no harm in the enemies of yesterday becoming the friends of today. Also the friends of today may become the enemies of tomorrow. I do not think I need adduce historical examples to support the correctness of this view. Such examples are being repeated every day, and in the international relations of the present time there is conclusive proof that the greatest sagacity is for us not to forget, when we are making friends with a nation, that she may become our enemy; or when there is enmity between us and a nation, that she may become our friend. The impulsive pursuit of love and hate is a manifestation of immaturity.

This view may appear opportunistic and unrelated to moral principles and ideals. But we have to remember that international relations—in all ages and among all nations—have never had any foundation except realities and interests. It were vain to ask of any state that it should be idealistic to the point of sacrificing its basic interests.

But this policy does not in any way mean that the Arab countries should become an instrument of evil or a source of aggression. Arab nationalism is proud of its ideals and has faith in moral values which it seeks to uphold, but while believing in truth and justice and ideals and the loftiest aspirations of humanity, it is not prepared to remain a gentle lamb in a world in which there are many wolves and tigers and lions.

## THE ARABS AND ISRAEL

Naturally these principles are only applicable in the relations with states which stand on a national foundation. As for artificial states which have been forcibly created and whose mere existence is a hostile fact, it is out of the question that the possibility of their friendship be admitted. Israel is not of the Middle East although she exists on a usurped piece of its land; and in relation to the Arabs she is not one of the states with whom friendship may be considered possible. For it is not possible

that she should live and thrive save on two bases, one internal and the other external. The internal basis is that she can only survive by maintaining a combative aggressive spirit seeking domination and expansion. Her leaders have affirmed that Israel in her present geographical, strategic and economic position must either expand or perish, and she cannot expand regionally or politically or economically except to the detriment of the Arab countries. In the field of foreign relations, the survival of Israel depends—as many of the Israelis themselves and the Powers that support Israel realize—on the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Arab countries. Any unity or union or serious rapprochement between two or more Arab countries runs counter to the interest of Israel and therefore would be opposed by her with her numerous internal and external means and with a full mobilization of all her apparent and concealed powers. It is therefore out of the question to consider her, or to consider the possibility of her becoming a friendly, peaceful state. Anyone who holds the contrary view must be either an uninformed person who is ignorant of Israel's philosophy, thoughts and basic points in her policy, or a conspiring traitor who does not care about what the Arab nation has suffered and may suffer from this certain mortal peril.

It may be interesting here that I should quote the words of the last chapter entitled "What Next?" in the book *Progress or the Pathos: The Middle East after the Parting of the Ways*, by Richard Thompson, who visited Iraq and the other Arab countries recently with the British Members of Parliament, invited by the Lebanese Deputy, Mr. Emile Bustani, to visit these lands. After reviewing the various dangers that cause the Middle East to be in a state of permanent anxiety, he says: "I was interested in the educated Arabs' classification of the dangers that surround the Arab world: (1) Israel, (2) social and electoral vices, (3) Western imperialism, (4) Communism."

The placing of Communism at the bottom of the list is easy to understand from the Arab point of view, because democracy is primarily a Western idea. More important still, what do the Arabs stand to lose at the hands of Communism? If we except the wealthy feudalist of the Arab world, the masses live in dire poverty; the poor Arab has only one shirt a year, often he does not possess a shoe and his standard of living is miserably low. One is therefore bound to ask, what would Communism take away from him? ... Nor does he know freedom as understood by the democratic West."

Arabs may differ today as to the order of the last three dangers mentioned by the British writer, advancing some of them and putting others back. But they are unanimous in considering Israel as the first danger, and Arab nationalism today is emphatic that Israel is a mortal peril, not only because it usurped a vital part of the Arab homeland (the Holy Land), but also because

it is a real menace threatening other parts of the Arab homeland and dividing its two wings in the East and the West, one from the other; and because, in addition, it is a centre from which dangerous principles are disseminated that conflict with the basic formative elements of the Arab nation and threaten its economic existence. Every policy therefore which aims at minimizing the gravity of this danger, or at accepting the *fait accompli* is doomed to failure. Despite the symptoms of weakness and resignation which may manifest themselves here or there in the Arab countries, the Arab nation will in no circumstances accept such a policy.

## THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

In the economic sphere our nationalism takes a comprehensive view of the Arab countries as an indivisible whole. It considers the natural resources in their land—raw materials, minerals, oil—as the property of the whole nation. It therefore disapproves of the squandering of such wealth in order to please the wishes of small groups; or the freezing of its benefits in foreign banks, so that in fact it is reduced to something that is almost non-existent; or the conversion of it into fixed unproductive capital, when there is ample scope for using it in building productive industries and launching useful economic projects that would raise the standard of living of the Arab individual and improve his economic and social condition, thereby helping to make secure the Arab homeland against the many dangers that threaten on all sides. Taking a realistic view, Arab nationalism does not allow itself to be bound by the doctrine of the "Free Economy", because such a system would necessarily lead to social instability, and cannot possibly offer equal opportunities to all. Likewise it does not believe in the Communist system which completely destroys individual initiative and transforms all productive wealth into state property. This leads to the destruction of public liberties and gives the state control over all social forces. Arab nationalism therefore takes a middle course, adopting what may be called a "prudent socialism"; it advocates, on the one hand, economic planning and radical intervention by the state to raise the level of production; and, on the other, the realization of social justice by the distribution of wealth on a sound basis that would ensure equality of opportunity for all citizens, put an end to exploitation and prevent the excessive accumulation of wealth in private hands.

Towards that end our nationalism demands that the state should undertake to execute public projects, provide all public utility services and administer all enterprises that have the character of monopolies. Likewise it advocates the nationalization of major industries when the necessary means for that have been realized; and it considers necessary—in order to realize social co-ordination and put an end to class discrimination—that there should be a fixed minimum for indivi-



dual income and a fixed maximum for agricultural and real estate ownership. It also calls for the complete abolition of the feudal order in all its parts; and it believes that profits and rewards should be on a just basis. Hence it advocates a system of direct, progressive taxation applicable to all kinds of income, including agricultural income which in many of the Arab countries is not, to this day, subject to any tax in the strict sense.

### THE CULTURAL SPHERE

The cultural sphere is one of the most important spheres with which the nationalist idea is concerned. For teaching and education are among the most important and effective means for disseminating and guiding the nation in a given direction. The States of the world today differ as to the extent to which they use education to realize their aims and spread their principles. Thus while the totalitarian states consider that education is a duty of the state and that no-one but the state must engage in it from fear that the result may not be in accordance with the aims of the state, the democratic governments consider that it is possible to give scope to individuals and bodies of individuals to participate in this grave mission. Nevertheless, the modern trend in this supervision over the course of education in order to ensure that the young shall—in addition to the necessary amount of knowledge—be given enough guidance to make them good citizens, equipped with what may be necessary of basic national culture to ensure social cohesion between the individuals of a nation and to enable the state to fulfill its mission.

### THE NATIONAL SPIRIT

Our nationalism considers that the most important and esteemed task of education is to disseminate the national spirit among the young, by giving attention to Arab history and the achievements of its heroes, and by bringing out fully the extent of the Arab contribution to civilization in the arts and sciences in all the ages. Thus it is not enough for a teacher of chemistry to teach his pupils among the young only the principles of this science and conduct with them the necessary experiments. He must, in addition to that, tell them about the contribution of the Arabs to this science and show them what level they attained in it. The same applies to teachers of physics, mathematics, astronomy or any of the other sciences or arts in which the Arabs had a share. It is important in cultural guidance to arouse in the young a spirit of self-reliance and independence, and not to show the Arabs as a burden on others but to stress what they originated and invested and created and added to human civilization in the different centuries. It is very important that education should follow a special course in cultivating national virtues and elevated

qualities in future generations. Literature and especially poetry would be among the best means to this end. What students learn and recite and dream, whether in fiction or non-fiction must undoubtedly have great influence in orientating them, especially in the early stages of their formation. It is therefore imperative that what is offered to the young by way of spiritual food should be wholesome and free from any fault which could be reflected in the morals of young people even after some time.

It is indeed deplorable that the curriculum of secondary education in Iraq should have reached such a degree of anarchy as must arouse serious concern about the future of this nation. I interviewed at the beginning of the past academic year tens of men and women students for admission to one of our colleges. I asked some of them what poems or pieces of literature they could quote. I was appalled at their ignorance of the Koran and the Tradition, and was even more appalled that the tens of the young men and women who had learned anything of Arabic poetry could only remember the poem of Abu Nawwas in praise of wine, which begins:

Desist from blaming me—to blame is to entice—  
And give me for medicine a cup of my vice.

This kind of literature—even if we grant its artistic merit—does not encourage manliness or inspire moral ideals or build a nation. In this present phase of our national life we cannot afford to waste time on such intellectual and artistic luxuries, since that would certainly be at the expense of the necessities. And it is a sin to dissipate vainly the energies of our young men and women and make them the victims of misguidance.

### WE AND THE WORLD

Arab nationalism, while not isolationist—and it cannot be isolationist in this world which has become so small, and the interests of whose nations and peoples have become increasingly entangled with each other and closely inter-connected as a result of modern inventions which from day to day add strength and cohesion to this progress—does not wish that its culture should be completely mixed with Western culture, but prefers that it should retain its distinctive and original character. It looks at the West with a vigilant eye, benefiting by what it has to offer and co-operating with it for the common good, but refusing to fuse into it or to take on its personality.

Indeed, a great deal of what appears today to be conflicting and incompatible is in fact of Western origin. Thus Communism, whose professors are called the "Eastern States", and Capitalism whose advocates are called the "Westerners", are both in fact a part of the Western legacy and a product of Western thinking. This truth has been accurately expressed by Dr. Fayez

Sayegh in his valuable book, *The Mission of the Arab Thinker*, where he says:

Communism is in its origin a reaction of the Western soul, in the name of Western values originating in the West, to some of the excesses, failures and aberrations of the Western soul as manifested in nationalism, capitalism and the bourgeois spirit. It is therefore wrong and misleading that the name "West" should be used to describe the group of states which call themselves, and are called by the world, the "Western" States, to the exclusion of that group which is known by the name of the "Eastern" States. For both these groups are Western in the traditional and spiritual meaning of the term "the West".

### CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR NATIONALISM

In short, our nationalist idea may be summarized in the following points: It is nationalist in the full cultural sense, but it is not racialist; it is socialist, advocating the intervention of this state to increase production and to realize justice in distribution, but it is not Communist; it is "consultative", believing in the sovereignty of the nation and holding its interest above everything else, and seeing in true and sound democracy the sure way to freedom and to the dignity of the Arab citizen, and the means of ensuring the general welfare of the Arab nation. It therefore detests despotism—whether it be that of a class or of an individual, and believes that the constructive reforms and material progress which dictatorship may realize can only be obtained at an appalling price which the nation has to pay in dignity, freedom and mental well-being. Our nationalism considers that every despotic system of government runs counter to the basic nature of the Arab nation and contradicts the ultimate truths which have been precipitated to this nation from its glorious history, in which throughout the ages will be repeated those immortal words of Omar addressing Amr Ibn Al-'As: "How can you enslave the people when their mothers gave them birth as free men?"

However, our nationalism recognizes that "democracy" and "freedom" are not two magic words that can be translated into reality by simply being proclaimed or repeated. It recognizes that democracy and freedom are first of all the product of upbringing, education, national preparation and social evolution. For this reason our educational policy must be directed to that end, and it is a great danger to the life of the Arab nation that a section of its sons should hold on to power and prevent the nation in its entirety from exercising its natural rights in ruling itself. No person with any understanding can be convinced by the pretensions put forward by this section or the reasons or arguments it invents to justify the unhealthy conditions obtaining in

some parts of the Arab homeland. The nation needs to exercise its rights even if this may lead it sometimes into error. The fear of making mistakes must not stand between the nation and its exercise of its natural right. It has been said of old that he who is afraid of mistakes will never do anything, and it is far better for the nation to err in the exercise of its democratic rights until it reaches, though after a time, the right path, than that one individual or a group of individuals should monopolize power and push it into wild and dangerous paths on the pretence that they are an elite alone capable of knowing what is good for it.

It is strange indeed that after the success of democracy in India, which is a semi-continent and has numerous races, religions, classes and cultures, anyone should contend that it will fail if applied sincerely in the Arab homeland, when the Arabs are one nation, speaking one language and sharing the same, or very similar, basic ideas, in addition to their being free by nature.

The testimony of the British Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, still rings in my ears. I heard it from his mouth when he was speaking from the Security Council in 1952 and I was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations. He praised India and congratulated her on the success of her democratic experiment. This testimony coming from the then British Colonial Secretary has its great value. We must believe that democracy is possible despite ignorance and the disparity of standards.

But the democracy which we advocate is not just a form. It is in the first place an idea and a philosophy of life. It is a belief in the nation as a whole, a recognition of its will, of its right and of its ability to choose the right path. This naturally does not mean a rigid attachment to certain forms and modalities. For democracy may be totally absent in spite of the presence of its forms, or it may exist in the absence of these forms and modalities. Furthermore, the interest of the Arab nation in one or more countries, and in a particular stage, may require the special conditions of a transitional phase. What is important is that there should be a profound faith in the consultative system and an emphatic affirmation of the nation's right to determine its future and choose its rulers. For in this is the only sure guarantee against despotism and arbitrary rule with their consequent oppression, violation of dignity and squandering of wealth.

In addition, our nationalism is progressive and receptive to new ideas, willing to adopt any effective means that may serve to enhance the condition of the Arabs, and raise their social, cultural and economic standards. Nevertheless, it does not forget, and does not wish to forget, its past with all the splendid civilizations created by its forefathers and which justly fill the mind today with pride. But in its remembrance of the past and exaltation of the glories of its forefathers, it does not wish to distract the people from its present unhappy condition. Rather it seeks to make of the past a spur for

the future, following in this the words of its great poet, Al-Rassaf:

Most admirable of men is he  
Whose present credit matches ancient ancestry;  
For his own noble deeds bear witness then  
To prove his claim to honour from his fellow men.

All that Arab nationalism seeks to achieve through its pride in the past is to disseminate the feeling of national dignity and to revive despairing souls overwhelmed by the pains of the present and exploited by the advocates of anarchy who turned them into destructive elements hopeless of any reform.

Our nationalism believes that in the past of the Arab nation, in the great wealth possessed by the Arab countries and in the immense potentialities of its future there is justification for sober optimism and hopes of a happy future.

But before this and despite its belief in the importance of material considerations and in the necessity of looking after all the needs of the individual, our nationalism believes in spiritual values and holds that the soul of man needs ideas and beliefs. Our history and our law are rich in material that offers the most elevating examples.

Also, Arab nationalism is responsive and peaceable; it respects other nationalisms and is not hostile except to those who are hostile to it; it seeks cooperation with the

peoples of the world on a basis of mutual respect and true understanding of reciprocal benefits, within the framework of just principles that will ensure for the Arab nation and for the whole world freedom, independence and prosperity.

Next, Arab nationalism is a comprehensive call, embracing all Arabs, in the eastern part of the Arab world as well as in the western. It repudiates narrow regionalism and religious or ideological sectarianism, and considers that the Arabs are one nation whose sacred right is to live free and independent in all its lands, whose aspiring nationalism spurs it to liberate and unite the Arab homeland, and to establish a political, economic and social system better and nearer to the ideal than its present systems.

Lastly, Arab nationalism is an immortal message deriving from the nature of the Arab nation, inspired by its history and necessary for the realization of its material and spiritual interests in the present and the future. It is the message of the nationalists which they exchange in every gathering. They believe that it is the way of salvation and the only means that will enable them to attain all that they aspire to of dignity and stability, of justice and peace.

(Concluded.)

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## General News

A group of thirteen University of Baghdad Deans of Colleges and other senior administrators of the university attended the University Administration Programme (29th June-18th August, 1964) organized by the University of California Centre for the Study of Higher Education under the auspices of the Agency for International Development.

The seminar was concerned with university planning, organization, and administration, major problems in administrative theory, structure, and operation, and specific administrative problems such as accounting, registration, and library work.

The Iraqi Maritime Transport Company has now completed its consultations with the authorities concerned about the designing of the four vessels which the company is planning to buy. The Council of

Ministers has already approved the company's proposal concerning the acquisition of these four ships and allocated £6,100,000 (\$17,080,000) for the purpose.

As a result of the consultations carried out by the company, final designs have now been worked out for the ships. The ships will have cold storage rooms and freezers for transporting all kinds of commodities. Such facilities will also help the transportation of Iraqi dates shipments, assuring such shipments of delivery in good condition. Each ship will also have special tanks for the transportation of fuels and chemical materials.

Each ship will have a gross tonnage of 10,000 and will cost about £1,200,000 (\$3,360,000). The ships will also be equipped with the latest types of radar and automatic fire-fighting equipment.

The Maritime Transport Company will this week invite world consultant firms to make offers for drawing up the final specifications of these ships and for supervising their building. This operation will take about two months after which offers made by various consultant engineers will be studied. Later, a tender will be announced inviting ship-building firms to make offers. The first ship should be delivered eighteen months from the signing of the contract. The three other ships will be delivered at three months intervals.

The Maritime Transport Company is planning to start a new shipping service immediately after the new vessels are received. The present vessels run by the company will be used on far eastern routes, while the new ships will operate between the Arab Gulf and North European and British ports.

